1995-1996年台海危机中美博弈研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 00:00

本文选题：李登辉访美 + 台海危机　；参考：《华东师范大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：自新中国成立以来,中美两国围绕着台湾问题爆发过三次较大的危机,1995-1996年台海危机是中美建交以来爆发的最严重的军事对抗危机,此次危机对21世纪的中美关系以及台海局势产生了深远的影响。本文以1995-1996年台海危机为研究对象,运用格伦·斯奈德和保罗·戴森所著《国家问冲突》(Conflict Among Nations)一书中的博弈理论和模型,对危机期间中美将近10个月的博弈过程展开分析和研究。本文第一部分首先介绍了基本的博弈理论模型,重点阐释了研究过程中用到的四种博弈模型,如斗鸡博弈、囚徒困境博弈、讹诈博弈和关键风险博弈等。并且本文也提出了博弈价值结构和博弈策略两个概念,博弈的价值结构主要包括军事力量和决心两个维度,军事力量又包括联盟关系。本文的基本论点是阐述在军事力量对比相对不变、危机的不同阶段下博弈模型以及博弈策略的变化。在危机的不同阶段,博弈各方的目标不同,运用的博弈模型和博弈策略也不尽相同。本文重点是对1995-1996年台海危机进行阶段性研究。第一阶段是从1995年5月22日美国宣布李登辉访美至1995年10月24日中美纽约林肯中心会晤,这一时期中美两国都采取斗鸡博弈策略,中国在这一阶段的博弈并没有达到预期目标,美国依然没有就台湾当局领导人访美问题上做出公开承诺,李登辉当局也继续挑衅中国；第二阶段是从1995年10月24日至1996年3月23日台湾地区领导人选举结束。第一阶段博弈的失利促使中国调整博弈策略,采用囚徒困境博弈方式,在1996年3月进行第二轮大规模的导弹试射。中国在此阶段基本实现了博弈目标,美国开始谨慎对待中美关系中的台湾问题,台湾也在美国的压力取消了随后的军事演习,不再过分挑衅中国大陆对台政策的底线。但是“刘连昆案件”的发生,使得中国的博弈底线被美国知悉,导致中国的这一阶段博弈效应打了折扣。本文结尾部分对1995-1996年台海危机中美两国的博弈效应进行了分析,从博弈结果的短期和长期效应上评析中美两国的博弈结果。最后,针对中国政府在博弈过程的得失问题,总结教训以及经验,并提出应对日后可能出现的台海危机的策略和方法。
[Abstract]:Since the founding of New China, China and the United States have experienced three major crises around the Taiwan issue. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is the most serious crisis of military confrontation since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. The crisis has had a profound impact on Sino-American relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait in the 21 st century. Taking the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as the object of study, this paper applies the game theory and model of Glen Snyder and Paul Dyson's conflict Among Nationals, which are written by Glenn Snyder and Paul Dyson. In the first part of this paper, the basic game theory model is introduced, and the four game models used in the research process, such as cockfight game, are explained. Prisoners' dilemma game, blackmail game and key risk game. This paper also puts forward two concepts: game value structure and game strategy. The value structure of game includes two dimensions of military force and determination, and military power includes alliance relationship. The basic argument of this paper is to expound the change of game model and game strategy in different stages of crisis. In different stages of the crisis, the game models and strategies used are different with the different objectives of the game players. This paper focuses on the stage study of the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996. The first stage was from May 22, 1995, when the United States announced Lee Teng-hui 's visit to the United States, to the October 24, 1995, New York Lincoln Center meeting between China and the United States. During this period, both China and the United States adopted the strategy of fighting chickens, and China's game at this stage did not reach the expected goal. The United States has still made no public commitment on the issue of the Taiwan leader's visit to the United States, and the Li Denghui authorities continue to provoke China; the second stage is from October 24, 1995 to March 23, 1996, when the election for the leader of the Taiwan region ends. The failure of the first stage of the game prompted China to adjust its game strategy and adopt the prisoner's dilemma game to launch the second round of large-scale missile tests in March 1996. China basically achieved the game goal at this stage, the United States began to be cautious about the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations, Taiwan also canceled the subsequent military exercises under pressure from the United States, and no longer excessively challenged the bottom line of China's Taiwan policy. However, the occurrence of "Liu Liankun case" makes the bottom line of Chinese game known to the United States, which leads to the discount of the game effect in this stage of China. At the end of this paper, the game effect between China and the United States during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is analyzed. The short-term and long-term effects of the game results are analyzed in terms of the results of the game between China and the United States. Finally, aiming at the problem of the gain and loss of the Chinese government in the process of game, this paper summarizes the lessons and experiences, and puts forward the strategies and methods to deal with the possible Taiwan Strait crisis in the future.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D822.3;D871.2

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