任人唯亲还是任人唯贤——来自北京市文化创业企业的证据

发布时间：2018-04-21 09:56

本文选题：任人唯亲 + 任人唯贤　；参考：《经济理论与经济管理》2017年04期

【摘要】：在中国传统文化和市场经济的双重环境下,企业在治理结构上是"任人唯亲"还是"任人唯贤"一直是一个存在争议的问题。从公司治理实践上看,两种治理模式各有优劣。那么,企业在什么情况下更可能"任人唯亲"呢?本文基于最优授权理论提出了一个理论框架,然后使用一个独特的创业企业调查数据,采取计量经济学方法进行了实证检验。本文的主要发现是:有创业经历的或文化水平低的企业主更愿意任用亲戚担任企业高管,而男性、有管理学背景或有银行贷款的企业主更不愿意任用亲戚担任企业高管。本文的研究结论对于当前"大众创业、万众创新"政策具有重要的理论意义。
[Abstract]:Under the dual environment of Chinese traditional culture and market economy, it is always a controversial question whether the corporate governance structure is "cronyism" or "meritocracy". From the corporate governance practice, the two governance models have their own advantages and disadvantages. So under what circumstances are companies more likely to be "cronies"? This paper proposes a theoretical framework based on the optimal authorization theory, and then uses a unique entrepreneurial survey data to make an empirical test using econometric methods. The main findings of this paper are as follows: entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial experience or low education are more willing to appoint relatives as executives, while men with background in management or with bank loans are more reluctant to appoint relatives as executives. The conclusion of this paper is of great theoretical significance to the current policy of "Mass Entrepreneurship, Mass Innovation".
【作者单位】：中国人民大学经济学院;首都经济贸易大学经济学院;
【基金】：北京市自然科学基金青年项目(9154025) 中国人民大学新教师启动金项目(2016030032) 北京市优秀人才项目的资助
【分类号】：G124

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