冷战后美国对朝政策的决策层认知分析

发布时间：2019-03-13 17:53

【摘要】： 冷战结束至今近20年来,国际形势发生了巨大的变化,但美国对朝政策没有发生大的改变。美国政府经历了布什—克林顿—小布什—奥巴马四任六届的更替,美朝关系至今没有取得任何实质性进展。从冷战后近20年的美朝关系发展历程看,朝鲜无论是退出核不扩散条约、试射导弹还是进行核试爆,都始终坚持与美国进行双边直接谈判以解决两国间存在的安全问题,直至签署和平协议,实现两国关系正常化。但美国自《核框架协议》签署之后,因朝核问题等始终没有答应朝鲜的要求。为什么朝核问题持续升温并且随时都有可能爆发危机?为什么朝美关系始终得不到改善?为什么东北亚安全机制始终未能建立?本文拟采用政治心理学研究方法,通过分析美国对朝政策决策层的认知结构来寻找答案。本文在概述冷战结束前的美朝关系历史和冷战后美国(全球战略和东亚战略框架下)历任政府对朝政策的基础上,通过对克林顿政府和小布什政府各8年任期内美朝关系的跌宕起伏和复杂微妙的变化过程的梳理,分析了两任政府决策层的认知图式。这两种认知图式作为干预变量影响决策者对来自朝鲜和周边国家的信息的加工处理,从而影响最终的对朝政策。通过分析,作者认为克林顿政府对朝政策决策层的政治图式是两个层次的三个问题三位一体组合:第一层次是从现实安全角度考虑需要解决的不扩散问题,第二层次是从价值观角度考虑需要解决的“朝鲜问题”和实现美国的战略利益问题。小布什政府对朝政策决策层的政治图式也是两个层次的三个问题三位一体组合:第一层次是从现实安全角度考虑需要解决的不扩散问题和从价值观角度考虑需要解决的“朝鲜问题”,这两个问题的解决又以实现美国的战略利益为最终目的,这是第二个层次的问题。通过对两任政府对朝政策决策层认知图式的对比分析,作者找出了它们的异同点。两种图式的不同点成为两任政府采取不同的对朝政策的根源。而通过对相同点的进一步分析,作者得出结论:朝鲜半岛问题的解决只有符合美国的战略利益,美国才有可能和朝鲜进行双边谈判,签署和平协议,构建东北亚安全机制。因此解决半岛问题最大的障碍就是美国的战略利益选择,只要美国不改变其“一超独霸”的全球战略目标和将东亚纳入“太平洋共同体”、确保其在东亚的主导地位的东亚战略,朝鲜半岛的一系列问题就难以解决,东北亚安全机制的建立也就遥遥无期。作者认为奥巴马政府能否调整美国东亚战略(和中俄等在东北亚实现战略合作),在多边框架下(六方会谈)通过和朝鲜双边直接谈判,最终签署和平协议,成为目前解决朝核问题和朝鲜问题的关键。中国在此问题上可以做出更多的积极努力,为掌控东北亚的安全进程和最终取得东北亚战略格局的主导权奠定基础。
[Abstract]:Great changes have taken place in the international situation in the past 20 years since the end of the Cold War, but the policy of the United States towards the DPRK has not changed significantly. The U. S. government has experienced the replacement of Bush-Clinton-Bush-Obama for four or six terms, so far no substantial progress has been made in the relations between the United States and North Korea. Judging from the development of US-DPRK relations in the past 20 years after the cold war, whether North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, launched missiles or carried out nuclear test explosions, it has always insisted on bilateral direct negotiations with the United States to resolve the security problems existing between the two countries. Until the signing of the peace agreement, the normalization of relations between the two countries. However, since the signing of the Nuclear Framework Agreement, the United States has not agreed to North Korea's demands due to the North Korean nuclear issue. Why does the North Korean nuclear issue continue to heat up and there is a chance of a crisis at any time? Why have relations between the DPRK and the United States never improved? Why can't the security mechanism in Northeast Asia be established all the time? This paper adopts the political psychology research method to find out the answer by analyzing the cognitive structure of American policy-making towards North Korea. On the basis of summarizing the history of the relations between the United States and the DPRK before the end of the Cold War and the policies of successive governments of the United States (under the framework of global strategy and East Asia strategy) towards the DPRK after the Cold War, By combing the ups and downs and complex and subtle changes of the relationship between the United States and the DPRK during the eight-year terms of the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, this paper analyzes the cognitive schema of the decision-makers in the two administrations. As intervention variables, these two cognitive schemata affect the processing of information from North Korea and neighboring countries by the decision makers, thus affecting the final policy towards the Democratic people's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Through the analysis, the author believes that the political schema of the Clinton administration towards the policy-making level in the DPRK is a trinity of three issues at two levels: the first level is to consider the non-proliferation issues that need to be resolved from the perspective of realistic security. The second level is to consider the need to resolve the "Korean issue" and the realization of the strategic interests of the United States from the point of view of values. The Bush administration's political schema of the North Korean policy-making level is also a trinity of three issues at two levels: the first level is to consider the non-proliferation issues that need to be addressed from the point of view of realistic security and the need to consider the needs from the point of view of values. The "Korean issue", The solution of these two problems is to realize the strategic interests of the United States as the ultimate goal, this is the second level of the problem. The author finds out their similarities and differences by comparing and analyzing the cognitive schema of the two governments to the policy-making level in North Korea. The difference between the two schemata is the root of the two governments' different policies towards the DPRK. Through the further analysis of the same points, the author concludes that only if the settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue is in line with the strategic interests of the United States, will it be possible for the United States to negotiate with North Korea bilaterally, sign a peace agreement and construct a security mechanism in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the biggest obstacle to resolving the Korean Peninsula issue is the choice of strategic interests of the United States, as long as the United States does not change its global strategic objectives of "super-hegemony" and incorporate East Asia into the "Pacific Community". In order to ensure its dominant position in East Asia, a series of problems in the Korean Peninsula will be difficult to solve, and the establishment of security mechanism in Northeast Asia will be far away. The author believes that the Obama administration can adjust the US strategy for East Asia (with China and Russia to achieve strategic cooperation in Northeast Asia) and finally sign a peace agreement through bilateral direct negotiations with the DPRK under the multilateral framework (six-party talks). It has become the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and the North Korean issue. China can make more active efforts on this issue and lay the foundation for controlling the security process of Northeast Asia and finally gaining the dominant power of the strategic pattern of Northeast Asia.
【学位授予单位】：外交学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D871.2;D831.2

【相似文献】