独立董事的明星效应:基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的考察

发布时间：2018-06-27 06:54

本文选题：独立董事 + 声誉机制　；参考：《南开管理评论》2014年03期

【摘要】：独立董事治理行为的首要机制是声誉激励,然而这一机制的有效性在中国却长期囿于数据的可获得性而未得到充分检验。基于此,本文首次根据百度中文搜索引擎数据反映的社会知名度来衡量独立董事个人的社会声誉激励强度,进而从高管薪酬—业绩敏感性视角检验了独立董事的社会声誉激励效应——也即所谓的明星效应。实证研究发现,同等条件下,聘请了高社会知名度的明星独立董事的上市公司具有显著更低的高管薪酬—业绩敏感性,即明星独董显著降低了公司高管薪酬契约的有效性,而且这一结果主要反映在薪酬政策不受政府管制的民营上市公司。本文的研究结论丰富了中国独立董事制度有效性相关的文献,特别是揭示了独董不能发挥作用的内在原因。
[Abstract]:The primary mechanism of independent directors' governance is reputation incentive. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism in China has been limited by the availability of data for a long time and has not been fully tested. Based on this, this paper measures the social reputation incentive intensity of individual independent director for the first time according to the social popularity reflected by Baidu Chinese search engine data. Then it tests the social reputation incentive effect of independent director from the perspective of executive compensation and performance sensitivity, that is, the so-called star effect. The empirical study found that under the same conditions, listed companies with high social awareness of star independent directors have significantly lower sensitivity to executive compensation-performance, that is, star independent directors significantly reduce the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. Moreover, this result is mainly reflected in the private listed companies whose salary policy is not regulated by the government. The conclusions of this paper enrich the relevant literature on the effectiveness of independent director system in China, especially reveal the internal reasons why the independent director can not play a role.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院会计系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202061)资助
【分类号】：F276.6

【参考文献】