国有企业高管人员犯罪控制实证研究
发布时间：2019-02-22 14:44
【摘要】： 企业是构成国民经济的组织。细胞发生病变不仅会影响企业组织的健康，而且会侵害国民经济环境。因此，本文从分析企业组织的病变入手，对国有企业高管犯罪及其控制手段进行系统研究，旨在寻找提高企业高管犯罪控制力的路径，建构企业高管犯罪系统控制理论框架。 从实践观察的角度来看，犯罪行为与败德行为和违规行为既有差别又有关联。首先，犯罪行为必然是败德行为，而败德行为到达一定程度后才为犯罪；其次，违规行为与败德行为具有交叉性，违规行为并不一定是败德行为，败德行为不一定是违规行为；最后，违规行为达到一定程度后，才为犯罪行为，而犯罪行为一定是违规行为。 从行为的决策程序来看，任何一个行为决策首先要考量的是是否符合道德要求，其次是是否能够满足制度要求，最后就是来自刑罚的威慑。因此，行为决策程序的三大考量决定了预防犯罪具有三大控制手段，即道德控制、制度控制和刑罚控制。 基于上述考虑，本文从五个方面切入国有企业高管犯罪问题，在犯罪动机、行为、后果及其预防和控制的研究取得了创新性的进展。第一，从微观角度分析了犯罪决策的机理，在原有文献模型的基础上添加了严重影响刑罚威慑效果的变量，即刑罚延迟变量；第二，分析了国有企业与国有企业高管人员犯罪决策的机制，得出了单位犯罪本质上就是自然人犯罪的结论；第三，率先借用学习演化博弈模型，解释了道德演化机理，分析了不同道德变化趋势中个人决策的机制；第四，从国有企业产权制度着手，根据多层委托代理理论，对监督机制和激励机制从犯罪预防角度进行了系统探讨，其中，重点是将犯罪实现和处罚可能性引入委托代理监督激励机制的研究；第五，探讨了刑罚延迟与刑罚威慑力之间的关系，其中突出了刑罚延迟对刑罚威慑力减损的机理，以及相应的政策性建议。 本文的内容结构划分为七个部分：第1章概述了本文研究的背景、意义、文献、主题和内容；第2章对犯罪决策进行了多学科的理论分析；进而提出了国有企业及其高管犯罪边界判断(第3章)；第4、5、6章分别对目前国有企业高管犯罪的控制手段进行了系统分析，全面检讨了国有企业高管犯罪三大控制手段存在的问题；第7章针对目前国有企业高管犯罪控制手段的缺陷，全方位的提出了对策和建议，，并对论文研究进行了全面总结。
[Abstract]:An enterprise is an organization that constitutes the national economy. Cytopathic changes not only affect the health of enterprises, but also affect the environment of national economy. Therefore, this paper starts with the analysis of the pathological changes of the enterprise organization, carries on the systematic research to the state-owned enterprise executives' crime and its control means, in order to find the way to improve the enterprise executive's crime control ability, constructs the enterprise executive's crime system control theory frame. From the point of view of practice, there are differences and relations between criminal behavior and moral behavior and illegal behavior. First of all, criminal behavior is bound to be the behavior of failing morality, and the behavior of failing morality is only a crime after it reaches a certain degree; secondly, the illegal behavior and the behavior of failing morality have the nature of crossing, the violation behavior is not necessarily the behavior of failing morality, the behavior of failing morality is not necessarily the behavior of violation of morality; Finally, after the violation reaches a certain level, it is a criminal act, and the criminal behavior must be a violation. From the point of view of the decision-making procedure of behavior, the first consideration of any behavior decision is whether it conforms to the moral requirements, the second is whether it can meet the requirements of the system, and the last is the deterrent from the penalty. Therefore, the three major considerations of behavioral decision-making procedure determine that crime prevention has three major means of control, namely, moral control, institutional control and penalty control. Based on the above considerations, this paper makes innovative progress in the study of crime motivation, behavior, consequences and prevention and control of state-owned enterprise executives from five aspects. Firstly, it analyzes the mechanism of crime decision from the micro angle, and adds the variables which seriously influence the effect of penalty deterrence, that is, penalty delay variable, on the basis of the original literature model. Secondly, it analyzes the mechanism of the senior executives' crime decision-making in state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises, and draws the conclusion that unit crime is natural person crime in essence; Thirdly, we first use the game model of learning evolution to explain the mechanism of moral evolution and analyze the individual decision-making mechanism in different moral trends. Fourth, starting from the property right system of state-owned enterprises, according to the multi-level principal-agent theory, the paper systematically discusses the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism from the angle of crime prevention, among which, The focus is to introduce the possibility of crime and punishment into the principal-agent supervision incentive mechanism; Fifthly, the relationship between penalty delay and penalty deterrence is discussed, in which the mechanism of penalty delay detracting from penalty deterrence and corresponding policy suggestions are highlighted. The content structure of this paper is divided into seven parts: the first chapter summarizes the background, significance, literature, theme and content of this study; Then it puts forward the judgment of the crime boundary of state-owned enterprises and their executives (Chapter 3); Chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6, respectively, systematically analyze the control methods of the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and comprehensively review the problems existing in the three means of controlling the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. In chapter 7, aiming at the defects of the crime control means of the senior executives in state-owned enterprises, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions in all directions, and summarizes the research of the thesis.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：D917.6
本文编号：2428327
[Abstract]:An enterprise is an organization that constitutes the national economy. Cytopathic changes not only affect the health of enterprises, but also affect the environment of national economy. Therefore, this paper starts with the analysis of the pathological changes of the enterprise organization, carries on the systematic research to the state-owned enterprise executives' crime and its control means, in order to find the way to improve the enterprise executive's crime control ability, constructs the enterprise executive's crime system control theory frame. From the point of view of practice, there are differences and relations between criminal behavior and moral behavior and illegal behavior. First of all, criminal behavior is bound to be the behavior of failing morality, and the behavior of failing morality is only a crime after it reaches a certain degree; secondly, the illegal behavior and the behavior of failing morality have the nature of crossing, the violation behavior is not necessarily the behavior of failing morality, the behavior of failing morality is not necessarily the behavior of violation of morality; Finally, after the violation reaches a certain level, it is a criminal act, and the criminal behavior must be a violation. From the point of view of the decision-making procedure of behavior, the first consideration of any behavior decision is whether it conforms to the moral requirements, the second is whether it can meet the requirements of the system, and the last is the deterrent from the penalty. Therefore, the three major considerations of behavioral decision-making procedure determine that crime prevention has three major means of control, namely, moral control, institutional control and penalty control. Based on the above considerations, this paper makes innovative progress in the study of crime motivation, behavior, consequences and prevention and control of state-owned enterprise executives from five aspects. Firstly, it analyzes the mechanism of crime decision from the micro angle, and adds the variables which seriously influence the effect of penalty deterrence, that is, penalty delay variable, on the basis of the original literature model. Secondly, it analyzes the mechanism of the senior executives' crime decision-making in state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises, and draws the conclusion that unit crime is natural person crime in essence; Thirdly, we first use the game model of learning evolution to explain the mechanism of moral evolution and analyze the individual decision-making mechanism in different moral trends. Fourth, starting from the property right system of state-owned enterprises, according to the multi-level principal-agent theory, the paper systematically discusses the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism from the angle of crime prevention, among which, The focus is to introduce the possibility of crime and punishment into the principal-agent supervision incentive mechanism; Fifthly, the relationship between penalty delay and penalty deterrence is discussed, in which the mechanism of penalty delay detracting from penalty deterrence and corresponding policy suggestions are highlighted. The content structure of this paper is divided into seven parts: the first chapter summarizes the background, significance, literature, theme and content of this study; Then it puts forward the judgment of the crime boundary of state-owned enterprises and their executives (Chapter 3); Chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6, respectively, systematically analyze the control methods of the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and comprehensively review the problems existing in the three means of controlling the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. In chapter 7, aiming at the defects of the crime control means of the senior executives in state-owned enterprises, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions in all directions, and summarizes the research of the thesis.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：D917.6
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 郝春禄;基于人力资本开发的辽宁国企管理层建设研究[D];武汉理工大学;2009年
本文编号：2428327
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