差价合约市场力抑制效应的Bertrand博弈模型分析

发布时间：2018-01-08 23:01

本文关键词：差价合约市场力抑制效应的Bertrand博弈模型分析　出处：《中国管理科学》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文通过拓展经典的Bertrand对称双寡头博弈模型,运用勒拿指数测度电力市场绝对电量差价合约对发电商市场力的抑制效应。在发电商二次幂函数成本函数假定下,得到了双寡头对称发电商Bertrand博弈纳什均衡的解析表达式,并且发现发电商绝对量差价合约电量的增加会导致发电商均衡状态勒拿指数的可能取值范围会下降,因而具有抑制其市场力的效应。本文获得的拓展Bertrand博弈模型还将经典Bertrand博弈模型加以推广,得到二次幂函数成本函数条件下存在正均衡利润Bertrand的充分必要条件,为研究差价合约的其他相关问题提供了工具。
[Abstract]:This paper extends the classical Bertrand symmetric duopoly game model. In this paper, we use Lena index to measure the inhibitory effect of the absolute power difference contract on the power generation market, under the assumption of the cost function of the second power function of the generator. The analytical expression of Nash equilibrium of duopoly symmetric generator Bertrand game is obtained. It is also found that the increase of the electricity quantity of the absolute difference contract will lead to the decrease of the range of the Lena index of the generator's equilibrium state. Therefore, it has the effect of restraining its market power. The extended Bertrand game model obtained in this paper also extends the classical Bertrand game model. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of positive equilibrium profit Bertrand under the condition of cost function of quadratic power function is obtained, which provides a tool for the study of other related problems in the contract for difference.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：重庆市“两江学者”计划专项经费资助项目重庆大学人文社科重点基地创新研究项目(106112015CDJSK02JD04)
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.61
【正文快照】： 1引言传统上电力因被视为自然垄断行业而一直是各国政府严格管制的对象。为了打破垄断和提高效率,从20世纪80年代开始,各国陆续开始对电力工业进行市场化改革。但在市场成员利益驱动,寡头垄断市场结构,以及电力不能大规模储存等内因以及外因的作用之下,解除管制后的发电商仍

【相似文献】