产权管制放松视角下玛河流域农业水资源管理模式研究

发布时间：2018-01-21 00:12

本文关键词： 玛纳斯河流域农业水资源产权管制放松管理模式　出处：《石河子大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：玛纳斯河流域作为新疆最大的绿洲农耕区,对于区域社会、经济发展具有重要的支撑作用。但是,经过多年的水土资源开发,农业用水份额不断增大,已经严重挤占了工业、生活和生态用水。特别是近年来工业化和城镇化的加速发展,流域水资源供给压力增加,生态问题也愈加突出。加之流域内多方利益主体共存,用水矛盾协调难度大,对流域水资源综合开发、高效利用和科学管理造成了严重阻碍。在技术瓶颈约束下,如何通过管水模式创新、资源产权制度建设,保障各方经济利益同时不断提升农业水资源配置效率成为现阶段研究的新课题。本文利用新制度经济学分析方法,从流域水资源产权管制放松为切入点,对流域农业水资源的管理模式进行了研究。文章主要分为三个部分:(1)第一部分:第一章和第二章,主要对研究的背景、意义、现状、方法及理论基础进行介绍。(2)第二部分:第三章和第四章,在前文理论基础上以产权管制放松为视角对流域农业水权管理制度变迁和三种农业水权管理模式进行分析。在流域农业水权管理制度变迁研究上对流域农业水权的政府管制放松进行了分析,并对农业水权的市场化进入空间进行了研究;在流域农业水权管理模式研究上,对流域存在的团场管理模式、社区管理模式及市场管理模式进行了案例分析,并采用帕累托改进和纳什均衡两个新的评价标准对三者进行了评价。(3)第三部分:第五章和第六章,主要在前文的分析结果基础上结合流域实际发展,对流域农业水资源管理模式进行了优化;最后根据论文研究情况进行了研究总结和反思并对文中建立的管理模式提出了相应的保障措施。本文主要结论如下:(1)玛河流域水权管理制度变迁路径朝着水资源产权管制放松的方向进行。(2)兵团体制下团场农业水资源团场管理模式不符合帕累托改进和纳什均衡,但由于第三方外部强制力的介入和团场的规模优势,这种管理模式又具有稳定性;社区管理模式满足帕累托改进,短时期内符合纳什均衡条件,但是在长期内由于组织自身能力限制、资金缺乏等原因导致在长期内自我发展不可持续;市场管理模式符合帕累托改进,在短期内以水权交易为主的市场管理符合纳什均衡,但从长期来看该模式仍旧存在不稳定因素。(3)团场管理模式、社区管理模式以及市场管理模式对于农业水权的管制放松程度逐渐加强。(4)水权市场从一级水权市场到四级水权市场的演变过程中,水权市场侧重面呈现阶梯型变化;并且农业剩余水权作为第四级水权市场的主要交易主体从理论上已经具备进行完全市场交易的特性。
[Abstract]:As the largest oasis farming area in Xinjiang, Manas River Basin plays an important supporting role in regional social and economic development. However, after many years of water and soil resources development, the share of agricultural water use is increasing. Industrial, domestic and ecological water has been seriously squeezed out, especially with the accelerating development of industrialization and urbanization in recent years, the pressure of water supply in river basin has increased. Ecological problems are becoming more and more prominent. In addition, the coexistence of multi-stakeholders in the basin, water contradiction coordination is very difficult, comprehensive development of water resources in the basin. Efficient utilization and scientific management have caused serious obstacles. Under the constraint of technical bottleneck, how to innovate the water management mode and build the property right system of resources. To protect the economic interests of all parties and constantly improve the efficiency of agricultural water resources allocation has become a new research topic at the present stage. This paper makes use of the new institutional economics analysis method to relax the control of water resources property rights in the watershed as a starting point. The article is divided into three parts: the first part: the first chapter and the second chapter, mainly to the research background, significance, current situation. The second part: chapter three and chapter 4th. On the basis of the above theory, this paper analyzes the changes of agricultural water rights management system and three agricultural water rights management models from the perspective of property rights deregulation. On the study of watershed agricultural water rights management system changes. The deregulation of the government was analyzed. The marketization of agricultural water rights into the space has been studied. On the research of watershed agricultural water right management model, the paper makes a case study on the farm management model, community management model and market management model. The third part: chapter 5th and Chapter 6th, which are based on the results of the above analysis and the actual development of the river basin. The management mode of agricultural water resources in river basin was optimized. Finally, according to the research situation of the thesis, the author summarizes and rethinks the research and puts forward the corresponding safeguard measures for the management mode established in the paper. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1). The water rights management system of Mahe river basin changes in the direction of relaxing the control of water resources property rights.) under the bingtuan system, the management mode of agricultural water resources farm does not accord with the Pareto improvement and Nash equilibrium. However, due to the intervention of the external coercive power of the third party and the advantage of the scale of the regiment, this management mode has the stability; The community management model satisfies the Pareto improvement and meets the Nash equilibrium condition in a short period of time, but in the long run, due to the limitation of the organization's own ability and the lack of funds, the self-development is not sustainable in the long run. The market management model accords with the Pareto improvement, and the market management with water rights trading in the short term accords with Nash equilibrium, but in the long run, there are still unstable factors. Community management model and market management model for agricultural water rights to relax the degree of gradual strengthening of water rights market from a water rights market to four water rights market evolution process. The water rights market focuses on the change of ladder; And agricultural residual water rights as the main trading body of the fourth level water rights market has theoretically had the characteristics of complete market transactions.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F323.213

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