回报性互利、惩罚性互利与小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给——基于Z村的个案研究

发布时间：2018-06-16 05:57

本文选题：行为人 + 回报性互利　；参考：《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：村庄成员利益明显受到建设田间水渠和维护支渠工作的影响,研究在国家大规模投入农田水利设施的情况下,村庄成员是否会组织起来合作提供并维护这些小规模工程,对农田水利设施的可持续发展具有重要意义。本文构建集体行为的行为人模型,通过案例研究,探讨基础性的行为规范(公平互利性)能否促成小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给。个案研究表明,在管护小型农田水利设施上,回报性互利难以形成,而在破坏小型农田水利设施上,村庄成员通过多回合博弈形成了畸形的"回报性互利",惩罚性互利失效,其结果是末级渠道和田间工程配套的维护、管理等陷入了困境,小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给难以实现。在国家提供了大规模的农田水利设施后,村庄成员难以组织起来合作提供并维护田间水渠与支渠,导致农田有效灌溉率低,农田灌溉成本较高。针对小型农田水利设施自愿合作供给困难的现象,本文建议,在鼓励农地流转的同时,通过建立有效的惩罚机制及重构共享规范,使村庄中经营规模小且地块分散的小农户合作供给小型农田水利设施。
[Abstract]:The interests of village members are clearly affected by the construction of field canals and the maintenance of branch canals. In the case of large-scale investment by the State in irrigation and water conservancy facilities, the members of the village will be organized to cooperate in the provision and maintenance of these small-scale projects. It is of great significance to the sustainable development of irrigation and water conservancy facilities. This paper constructs the behavior model of collective behavior and discusses whether the basic norms of behavior (equity and mutual benefit) can promote the voluntary cooperative supply of small irrigation and water conservancy facilities through the case study. The case study shows that in the management of small irrigation and water conservancy facilities, it is difficult to form the reciprocal benefit, while in destroying the small irrigation and water conservancy facilities, the village members form abnormal "reward mutual benefit" through multi-round game, and the punitive mutual benefit fails. The result is that the maintenance and management of the final channel and field engineering are in difficulty, and it is difficult to realize the voluntary cooperative supply of small irrigation and water conservancy facilities. After the state provided large-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities, it was difficult for village members to organize to provide and maintain field canals and branch canals, which resulted in low effective irrigation rate of farmland and high irrigation cost. In view of the difficulty of voluntary cooperation in the supply of small-scale irrigation and water conservancy facilities, this paper suggests that, while encouraging the transfer of agricultural land, it should establish an effective punishment mechanism and reconstruct the sharing norms. Small farmers with small scale and scattered plots in the village cooperate to supply small farmland and water conservancy facilities.
【作者单位】：安徽财经大学财政与公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“主体功能区战略引导下的城市增长边界管理策略差异响应研究”(71373231) 中国博士后科学基金项目“基于食物安全的中国耕地保护制度:绩效评价与优化路径”(2016M601956) 浙江大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“粮食主产区耕地保护制度实施绩效研究:农村基层调查的视角”(2017QNA212)
【分类号】：F323.213

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