非煤矿山安全监管的博弈分析
发布时间：2018-10-21 08:57
【摘要】：我国非煤矿山事故量虽然稳中有降,但重大事故时有发生,安全生产形势依然严峻。安全生产监管的低能效是重要原因之一。造成这种状况的主要原因在于非煤矿山安全生产监管体制涉及的相关方之间的利益目标不一致,导致利益冲突。各相关方为了各自的利益相互博弈,这不免会对安全生产监管产生消极的影响。基于此背景,本文以博弈论和演化博弈论作为分析工具针对非煤矿山安全监管问题进行研究讨论,旨在揭示非煤矿山安全监管低效率的原因,为提高非煤矿山安全监管能效提供有效的对策。 本文首先分析我国非煤矿山安全监管现状,提出目前我国安全监管体制存在的问题。论证安全监管的理论依据：外部性,信息不对称,社会责任缺失等。其次根据我国现行的非煤矿山安全监管体制的实际情况构建了政府-非煤矿山企业的博弈和演化博弈模型,并分别讨论了一般和存在寻租的情况。通过求解纳什均衡,复制动态方程和演化博弈均衡对结果进行了讨论和分析。然后对矿山企业内部的安全激励措施构建了博弈模型,对矿山职工之间的安全行为进行了博弈仿真。最后提出了提高我国非煤矿山安全监管体制的若干对策和建议。 本文提供了解决目前非煤矿山安全监管问题的一种思路,探寻适用于我国非煤矿山安全监管体系的机制。 本文的主要创新在于：运用博弈论和演化博弈论讨论了存在寻租条件下的政府和矿山企业安全监管博弈；运用博弈论,结合委托代理理论对矿山企业内部安全激励进行分析；运用多主体仿真软件对矿山职工的安全生产行为的演化进行仿真。
[Abstract]:Although the number of accidents in non-coal mines in China is decreasing steadily, major accidents occur from time to time, and the situation of safety in production is still grim. Low energy efficiency in production safety regulation is one of the important reasons. The main reason for this situation lies in the conflict of interest between the related parties involved in the supervision system of non-coal mine safety production. The parties play games for their own interests, which will inevitably have a negative impact on the supervision of production safety. Based on this background, this paper uses game theory and evolutionary game theory as analysis tools to study and discuss the safety supervision of non-coal mines, in order to reveal the reasons for the low efficiency of safety supervision in non-coal mines. It provides effective countermeasures for improving safety supervision and energy efficiency of non-coal mines. This paper first analyzes the present situation of safety supervision in non-coal mines in China, and puts forward the problems existing in the safety supervision system of our country at present. Demonstrate the theoretical basis of safety supervision: externality, information asymmetry, lack of social responsibility and so on. Secondly, according to the actual situation of the current safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China, the game and evolution game models of government-non-coal mining enterprises are constructed, and the general and existing rent-seeking situations are discussed respectively. The results are discussed and analyzed by solving Nash equilibrium, replicating dynamic equation and evolutionary game equilibrium. Then the game model is constructed for the safety incentive measures in the mine enterprises, and the game simulation of the safety behavior among the mine workers is carried out. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions for improving the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China are put forward. This paper provides a way to solve the problem of safety supervision in non-coal mines at present and explores the mechanism suitable for the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: the game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to discuss the safety supervision game between government and mine enterprise under the condition of rent-seeking, and the internal safety incentive of mine enterprise is analyzed by using game theory and principal-agent theory. The multi-agent simulation software is used to simulate the evolution of safety production behavior of mine workers.
【学位授予单位】：昆明理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：TD77
本文编号：2284619
[Abstract]:Although the number of accidents in non-coal mines in China is decreasing steadily, major accidents occur from time to time, and the situation of safety in production is still grim. Low energy efficiency in production safety regulation is one of the important reasons. The main reason for this situation lies in the conflict of interest between the related parties involved in the supervision system of non-coal mine safety production. The parties play games for their own interests, which will inevitably have a negative impact on the supervision of production safety. Based on this background, this paper uses game theory and evolutionary game theory as analysis tools to study and discuss the safety supervision of non-coal mines, in order to reveal the reasons for the low efficiency of safety supervision in non-coal mines. It provides effective countermeasures for improving safety supervision and energy efficiency of non-coal mines. This paper first analyzes the present situation of safety supervision in non-coal mines in China, and puts forward the problems existing in the safety supervision system of our country at present. Demonstrate the theoretical basis of safety supervision: externality, information asymmetry, lack of social responsibility and so on. Secondly, according to the actual situation of the current safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China, the game and evolution game models of government-non-coal mining enterprises are constructed, and the general and existing rent-seeking situations are discussed respectively. The results are discussed and analyzed by solving Nash equilibrium, replicating dynamic equation and evolutionary game equilibrium. Then the game model is constructed for the safety incentive measures in the mine enterprises, and the game simulation of the safety behavior among the mine workers is carried out. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions for improving the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China are put forward. This paper provides a way to solve the problem of safety supervision in non-coal mines at present and explores the mechanism suitable for the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: the game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to discuss the safety supervision game between government and mine enterprise under the condition of rent-seeking, and the internal safety incentive of mine enterprise is analyzed by using game theory and principal-agent theory. The multi-agent simulation software is used to simulate the evolution of safety production behavior of mine workers.
【学位授予单位】：昆明理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：TD77
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 范银华;安全生产管理体制与政府、企业、从业人员三方博弈[J];中国职业安全卫生管理体系认证;2003年05期
，本文编号：2284619
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