机会网络中节点激励机制研究
发布时间：2018-09-11 15:05
【摘要】：机会网络是由无线自组织网络和延迟容忍网络演化而来的一种新型网络,它是一种源节点与目的节点可能不存在完整的通信链路、利用节点移动带来的相遇机会进行数据交换的移动自组织网络。与传统的无线自组织网络不同,机会网络节点稀疏、分布不均匀,节点间都是机会性的相遇,所以采用的是“存储-携带-转发”的路由机制。这种路由机制完全依赖于中继节点的合作,现有的路由转发协议也都是假设节点会选择合作即帮助其他节点转发数据。然而,组成机会网络的大部分移动设备是资源有限的,比如电池、内存、CPU等资源。如果节点被理性个体控制的话,它们可能会为了节省资源而不帮其他节点转发消息,这些节点被称为“自私节点”,目前,大量文献研究发现这些自私节点将严重影响整个网络的性能,并且导致数据传输率下降。 本文提出的激励机制就是为了解决自私节点影响网络性能的问题,现有的一些激励机制基本上都是应用在传统的无线自组织网络当中,然而由于机会网络的一些固有特性如网络间歇性断开、延迟长等,使得这些激励机制不太适用于机会网络。本文在讨论现有的激励机制基础上,提出了一种基于交换的声誉激励机制(ERIS),该机制的主要思想是：相遇的两个节点是基于感兴趣的消息出发,声誉高的两个相遇节点彼此交换消息,本文认为任何交换的消息都是有价值的,虽然有可能交换到的消息不是自身感兴趣的,但是以后可以用它们来交换自身感兴趣的消息,这样的交互使得消息在网络中能够顺利的传输,数据传输延迟下降。不交换消息(不合作)的节点不仅可能失去自身感兴趣的消息也会导致声誉下降,声誉下降到比阈值低时,它将被隔离出网络,不会再有节点为它转发消息。 本文利用博弈论理论分析ERIS机制,并在ONE模拟器上进行仿真实验,实验结果表明该激励机制可以减少节点的自私行为,提高数据的传输率。自私行为在长期看来对节点自身是不利的,节点为了获取自身感兴趣的消息和提高自身的声誉会尽量选择合作,实验证明在本文的激励机制中节点选择纳什均衡的策略组合时,整个网络的性能和数据传输率均得到很大的改善。
[Abstract]:Opportunistic network is a new network evolved from wireless ad hoc network and delay tolerance network. It is a kind of source node and destination node which may not have a complete communication link. A mobile ad hoc network that uses the encounter opportunity brought by node mobility to exchange data. Different from the traditional wireless ad hoc networks, the nodes of the opportunistic networks are sparse, unevenly distributed, and the nodes meet each other opportunistically, so the routing mechanism of "store-carry-forward" is adopted. This routing mechanism depends entirely on the cooperation of relay nodes. Existing routing and forwarding protocols also assume that nodes will choose cooperation to help other nodes forward data. However, most of the mobile devices that make up the opportunity network have limited resources, such as batteries, memory processors, and so on. If nodes were controlled by rational individuals, they might not forward messages for other nodes, known as "selfish nodes," in order to save resources. A large number of literatures have found that these selfish nodes will seriously affect the performance of the entire network and lead to a decrease in the data transmission rate. The incentive mechanism proposed in this paper is to solve the problem that selfish nodes affect the performance of the network. Some existing incentive mechanisms are basically applied in the traditional wireless ad hoc networks. However, due to some inherent characteristics of opportunistic networks, such as intermittent disconnection, long delay and so on, these incentive mechanisms are not suitable for opportunistic networks. In this paper, based on the discussion of the existing incentive mechanism, a reputation incentive mechanism based on exchange (ERIS),) is proposed. The main idea of the mechanism is that the two nodes met are based on the interested message. Two reputable meeting nodes exchange messages with each other. This paper holds that any messages exchanged are valuable. Although the messages that may be exchanged are not of interest to them, they can be used to exchange messages of interest to them in the future. Such interaction enables messages to be transmitted smoothly in the network, and data transmission delays decrease. The node that does not exchange messages (uncooperative) may not only lose the information of its own interest but also lead to the loss of reputation. When the reputation falls below the threshold it will be isolated from the network and no more nodes will forward messages for it. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the ERIS mechanism, and the simulation experiments are carried out on the ONE simulator. The experimental results show that the excitation mechanism can reduce the selfish behavior of the nodes and improve the data transmission rate. In the long run, selfishness is unfavorable to the node itself. In order to obtain the information of interest to the node and improve its reputation, the node will choose cooperation as far as possible. The experimental results show that in the incentive mechanism of this paper, the node chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy combination. The performance and data transmission rate of the whole network are greatly improved.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：TN92
本文编号：2237041
[Abstract]:Opportunistic network is a new network evolved from wireless ad hoc network and delay tolerance network. It is a kind of source node and destination node which may not have a complete communication link. A mobile ad hoc network that uses the encounter opportunity brought by node mobility to exchange data. Different from the traditional wireless ad hoc networks, the nodes of the opportunistic networks are sparse, unevenly distributed, and the nodes meet each other opportunistically, so the routing mechanism of "store-carry-forward" is adopted. This routing mechanism depends entirely on the cooperation of relay nodes. Existing routing and forwarding protocols also assume that nodes will choose cooperation to help other nodes forward data. However, most of the mobile devices that make up the opportunity network have limited resources, such as batteries, memory processors, and so on. If nodes were controlled by rational individuals, they might not forward messages for other nodes, known as "selfish nodes," in order to save resources. A large number of literatures have found that these selfish nodes will seriously affect the performance of the entire network and lead to a decrease in the data transmission rate. The incentive mechanism proposed in this paper is to solve the problem that selfish nodes affect the performance of the network. Some existing incentive mechanisms are basically applied in the traditional wireless ad hoc networks. However, due to some inherent characteristics of opportunistic networks, such as intermittent disconnection, long delay and so on, these incentive mechanisms are not suitable for opportunistic networks. In this paper, based on the discussion of the existing incentive mechanism, a reputation incentive mechanism based on exchange (ERIS),) is proposed. The main idea of the mechanism is that the two nodes met are based on the interested message. Two reputable meeting nodes exchange messages with each other. This paper holds that any messages exchanged are valuable. Although the messages that may be exchanged are not of interest to them, they can be used to exchange messages of interest to them in the future. Such interaction enables messages to be transmitted smoothly in the network, and data transmission delays decrease. The node that does not exchange messages (uncooperative) may not only lose the information of its own interest but also lead to the loss of reputation. When the reputation falls below the threshold it will be isolated from the network and no more nodes will forward messages for it. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the ERIS mechanism, and the simulation experiments are carried out on the ONE simulator. The experimental results show that the excitation mechanism can reduce the selfish behavior of the nodes and improve the data transmission rate. In the long run, selfishness is unfavorable to the node itself. In order to obtain the information of interest to the node and improve its reputation, the node will choose cooperation as far as possible. The experimental results show that in the incentive mechanism of this paper, the node chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy combination. The performance and data transmission rate of the whole network are greatly improved.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：TN92
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前4条
1 牛建伟;周兴;刘燕;孙利民;马建;;一种基于社区机会网络的消息传输算法[J];计算机研究与发展;2009年12期
2 李云;于季弘;尤肖虎;;资源受限的机会网络节点激励策略研究[J];计算机学报;2013年05期
3 熊永平;孙利民;牛建伟;刘燕;;机会网络[J];软件学报;2009年01期
4 赵广松;陈鸣;;自私性机会网络中激励感知的内容分发的研究[J];通信学报;2013年02期
相关博士学位论文 前2条
1 叶晖;机会网络数据分发关键技术研究[D];中南大学;2010年
2 范家璐;机会移动网络建模与应用研究[D];浙江大学;2011年
，本文编号：2237041
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/kejilunwen/wltx/2237041.html
