基于博弈论的天然气管网恐怖袭击脆弱性分析

发布时间：2018-11-21 17:21

【摘要】：近年来,全球范围内的恐怖袭击事件愈演愈烈,恐怖势力开始蔓延至各个国家的中心城市。天然气管网作为城市中承载危险品的运输网络,极易成为袭击目标。基于此,该文对天然气管网的恐怖袭击脆弱性进行研究。为描述恐怖袭击事件中袭击者和防御者之间的对抗关系,以某市天然气管网为例,基于博弈理论和网络的最大流模型,建立天然气网络的攻防博弈模型,求解博弈双方策略的Nash均衡解,分析双方的最优策略选择。通过Monte Carlo模拟,分析随机攻击和最优策略攻击的差异。结果表明:对于最优策略攻击,攻击管道数目不同时最优攻击目标也不同,因此无法简单地给出各条管道受到恐怖袭击威胁的优先级,此外,绝大多数随机攻击对系统造成的损失很小。该研究可以为政府部门防范恐怖袭击提供决策支持。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the global terrorist attacks intensified, the terrorist forces began to spread to the central cities of various countries. As the transportation network of dangerous goods in cities, natural gas pipeline network is easy to be attacked. Based on this, this paper studies the vulnerability of natural gas networks to terrorist attacks. In order to describe the antagonistic relationship between attackers and defenders in terrorist attacks, taking a natural gas network in a certain city as an example, based on the game theory and the maximum flow model of the network, a game model of attack and defense of natural gas network is established. The Nash equilibrium solution of game strategy is solved, and the optimal strategy selection of both parties is analyzed. The difference between random attack and optimal strategy attack is analyzed by Monte Carlo simulation. The results show that for the optimal policy attack, the number of attack channels is different and the optimal target is different. Therefore, it is impossible to simply give the priority of each pipeline being threatened by terrorist attack. Most random attacks do little damage to the system. The study could provide decision support for government departments to prevent terrorist attacks.
【作者单位】：清华大学工程物理系公共安全研究院;
【分类号】：D815.5

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