基于有限理性的工程质量监督管理

发布时间：2018-05-21 00:35

本文选题：质量监管 + 有限理性　；参考：《同济大学学报(自然科学版)》2014年08期

【摘要】：在有限理性分析框架下构建了监管部门和承包商群体之间的演化博弈模型,分析了群体策略的动态演化.研究发现在监管部门和承包商随机配对的质量监管博弈中,最终会出现监管失效现象.为了分析这种现象产生的原因,对承包商群体内部的质量竞争博弈展开研究,发现过高和过低的惩罚费用都不利于质量监管系统的有效运转,引入外部激励改变群体策略的演化方向从而实现监管目标是提高工程质量监管绩效的有效途径.发现对于某一承包商的质量监管激励会对其他承包商的质量行为产生威慑效应,对质量欺骗净收益较大的承包商实施质量监管激励可以有效提高监管绩效.最后找到了使总激励费用最小的策略组合,实现了工程质量监管系统的优化.
[Abstract]:The evolutionary game model between the regulatory department and the contractor group is constructed under the framework of bounded rationality analysis, and the dynamic evolution of the group strategy is analyzed. It is found that regulatory failure will eventually occur in the quality supervision game of random matching between regulatory authorities and contractors. In order to analyze the causes of this phenomenon, the quality competition game within the contractor group is studied. It is found that too high and too low punishment costs are not conducive to the effective operation of the quality supervision system. It is an effective way to improve the performance of project quality supervision by introducing external incentives to change the evolutionary direction of group strategy and achieve the regulatory goal. It is found that the quality supervision incentive for one contractor will have a deterrent effect on the quality behavior of other contractors, and the quality supervision incentive for the contractor with higher net benefit of quality deception can effectively improve the supervision performance. Finally, the strategy combination to minimize the total incentive cost is found, and the optimization of the project quality supervision system is realized.
【作者单位】：同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究基金(12YJA630099) 国家自然科学青年基金(71301065)
【分类号】：TU712.3

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