基于委托代理的总承包供应链多任务收益激励研究

发布时间：2018-04-30 15:25

  本文选题：总承包模式 + 收益激励　； 参考：《南京大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：工程建设项目是推动国民经济往更高层次发展的重要源泉和动力,深深影响着国家经济未来的发展速度与质量,而工程供应链上关于总包商与分包商之间的收益分配问题以及多项任务问协调均衡问题,是影响工程项目顺利、高效运行的重要因素,亟待解决。因此,建立一个高效的、能真正激励各利益相关方的多任务收益激励模型,从而解决工程供应链上总包商与分包商之间的利益冲突关系,是十分迫切且有必要的。在国内外有关文献梳理、总结的基础上,对我国当前总承包供应链上总包商与分包商合作状况进行深入分析,从协调均衡与收益激励的研究角度出发,以总承包工程供应链上总包商与分包商为主要研究对象,利用委托代理理论及博弈论的思想,研究了工程供应链上总包商与分包商之间有关利益分配以及激励协调等问题,最终建立总承包供应链上总包商对分包商关于工期和质量的多任务激励优化模型。并对模型结果进行分析,指出总包商与分包商之间多任务的收益激励最优合同与任务观测结果波动性成反比关系、与分包商的风险规避度负相关、与各自的边际成本变化率负相关,且是各项任务边际成本替代率的递减函数。委托人在得知影响因素是如何影响最优激励合同的基础上,便可针对分包商在工期和质量任务上设计和分配合理的激励强度,使得分包商在此激励水平下调整自身努力水平,从而可以实现多项任务之间的均衡改善,最终实现总承包供应链上总收益的最大化。研究结果从实践和理论上对我国建筑业以及建筑企业的健康、全面、协调及可持续发展起到了一定的指导作用。
[Abstract]:Engineering construction project is an important source and motive force to promote the development of the national economy to a higher level, which deeply affects the development speed and quality of the national economy in the future. In the engineering supply chain, the problem of profit distribution between the contractor and the subcontractor and the problem of coordination and equilibrium of many tasks are the important factors affecting the smooth and efficient operation of the project, which need to be solved urgently. Therefore, it is very urgent and necessary to establish an efficient multi-task income incentive model that can really motivate all stakeholders to solve the conflict of interest between the contractor and the subcontractor in the engineering supply chain. On the basis of combing and summing up the relevant literature at home and abroad, this paper makes a deep analysis of the cooperation between the general contractor and the subcontractor in our country's current general contracting supply chain, starting from the angle of coordinating equilibrium and income incentive. Taking the general contractor and subcontractor as the main research object, using the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper studies the distribution of benefits and incentive coordination between the contractor and the subcontractor in the engineering supply chain. Finally, the multi-task incentive optimization model for duration and quality of contractor to subcontractor in general contract supply chain is established. Based on the analysis of the model results, it is pointed out that the multi-task income incentive optimal contract between the contractor and the subcontractor is inversely proportional to the volatility of the observed results, and negatively related to the risk aversion of the subcontractor. It is negatively correlated with the rate of marginal cost change and is a decreasing function of the marginal cost substitution rate of each task. On the basis of knowing how the influencing factors affect the optimal incentive contract, the principal can design and allocate reasonable incentive intensity for the subcontractor on the time limit and quality task, so that the subcontractor can adjust its level of effort under this incentive level. Thus, the equilibrium between multiple tasks can be improved, and the total income in the general contract supply chain can be maximized. The research results play a guiding role in practice and theory for the healthy, comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of the construction industry and construction enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.92
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本文编号：1825096