战略稳定性中的相互依赖因素

发布时间：2018-10-14 15:39

【摘要】：当前，国际核裁军进程遇到的一个主要问题，是美俄两个核大国能否在新的《战略武器削减条约》（新START条约）基础上进一步削减战略核武器数量。其主要的障碍是，美俄难以突破“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性概念的束缚。冷战时期发展起来的战略稳定性理论，从防御性现实主义和结构现实主义出发，以“国家理性”假定和“不可接受损失”概念，构筑起以损失计算为核心的“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性分析方法，结论是：只要两个国家的核武器数量达到“相互确保摧毁”的水平（即可以在“报复还击”中给对方造成“不可接受损失”），双方就可以实现战略稳定（被称作“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性）。这在冷战时期及冷战后美苏（俄）拥有大量核武器的时候，指导了双方的核军备控制与裁军谈判，但却没有回答低于这一核武器数量水平时可否实现战略稳定的问题。本论文从传统战略稳定性理论用比较“首先核攻击”与“报复还击”两种策略下所遭受损失来评价战略稳定性的基本逻辑出发，吸收自由主义相互依赖理论的思路，在核战争损失计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失（传统战略稳定性计算中没有计入这部分损失）。首先，从核武器的毁伤效应出发，分析了环境、经济和政治相互依赖因素的构成，讨论了环境（“核冬天”、“大气臭氧层破坏”和“全球放射性尘降”）及经济（直接投资、相互间货物/服务贸易和金融资产）等相互依赖因素在核战争中造成损失的计算方法；然后，在高、低两种核战争规模下进行了模拟案例的定量计算，，分别评估了相互依赖因素造成损失对传统战略稳定性计算结果的影响程度。得到的结论是：在大数量核武器情况下，“核冬天”环境相互依赖因素对“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性的计算会产生明显影响；在小数量核武器情况下，经济相互依赖因素对战略稳定性计算有重要影响，环境相互依赖因素也具有一定作用。从而证明了在战略稳定性分析中考虑相互依赖因素造成损失的必要性，说明考虑相互依赖因素有助于战略稳定性的提高。从上述结论可以看出，如果美俄在战略稳定性计算时考虑相互依赖因素所带来的损失，则不仅达到“相互确保摧毁”战略稳定性所需的核武器数量可以明显减少，而且还可能突破“相互确保摧毁”的核武器数量水平实现大幅度削减。这对美俄实现深度核裁军有明显的促进作用。之后，如果美俄（包括其他核国家）不断发展相互间的经贸关系，使各自经济相互依赖因素在战略稳定性分析中的比重增大，则可以进一步推动国际核裁军进程。
[Abstract]:At present, one of the major problems in the process of international nuclear disarmament is whether the two nuclear powers of the United States and Russia can further reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of the new Strategic Arms reduction Treaty (new START Treaty). Its main obstacle is that the US and Russia struggle to break through the shackles of the concept of mutual assured destruction of strategic stability. The theory of strategic stability developed during the Cold War, based on defensive realism and structural realism, is based on the assumption of "national rationality" and the concept of "unacceptable loss". The strategic stability analysis method of "mutual assured destruction" with loss calculation as the core is constructed. The conclusion is that as long as the number of nuclear weapons in both countries reaches the level of "mutually assured destruction" (i.e. "unacceptable loss" caused to each other in the "retaliatory response"), both sides can achieve strategic stability (referred to as "mutual destruction"). "mutual assurance destroy" strategic stability). This led to nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations during the Cold War period and when the US and Soviet Union (Russia) possessed a large number of nuclear weapons after the Cold War, but did not answer the question of whether strategic stability could be achieved when the nuclear weapons quantity level was lower. This paper starts from the basic logic of the traditional strategic stability theory to evaluate the strategic stability by comparing the losses suffered under the "first nuclear attack" and "retaliatory response" strategies, and absorbs the idea of liberalism interdependence theory. The loss caused by interdependence is taken into account in the calculation of the loss of nuclear war (which is not included in the traditional calculation of strategic stability). First, based on the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, the composition of environmental, economic and political interdependence is analysed, and the environment ("nuclear winter", "atmospheric ozone layer destruction" and "global radioactive dust fall") and the economy (direct investment) are discussed. Methods of calculating the losses caused by interdependent factors, such as trade in goods / services and financial assets, in a nuclear war; then, quantitative calculations of simulated cases are carried out in both high and low scale nuclear wars, The influence of the loss caused by interdependence factors on the results of traditional strategic stability calculation was evaluated respectively. It was concluded that in the case of large quantities of nuclear weapons, the environmental interdependence of the "nuclear winter" would have a significant impact on the calculation of the strategic stability of "mutually assured destruction"; in the case of small quantities of nuclear weapons, Economic interdependence factors play an important role in the calculation of strategic stability, and environmental interdependence factors also play a certain role. It is proved that it is necessary to consider the loss caused by interdependence in the analysis of strategic stability, and the consideration of interdependence is helpful to the improvement of strategic stability. From the above conclusions, it can be seen that if the United States and Russia take into account the losses caused by interdependence in the calculation of strategic stability, the number of nuclear weapons required to "ensure mutual assurance" of strategic stability can be significantly reduced not only. It could also lead to deep cuts in the number of nuclear weapons that can be destroyed by mutual assurance. This will obviously promote the US and Russia to achieve deep nuclear disarmament. After that, if the United States and Russia (including other nuclear countries) continue to develop their economic and trade relations and increase the proportion of their respective economic interdependence factors in the strategic stability analysis, the process of international nuclear disarmament can be further promoted.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D815.2

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