解放战争时期刘邓大军挺进大别山研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 07:32

本文选题：解放战争　切入点：刘邓大军　出处：《上海师范大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文重点研究刘邓大军挺进大别山的原因、性质和效果,阐述了一些与目前中国学界和政界主流观点不同的看法。按照战争的规律和形势的发展,人民解放军在解放战争中,由保卫解放区的内线作战转为进攻国民党统治区的外线作战,是顺理成章的事情。但是这种转变需要具备一定的条件,一般是在双方力量对比由敌强我弱转变为敌弱我强之后,而且一般会采用渐进式推进的方式。但1947年8月刘邓大军挺进大别山的时机和方式却是打破常规的。在粉碎了国民党军对各解放区的全面进攻之后,处于国民党重点进攻中的陕北和山东解放区面临着巨大的压力。中共中央在此时命令刘邓大军无后方千里跃进大别山的原因,是为了吸引国民党军队回援,用“围魏救赵”的方式,扯散国民党对陕北的重点进攻,从而缓解陕北的经济困难。陈谢大军由原定调入陕北、直接解围,改为转兵豫西的决策,也是因为担心陕北贫瘠缺粮,无力支撑陈谢这新的八万大军。因此刘邓大军挺进大别山并不是国共双方力量转换后的战略进攻行为,而是在战略防御阶段,采取以攻代守的战略反攻行为。从效果来看,刘邓大军进入大别山后,事实上并没有调动多少进攻解放区的国民党军队,反而引来了白崇禧指挥的桂系精锐部队这个新敌人的大举进攻,预期调动敌人回援、为陕北解围的目的没有达到,陕北反而陷入更大的困境。由于远离后方作战,面临许多无法克服的困难,加上国民党不断调动军队“清剿”,在进入大别山仅三个月后,刘、邓被迫分兵,留在大别山的部队也只能实行“避战”政策,用游击作战的方式与国民党军周旋,无法有效组织大规模歼灭战。随后,留在大别山的部队也撤出了大别山,并未实现在大别山“站住脚”、重建根据地的战略目标。在这个进出大别山的过程中,刘邓大军减员过半,“元气”大伤,由内战初期人数众多、“九战九捷”的一支劲旅,变成一支缺乏攻坚能力的弱旅。巨大的代价换来并不理想的效果,难免使人对挺进大别山决策的正确性产生质疑。本文分为五章:第一章绪论,介绍本文研究主题和研究意义,研究现状,方法、创新和结构等。第二章梳理刘邓大军挺进大别山的曲折决策过程。第三章分析刘邓大军千里跃进大别山的原因,其中对陕北经济困难情况做了较为详细的阐述。第四章简要概括刘邓大军挺进大别山及撤离大别山的全过程。第五章结语,简要概括全文主要观点,包括分析刘邓大军挺进大别山的原因、性质和效果。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on the reasons, nature and effect of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains, and expounds some views that are different from the current mainstream views of Chinese academic and political circles. According to the law of the war and the development of the situation, the people's Liberation Army was in the War of Liberation. It is only natural that the internal line operations in the liberated areas should be converted to outside operations in the Kuomintang areas. However, such a change requires certain conditions, generally after the balance of forces between the two sides has changed from a strong enemy to a strong one. But in August 1947, Liu Deng's army moved into the Dabie Mountains in an unconventional way. After crushing the Kuomintang army's all-out attack on the liberated areas, The northern Shaanxi and Shandong liberated areas, which are under the Kuomintang's major offensive, are facing tremendous pressure. The reason why the CPC Central Committee ordered Liu Deng's army to leapfrog into the Dabie Mountains thousands of miles from the rear at this time was to attract the Kuomintang troops to return to the mountains. By "besieging Wei and rescuing Zhao", the Kuomintang's key attack on northern Shaanxi was dispersed, thereby alleviating the economic difficulties in northern Shaanxi. Chen Xie's army was originally transferred to northern Shaanxi to directly rescue the enclave, and instead made the decision to switch troops to the western part of Henan, also because he was worried that the northern part of Shaanxi was barren and short of grain. Unable to support Chen Hsieh's new 80,000 troops. Therefore, Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains is not a strategic offensive act after the transfer of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but a strategic counter-offensive act in the strategic defense phase, which is based on attack instead of defense. From the point of view of the effect, After Liu Deng's army entered the Dabie Mountains, in fact, it did not mobilize many Kuomintang troops attacking the liberated areas. On the contrary, it attracted a large-scale attack by the elite Guizinese troops of the Department of Guangxi under the command of Bai Chongxi, who were expected to mobilize the enemy's return assistance. Instead of achieving the goal of resolving the siege in northern Shaanxi, North Shaanxi is in even greater difficulty. Because it is far from the rear, it faces many insurmountable difficulties, and the Kuomintang has constantly mobilized its troops to "clear and suppress" the encirclement. Only three months after entering the Dabie Mountains, Liu, Deng was forced to split up his troops, and those who remained in the Dabie Mountains were forced to carry out the policy of "avoiding war" and engaged in guerrilla operations against the Kuomintang forces. They were unable to effectively organize a large-scale war of annihilation. Subsequently, the troops remaining in the Dabie Mountains withdrew from the Dabie Mountains, too. The strategic goal of "establishing a foothold" and rebuilding the base area in the Dabie Mountains has not been realized. In the process of entering and leaving the Dabie Mountains, Liu Deng's army has been reduced by more than half, "vitality" has been greatly wounded, and the number of people in the early stage of the civil war has been large, and the "nine wars and nine victories" have been a strong force. To become a weak brigade lacking the ability to attack the key points. The huge cost for the unsatisfactory results inevitably makes people question the correctness of the decision to advance into the Dabie Mountains. This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter is an introduction, which introduces the theme and significance of this study, research status, methods, Chapter two combs the tortuous decision-making process of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains. Chapter three analyzes the reasons why Liu Deng's army leapt into the Dabie Mountains. The fourth chapter briefly summarizes the whole process of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains and withdrawing from the Dabie Mountains. Chapter five concludes with a brief summary of the main viewpoints of the full text. Including analysis of Liu Deng army into the Dabie Mountain reasons, nature and effect.
【学位授予单位】：上海师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：K266

【共引文献】