美国政府欧安会政策考察（1969-1975）
发布时间：2019-05-15 15:55
【摘要】：本文以美国政府解密档案为主要支撑,在借鉴国内外新近研究成果的基础上,拟就1969-1975年间美国政府欧安会政策的评估、制定和实施进行考察,分析美国政府欧安会政策背后的深层原因,并阐述这一时期的外交战略理念,最终探讨欧安会对冷战结束的影响。 长期以来,欧安会一直被学界视为冷战期间东西方缓和的顶峰,而通向欧安会的“赫尔辛基进程(Helsinki Process)"及其后续会议对美国外交决策、美苏关系以及冷战的结束皆产生了深远影响,并加速了东欧地区民族民主意识的高涨,促成了东欧集团内部改革派力量壮大,且在引发苏东剧变、促成两极体系在持续了五十年之后宣告终结的过程中发挥了重要作用。与欧安会这般深远影响所不同的是,美国在整个会议期间的态度和立场却显得并不那么积极,这与尼克松——福特当局的欧洲安全政策有直接的关系。其中,基辛格个人的欧洲安全理念对当局的欧安会对策制定影响尤为明显。 全文共分为五个部分： 第一部分阐述欧安会问题的由来、发展及各方对策,重点分析苏联政府提出欧安会的动机和北约盟国的态度。苏联欧安会倡议是旨在寻求对战后欧洲边界的国际认可、在美国与西欧各国之间打入楔子,同时与西方开展经济合作,但该倡议却一再被西方拒绝,这与冷战肇始的国际环境、苏联自身的策略密切相关。在敌对尚未消退而缓和尚未开启之时,美国政府不可能轻易将欧安会纳入双边或者多边对话中,而处于马歇尔计划援助之下西欧各国,对美依存度尚高,更不可能摆脱美国追求独立自主的外交政策。但随着欧洲走上复兴之路,西欧各国开始在美苏之间逐渐发出自己的声音,欧安会召开的时机尚不成熟但却慢慢发生变化。 第二部分则重点阐述缓和形势下,尼克松当局对欧安会政策的初步形成过程。在欧洲缓和浪潮推动下,召开欧安会的倡议逐渐被西欧各国所接受。尼克松-基辛格上台后对欧洲政策进行修订,根据关联的策略,相继提出了以柏林问题的解决和确定共同均衡裁军谈判召开日期作为召开欧安会的条件。这一时期美国政府的主要政策是尽可能借苏联的迫切心情来获取更多的战略利益,诸如首脑访问等。 第三部分重点分析美国在筹备会议召开过程中的立场。这一时期美国对欧安会政策进一步形成发展。随着筹备会议各项议程的开展,美国与苏联、欧洲政治委员会之间的分歧日益凸显。在尼克松当局对欧关系原则指导下,尼克松当局成功地实现了筹备会议的召开与共同均衡裁军之间的关联。与此同时,对欧安会的“损害限制”政策也成为了美国在正式会议期间的基本政策。 第四部分着重阐释欧安会政策的推进与执行。在这一阶段,苏联与西欧各国分歧重重导致会期相当冗长,谈判甚至一度陷入僵局。因需考量与盟国的微妙关系,以及受到苏联的催促和舆论的质疑,基辛格不得不在苏联和西欧各国中间调停。至水门事件后,福特总统上台,在基辛格领导的国家安全委员会指导下,美国与欧洲政治委员会之间依然保持了有效的沟通。经过长期的讨价还价,在基辛格的斡旋下,最终协定得以达成。 第五部分是结论。赫尔辛基协定的签署是一次谋求集体安全的尝试,也是理想主义者和现实主义者之间的交锋,短期的历史也证明了这点。该协定是对60年代中期以来欧洲缓和的肯定,也是对美苏之间均势的一种认可。事实上,协定也并没有阻止苏联入侵阿富汗,所达成的协定也并没有有效地实施。但从长远来看,赫尔辛基协定第三个篮子所开启的人员、信息、文化交流,却给西方分化瓦解苏联提供了良好的机会,在二十年内加速了苏联阵营的解体,却是尼克松和基辛格等政策决策者当时并未预料到的。
[Abstract]:Based on the recent research results from home and abroad, this paper, based on the recent research results from home and abroad, is to make a survey on the evaluation, formulation and implementation of the CSCE policy in the United States of America from 1969 to 1975, and to analyze the deep reason behind the policy of the United States government's CSCE. The paper also discusses the concept of the diplomatic strategy in this period, and finally discusses the influence of CSCE on the end of the cold war. For a long time, the CSCE has been regarded as the peak of the transition between the East and the West during the cold war, and the "Helsinki Process" to the CSCE and its follow-up meetings have far-reaching effects on the United States diplomatic decision-making, the U.S.-Soviet relations and the end of the cold war The sound of the national democratic consciousness in the eastern European region has led to the expansion of the internal reformers in the Eastern European Group, and has played an important role in the process of ending the declaration of the two-pole system after 50 years after the change of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the far-reaching implications of the CSCE, the attitude and position of the United States during the entire session is not so positive, which is directly related to the European security policy of the Nixon _ Ford authorities This is the case in which Kissinger's personal European security concept has an impact on the authorities' CSCE response The full text is divided into five. Part I: The first part addresses the problems of the CSCE, the development of the CSCE and the responses of the parties, with a focus on the motives of the CSCE and the NATO The Soviet Union's initiative is to seek international recognition of the post-war European border, to strike a wedge between the United States and the Western European countries and to cooperate with the West, but the initiative has repeatedly been rejected by the West, which is contrary to the international environment since the beginning of the cold war and the Soviet Union's own policy The United States government is not likely to include the CSCE in a bilateral or multilateral dialogue, while the Western European countries, which are under the Marshall Plan's assistance, are not likely to get rid of the United States for their independence. But as Europe is on the way to the recovery, the Western European countries have begun to make their own voice between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the time for the CSCE to be held is not yet mature but slow The second part focuses on the easing of the situation and the Nixon administration's policy on the CSCE The initial process of the formation of the CSCE, driven by the European mitigation wave, is gradually being called upon to convene the CSCE initiative Western European countries accepted. Nixon-Kissinger, who came to power, revised the European policy and, on the basis of the associated strategy, put forward the resolution of the Berlin issue and the establishment of a co-balanced Conference on Disarmament as a call. On the condition of the CSCE, the main policy of the United States Government during this period is to obtain more strategic interests as far as possible through the pressing mood of the Soviet Union, The third part focuses on the U.S. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The position in the process of convening. The United States of the United States to the CSCE Further development of the policy. With the development of the agendas of the preparatory meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union and the European Political Commission The differences between the Nixon Administration and the Nixon Administration, under the guidance of the Nixon administration on the principle of the relationship between the two countries, have succeeded in achieving the holding and common of the preparatory meeting. At the same time, the "damage limit" policy on the CSCE has also become the United States in the United States The basic policy during the session. The fourth part focuses on the interpretation The advance and implementation of the CSCE policy. In this stage, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries have led to a considerable length of time The talks are even in a stalemate, and Kissinger has to be in a position to consider the delicate relationship with the allies, as well as the challenge of the Soviet Union's urging and public opinion. In the middle of the Soviet and Western European countries, after the Watergate incident, President Ford took office and under the guidance of the National Security Council led by Kissinger, the United States and the European Political Committee An effective communication is still in place. After long-term bargaining, Kissinger's head Screw off, final agreement The fifth part is the conclusion. The signing of the Helsinki agreement is an attempt to seek collective security and an intersection between the idealist and the realist. The short-term history has also proved that. The agreement is an affirmation of Europe's relaxation since the mid-1960s, too. A recognition of the balance between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. In fact, the agreement did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. The agreement also has not been implemented effectively. But in the long run, the people, information and cultural exchanges opened by the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement have provided a good opportunity for the Western to break down the Soviet Union, at two The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accelerated in ten years, but Nixon and Kissinger, and so on.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：K712;D871.2
本文编号：2477617
[Abstract]:Based on the recent research results from home and abroad, this paper, based on the recent research results from home and abroad, is to make a survey on the evaluation, formulation and implementation of the CSCE policy in the United States of America from 1969 to 1975, and to analyze the deep reason behind the policy of the United States government's CSCE. The paper also discusses the concept of the diplomatic strategy in this period, and finally discusses the influence of CSCE on the end of the cold war. For a long time, the CSCE has been regarded as the peak of the transition between the East and the West during the cold war, and the "Helsinki Process" to the CSCE and its follow-up meetings have far-reaching effects on the United States diplomatic decision-making, the U.S.-Soviet relations and the end of the cold war The sound of the national democratic consciousness in the eastern European region has led to the expansion of the internal reformers in the Eastern European Group, and has played an important role in the process of ending the declaration of the two-pole system after 50 years after the change of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the far-reaching implications of the CSCE, the attitude and position of the United States during the entire session is not so positive, which is directly related to the European security policy of the Nixon _ Ford authorities This is the case in which Kissinger's personal European security concept has an impact on the authorities' CSCE response The full text is divided into five. Part I: The first part addresses the problems of the CSCE, the development of the CSCE and the responses of the parties, with a focus on the motives of the CSCE and the NATO The Soviet Union's initiative is to seek international recognition of the post-war European border, to strike a wedge between the United States and the Western European countries and to cooperate with the West, but the initiative has repeatedly been rejected by the West, which is contrary to the international environment since the beginning of the cold war and the Soviet Union's own policy The United States government is not likely to include the CSCE in a bilateral or multilateral dialogue, while the Western European countries, which are under the Marshall Plan's assistance, are not likely to get rid of the United States for their independence. But as Europe is on the way to the recovery, the Western European countries have begun to make their own voice between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the time for the CSCE to be held is not yet mature but slow The second part focuses on the easing of the situation and the Nixon administration's policy on the CSCE The initial process of the formation of the CSCE, driven by the European mitigation wave, is gradually being called upon to convene the CSCE initiative Western European countries accepted. Nixon-Kissinger, who came to power, revised the European policy and, on the basis of the associated strategy, put forward the resolution of the Berlin issue and the establishment of a co-balanced Conference on Disarmament as a call. On the condition of the CSCE, the main policy of the United States Government during this period is to obtain more strategic interests as far as possible through the pressing mood of the Soviet Union, The third part focuses on the U.S. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The position in the process of convening. The United States of the United States to the CSCE Further development of the policy. With the development of the agendas of the preparatory meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union and the European Political Commission The differences between the Nixon Administration and the Nixon Administration, under the guidance of the Nixon administration on the principle of the relationship between the two countries, have succeeded in achieving the holding and common of the preparatory meeting. At the same time, the "damage limit" policy on the CSCE has also become the United States in the United States The basic policy during the session. The fourth part focuses on the interpretation The advance and implementation of the CSCE policy. In this stage, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries have led to a considerable length of time The talks are even in a stalemate, and Kissinger has to be in a position to consider the delicate relationship with the allies, as well as the challenge of the Soviet Union's urging and public opinion. In the middle of the Soviet and Western European countries, after the Watergate incident, President Ford took office and under the guidance of the National Security Council led by Kissinger, the United States and the European Political Committee An effective communication is still in place. After long-term bargaining, Kissinger's head Screw off, final agreement The fifth part is the conclusion. The signing of the Helsinki agreement is an attempt to seek collective security and an intersection between the idealist and the realist. The short-term history has also proved that. The agreement is an affirmation of Europe's relaxation since the mid-1960s, too. A recognition of the balance between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. In fact, the agreement did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. The agreement also has not been implemented effectively. But in the long run, the people, information and cultural exchanges opened by the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement have provided a good opportunity for the Western to break down the Soviet Union, at two The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accelerated in ten years, but Nixon and Kissinger, and so on.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：K712;D871.2
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