从推责到合作:中美气候博弈策略研究——基于“紧缩趋同”理论视角

发布时间：2018-12-10 22:12

【摘要】：在缺乏公共权威的无政府状态下探讨全球气候多边治理合作问题,既不可能让所有参与方都成为大赢家,也不可能让每个参与者都是大输家。大国间博弈的结果只能产生一个基于双方利益认知底线的博弈均衡值。面对多边合作进程中存在的"集体行动逻辑"的困境与策略选择,所有博弈方均需要承认的一个基本前提是:每个国家都是精于成本—收益核算的理性自利行为体。因此,最优的解决方案只能是形成一个让"多数参与方都不十分满意,但在最后又能够接受"的最大公约数。"紧缩趋同"理论模型正是在这一前提下提出的一条能够弥合中美双方在气候谈判问题上分歧的有效分析框架。通过"以行动对行动"和分阶段取得实质性成果的方式,有利于早日打开中美双方在全球气候多边治理中的僵持局面。
[Abstract]:In the absence of public authority, it is impossible to discuss multilateral governance cooperation on global climate in the absence of public authority. It is neither possible for all participants to be big winners nor for every participant to be a big loser. The result of game between big countries can only produce a game equilibrium value based on the bottom line of mutual benefit cognition. In the face of the dilemma and strategic choice of "collective action logic" in the process of multilateral cooperation, one of the basic prerequisites that all players need to admit is that each country is a rational self-interested actor good at cost-benefit accounting. The best solution, therefore, is to form a maximum common divisor that "the majority of participants are not very satisfied with, but in the end can accept". It is under this premise that the theoretical model of convergence of austerity provides an effective analytical framework that can bridge the differences between China and the United States on climate negotiations. The "action to action" approach and the phased approach to achieving substantive results will help to open the deadlock between China and the United States in multilateral global climate governance at an early date.
【作者单位】：吉林大学行政学院;哈尔滨工程大学马克思主义学院;
【基金】：吉林省社会科学基金项目“国际组织中的博弈研究——以气候大会为例”(2012B02) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“联合国框架下应对气候问题的利益博弈和我国的对策研究”(2013ZZ032)
【分类号】：P467;D815

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