基于政策工具的长江危险货物运输安全监管对策研究
发布时间：2019-06-18 23:31
【摘要】：近年来,长江航运事业不断发展壮大,危险货物水上运输日益频繁,并且危险货物种类日趋复杂,再加上运输行业的不规范,使得水上危险货物运输风险凸显。水上危险货物运输安全事故时有发生,造成的不仅是人身、财产的损失,更会威胁到广大沿江人民群众的利益,导致社会性的问题。因此对于长江危险货物运输安全监督者,如何利用政策工具提升管理效能,更好地服务于长江航运事业的绿色、健康、平安成为了当前改革发展的热点。为了适应新时期的改革发展要求,本文在研究长江危险货物运输政策工具的基础上,运用成熟度模型对当前监管成熟度水平进行了评判,结果显示处于规范级别,表明目前的安全监管拥有较高的监管水平;同时基于生产理论微观经济学对厂商的基本假定,运用“博弈”理论构建了监管双方的演化博弈模型,并通过模拟仿真,对演化策略进行了动态推演,结果展现出了成熟的策略不断被模仿,双方的博弈不断演化成熟,在一定条件下能够达到一定的稳态。最后基于上述研究,提出了危险货物运输安全监管策略。具体如下:(1)通过对海事安全监管、船舶运输安全等方面的研究进行比对和分析,指出危险货物运输这一特殊情形在当前研究中的趋势。(2)对当前的长江危险货物运输基本参数进行了统计分析,从人-船-环境-管理四维对货物运输的事故致因进行分析,阐释了当前长江危险货物运输安全监管政策工具。(3)运用网络理论构建了危险货物航运复杂网络模型,分析了危险货物运输网络的拓扑特性,结果显示了危险货物运输网络的小世界特性;在此基础上研究了与危险货物运输网络对应的监管网络成熟度,运用成熟度管理理论构建了长江危险货物运输安全监管成熟度模型。并运用SPSS数理统计软件对进行了实例验算。(4)基于生产理论微观经济学对厂商的基本假定,运用博弈理论构建了监管双方的演化博弈模型,并运用Matlab编程对模型进行了仿真,验证了监管双方的博弈演化关系。(5)基于以上几方面的研究,从政策目标的实现角度提出了长江危险货物运输安全监管的体制机制创新策略,丰富了长江危险货物运输安全监管研究视角,为新形势下的长江危险货物运输安全监管模式的转变提供了重要参考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the shipping industry of the Yangtze River has been developing and growing, the water transport of dangerous goods is becoming more and more frequent, and the types of dangerous goods are becoming more and more complex. Coupled with the non-standard transportation industry, the risk of the transport of dangerous goods on water is prominent. Safety accidents in the transport of dangerous goods on water occur from time to time, which not only cause the loss of personal and property, but also threaten the interests of the broad masses of the people along the river and lead to social problems. Therefore, for the safety supervisors of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River, how to use policy tools to improve the management efficiency and better serve the green, healthy and safe shipping cause of the Yangtze River has become the hot spot of reform and development at present. In order to meet the requirements of the reform and development in the new period, based on the study of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transport policy tools, this paper uses the maturity model to evaluate the current regulatory maturity level. The results show that the current safety supervision has a high level of supervision. At the same time, based on the basic assumption of production theory microeconomics on manufacturers, the evolutionary game model of regulatory parties is constructed by using game theory, and the evolution strategy is dynamically deduced through simulation. The results show that the mature strategy is constantly imitated, the game between the two sides is constantly evolved and mature, and a certain steady state can be achieved under certain conditions. Finally, based on the above research, the safety supervision strategy of dangerous goods transportation is put forward. The details are as follows: (1) through the comparison and analysis of the research on maritime safety supervision and ship transport safety, this paper points out the trend of the special situation of dangerous goods transportation in the current research. (2) the basic parameters of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River are statistically analyzed, and the causes of accidents in cargo transportation are analyzed from the four dimensions of man-ship-environment-management. This paper explains the current regulatory policy tools for the safety of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River. (3) the complex network model of dangerous goods shipping is constructed by using the network theory, and the topological characteristics of the dangerous goods transportation network are analyzed, and the results show the small world characteristics of the dangerous goods transportation network. On this basis, the maturity of the regulatory network corresponding to the dangerous goods transportation network is studied, and the maturity model of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision is constructed by using the maturity management theory. The example is checked by SPSS mathematical statistics software. (4) based on the basic assumption of production theory microeconomics to manufacturers, the evolutionary game model of regulatory parties is constructed by using game theory, and the model is simulated by Matlab programming to verify the game evolution relationship between supervisors and supervisors. (5) based on the above research, This paper puts forward the system and mechanism innovation strategy of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision from the angle of realizing the policy goal, enriches the research angle of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision, and provides an important reference for the transformation of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision mode under the new situation.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：U698.3
[Abstract]:In recent years, the shipping industry of the Yangtze River has been developing and growing, the water transport of dangerous goods is becoming more and more frequent, and the types of dangerous goods are becoming more and more complex. Coupled with the non-standard transportation industry, the risk of the transport of dangerous goods on water is prominent. Safety accidents in the transport of dangerous goods on water occur from time to time, which not only cause the loss of personal and property, but also threaten the interests of the broad masses of the people along the river and lead to social problems. Therefore, for the safety supervisors of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River, how to use policy tools to improve the management efficiency and better serve the green, healthy and safe shipping cause of the Yangtze River has become the hot spot of reform and development at present. In order to meet the requirements of the reform and development in the new period, based on the study of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transport policy tools, this paper uses the maturity model to evaluate the current regulatory maturity level. The results show that the current safety supervision has a high level of supervision. At the same time, based on the basic assumption of production theory microeconomics on manufacturers, the evolutionary game model of regulatory parties is constructed by using game theory, and the evolution strategy is dynamically deduced through simulation. The results show that the mature strategy is constantly imitated, the game between the two sides is constantly evolved and mature, and a certain steady state can be achieved under certain conditions. Finally, based on the above research, the safety supervision strategy of dangerous goods transportation is put forward. The details are as follows: (1) through the comparison and analysis of the research on maritime safety supervision and ship transport safety, this paper points out the trend of the special situation of dangerous goods transportation in the current research. (2) the basic parameters of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River are statistically analyzed, and the causes of accidents in cargo transportation are analyzed from the four dimensions of man-ship-environment-management. This paper explains the current regulatory policy tools for the safety of dangerous goods transportation in the Yangtze River. (3) the complex network model of dangerous goods shipping is constructed by using the network theory, and the topological characteristics of the dangerous goods transportation network are analyzed, and the results show the small world characteristics of the dangerous goods transportation network. On this basis, the maturity of the regulatory network corresponding to the dangerous goods transportation network is studied, and the maturity model of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision is constructed by using the maturity management theory. The example is checked by SPSS mathematical statistics software. (4) based on the basic assumption of production theory microeconomics to manufacturers, the evolutionary game model of regulatory parties is constructed by using game theory, and the model is simulated by Matlab programming to verify the game evolution relationship between supervisors and supervisors. (5) based on the above research, This paper puts forward the system and mechanism innovation strategy of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision from the angle of realizing the policy goal, enriches the research angle of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision, and provides an important reference for the transformation of the Yangtze River dangerous goods transportation safety supervision mode under the new situation.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：U698.3
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