从演化博弈论视角探析印孟之间水资源争端
发布时间：2019-03-21 20:24
【摘要】： 印度和孟加拉国是相邻的沿岸国,共享54条河流,其中包括两大喜马拉雅河流系统-恒河和布拉马普特拉河,影响两国关系发展的主要原因在于印孟对恒河水资源的分享利用问题。该争端自1971年孟加拉国在印度的帮助下获得独立开始就成为影响两国关系发展的主要障碍之一。迄今为止,印度和孟加拉国两国围绕恒河水资源的分享与利用进行了长达数十年的博弈,虽然在此期间两国曾达成过两次协议和两次临时性安排以及一份于1996年达成的、有效期长达三十年的《印孟恒河河水分享条约》,但是这些共识和条约并没能从根本上解决该问题,印孟两国围绕利用恒河水资源产生的纠纷仍时有发生。 本文的目的就在于从演化博弈论的视角来探寻印孟之间缺乏促使水资源争端得到永久解决的有效机制的主要原因,并在此基础上以理论与事实相结合的方式为印孟两国解决该争端提供建设性意见。根据以上的逻辑思路,本论文的内容共分为六章。第一章重点介绍印孟水资源争端的背景。第二章提出了本文的演化博弈论分析框架。第三章介绍1996年《印孟恒河河水分享条约》签署之前印孟两国水资源争端的发展并对其进行相关博弈分析。第四章重点对印孟两国于1996年签署的《印孟恒河河水分享条约》的效力进行分析。第五章介绍了1996年《印孟恒河河水分享条约》签署之后印孟水资源争端的发展并对其进行博弈分析。最后一章在前文的基础上探讨第三方的参与对解决印孟水资源争端所起的作用,并对该争端的解决提供了建设性的意见。 从理论上来说,印孟之间水资源争端不能得到有效解决的原因在于在双方关于该问题进行的两人对局的“鹰-鸽博弈”中,不存在非强硬策略的演化稳定策略。将这一结论应用到现实中也就是说印孟单靠双边谈判无法有效地解决该争端。因此第三方的参与对于消除影响印孟两国关系发展的这一“顽症”无疑有着重要的作用。尽管如此,由于第三方所发挥的作用毕竟是间接的,解决印孟之间水资源争端的本质还在于有关各方能够做出巨大的努力:印孟双方应互相依存,互相尊重用水的正当权益,并共同致力于共享国际河流的开发与利用。
[Abstract]:India and Bangladesh are adjacent coastal countries, sharing 54 rivers, including the two Himalayan river systems-the Ganges and Brahma Putra rivers. The main reason affecting the development of bilateral relations lies in the sharing and utilization of Indo-Mencius water resources to the Ganges River. The dispute has been one of the main obstacles to the development of relations between the two countries since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence with the help of India. To date, India and Bangladesh have engaged in decades-long games on the sharing and utilization of the Ganges water resources, although two agreements and two interim arrangements and one reached in 1996 have been reached between the two countries, The Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty, which is valid for up to 30 years, has failed to solve the problem fundamentally. Disputes over the use of the Ganges water resources between India and Bangladesh still occur from time to time. The purpose of this paper is to explore the main reasons for the lack of an effective mechanism for the permanent settlement of water resources disputes between India and Bangladesh from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. On this basis, it provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute between India and Bangladesh by means of combination of theory and fact. According to the above logic thinking, the content of this paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the background of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. In the second chapter, the framework of evolutionary game theory is proposed. The third chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh before the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the relevant game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of the effectiveness of the Indo-Mengol River sharing Treaty signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. The fifth chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh after the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. The last chapter discusses the role of third-party participation in the settlement of the Indo-Mencius water dispute on the basis of the previous paper, and provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute. Theoretically speaking, the reason why the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh can not be solved effectively is that there is no evolutionary stability strategy of non-hardline strategy in the hawk-dove game between the two sides about the problem. Applying this conclusion to reality means that India and Bangladesh alone cannot effectively resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the participation of the third party plays an important role in the elimination of this "stubborn disease" which affects the development of the relations between India and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, since the role played by third parties is, after all, indirect, the essence of resolving the water dispute between India and Bangladesh lies in the ability of the parties concerned to make great efforts: India and Bangladesh should rely on each other and respect each other's legitimate rights and interests in water use. And work together to share the development and utilization of international rivers.
【学位授予单位】：外交学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D835;F224.32;F294
本文编号：2445289
[Abstract]:India and Bangladesh are adjacent coastal countries, sharing 54 rivers, including the two Himalayan river systems-the Ganges and Brahma Putra rivers. The main reason affecting the development of bilateral relations lies in the sharing and utilization of Indo-Mencius water resources to the Ganges River. The dispute has been one of the main obstacles to the development of relations between the two countries since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence with the help of India. To date, India and Bangladesh have engaged in decades-long games on the sharing and utilization of the Ganges water resources, although two agreements and two interim arrangements and one reached in 1996 have been reached between the two countries, The Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty, which is valid for up to 30 years, has failed to solve the problem fundamentally. Disputes over the use of the Ganges water resources between India and Bangladesh still occur from time to time. The purpose of this paper is to explore the main reasons for the lack of an effective mechanism for the permanent settlement of water resources disputes between India and Bangladesh from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. On this basis, it provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute between India and Bangladesh by means of combination of theory and fact. According to the above logic thinking, the content of this paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the background of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. In the second chapter, the framework of evolutionary game theory is proposed. The third chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh before the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the relevant game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of the effectiveness of the Indo-Mengol River sharing Treaty signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. The fifth chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh after the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. The last chapter discusses the role of third-party participation in the settlement of the Indo-Mencius water dispute on the basis of the previous paper, and provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute. Theoretically speaking, the reason why the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh can not be solved effectively is that there is no evolutionary stability strategy of non-hardline strategy in the hawk-dove game between the two sides about the problem. Applying this conclusion to reality means that India and Bangladesh alone cannot effectively resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the participation of the third party plays an important role in the elimination of this "stubborn disease" which affects the development of the relations between India and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, since the role played by third parties is, after all, indirect, the essence of resolving the water dispute between India and Bangladesh lies in the ability of the parties concerned to make great efforts: India and Bangladesh should rely on each other and respect each other's legitimate rights and interests in water use. And work together to share the development and utilization of international rivers.
【学位授予单位】：外交学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D835;F224.32;F294
【引证文献】
相关硕士学位论文 前1条
1 陈亮;孟印关系研究（1971-2006）[D];云南大学;2012年
，本文编号：2445289
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