过度自信行为影响下的应急决策偏差和惩罚援助机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 09:20

本文关键词：过度自信行为影响下的应急决策偏差和惩罚援助机制研究　出处：《管理工程学报》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文基于某电力公司的实地调研,在运作能力因灾受损情境下研究了应急修复过程中管理者两种过度自信行为对决策偏差的影响,分析了惩罚援助机制在决策纠偏方面的作用。研究结果表明:提高惩罚和积极援助的"胡萝卜+大棒"调控机制有助于纠正管理者过度自信造成的决策偏差;过度精确行为对偏差存在双向影响,但可通过调节惩罚援助参数比例促使管理者向"积极应急"的方向决策;过高估计行为必将造成应急投入不足,同时将抑制过度精确行为的偏差,惩罚援助的调控机制必然失效;外界随机扰动分布左偏时,管理者需适当增加决策量以缓解应急投入不足。
[Abstract]:Based on the field investigation of a power company, this paper studies the influence of two kinds of overconfident behavior of managers on the decision deviation in the emergency repair process under the situation that the operation ability is damaged by disaster. This paper analyzes the role of punishment aid mechanism in correcting decision-making bias. The results show that the "carrot stick" regulation mechanism of increasing punishment and active aid can help to correct the decision-making bias caused by overconfidence of managers; Excessive precision behavior has a bidirectional effect on deviation, but it can promote managers to make decisions in the direction of "positive emergency" by adjusting the proportion of penalty aid parameters. Overestimated behavior will inevitably lead to insufficient emergency investment, at the same time, it will restrain the deviation of excessive precision behavior, and the regulatory mechanism of punishment assistance will inevitably fail. When the random disturbance is distributed to the left, the manager should increase the decision quantity properly to alleviate the shortage of emergency investment.
【作者单位】：中共浙江省委党校;浙江省科学发展观与浙江发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71302033、71301146) 教育部博士点基金资助项目(2011332612002) 浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LQ12G01004) 浙江省社科规划“之江青年课题研究成果”资助项目(13ZJQN048YB)
【分类号】：F274;F426.61
【正文快照】： 0引言知识管理领域的实证研究发现,对先验知识准确度的自信有助于改善管理者在不完全信息或不确定情境下的决策绩效,尤其在管理者观测到现象和知识之间存在精度匹配的情境下会增强管理者使用先验知识的意愿和自信度[1]。虽然历史经验、培训和模拟演练均有助于提高管理者使用先

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