我国生产安全事故瞒报成因分析

发布时间：2018-11-24 12:30

【摘要】：安全生产监督管理是政府工作的重要组成部分。安全生产工作成效的好坏,直接关系着人民群众生命财产安全和来之不易的改革开放成果,关系到党和政府在人民群众心目中乃至在国际社会中的良好形象,关系到党执政地位的稳定。目前,随着我国经济建设的快速发展,党和国家越来越重视安全生产工作,我国安全生产的五大体系已经基本建立。尽管国家对安全生产工作空前的重视,但是,生产安全事故仍然不断发生,重特大事故也时有发生,同时事故瞒报也层出不穷。为了降低安全生产事故的发生率,杜绝事故谎报、瞒报,国家三令五申出台政策,陆续采取了一系列措施,然而收效甚微。安全生产事故瞒报背后存在的各种官商勾结的利益链条使其成为公众舆论关注的焦点。瞒报事故背后隐藏的主要是利益问题。各参与方作为理性的经济人,参与活动的最终目的是追求自身利益最大化,只是各方利益目标不尽一致。故本文运用博弈论研究生产安全事故发生后国家安全生产监管部门与基层监管者及事故发生企业之间的博弈是具有实际意义的。本文重点就各方之间对“瞒报”可能出现的不同博弈过程进行了分析和研究。并且根据不同的假设条件、不同的信息结构、不同的行动顺序,构建了各方在生产安全事故瞒报中的博弈关系。本文从国家安全生产监管者的角度研究了防止事故发生企业隐瞒不报安全生产事故的对策,并对如何瓦解地方利益群体的合谋瞒报、促使人民群众和各类媒体对瞒报事故的举报、对事故发生企业如实上报的策略进行奖励等提出了一些具体的措施。
[Abstract]:Production safety supervision and management is an important part of government work. The effectiveness of the work of safety in production is directly related to the safety of the people's lives and property, the hard-won achievements of reform and opening up, and the good image of the Party and the government in the eyes of the people and even in the international community. Related to the stability of the ruling position of the party. At present, with the rapid development of economic construction in our country, the Party and the country pay more and more attention to the work of safety in production, and the five systems of safe production in our country have been basically established. Although the state attaches great importance to the work of safety in production, the accidents of production safety still occur continuously, serious and serious accidents occur from time to time, and the accidents of hidden reporting are also emerging in endlessly. In order to reduce the incidence of accidents in production, prevent false reports of accidents, the state repeatedly issued policies, one after another has taken a series of measures, but little effect. The profit chain of all kinds of collusion between government and business behind the underreporting of safety accidents makes it the focus of public opinion. The main hidden problem behind the cover-up of the accident is the problem of interests. As rational economic person, the ultimate purpose of participating in the activities is to maximize their own interests, but the interests of the parties are not the same. Therefore, it is of practical significance to use game theory to study the game between the national production safety supervision department, the grass-roots supervisor and the accident occurrence enterprise after the production safety accident. This paper focuses on the analysis and study of the different game processes that may occur between the parties. According to different hypothetical conditions, different information structure and different sequence of action, the game relation between the parties in production safety accidents is constructed. From the point of view of the national safety production supervisor, this paper studies the countermeasures to prevent accidents from happening, and how to break up the collusion of local interest groups. Some concrete measures are put forward to encourage the people and all kinds of media to report the accidents and reward the enterprises to report the accidents truthfully.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：X922.2

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