“预备立宪”—博弈论视角下的清廷派系之争

发布时间：2018-04-14 18:22

本文选题：预备立宪 + 博弈论　；参考：《山东大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：“预备立宪”在中国宪政改革的历史上占有重要的一席,可以说它与清政府的命运息息相关,正是它的重要性也决定了这次改革的坎坷性与不确定性。从前期的准备到中期的实施,直至后期的收场,这一过程无不充满了派系斗争的影子,或出于公论,或为谋得私利,对于那些别有用心的政客而言,“预备立宪”恰恰成为其掩饰自己野心最好的幌子。这场改革本身就充满了复杂性,顽固派和立宪派关于在中国当时的历史条件下要不要立宪的争论,大有你死我活的态势,从某一方面来说,正应和了博弈论中的零和博弈。文章的第一部分就是以零和博弈的四种分布情况来分析顽固派和立宪派做出选择的依据,从而为王朝的取向偏好提供了理论基础。第二部分以博弈论之中的严格从优战略为出发点,通过对慈禧选择的分析,指出“预备立宪”不失为一种上上策,既可以满足立宪派和国内要求改革的呼声,又不至于让顽固派太过于孤立,宪政虽然难产,但最终在蹒跚中也尘埃落定。然而,在博弈论中被称为“自然”的慈禧太后的离世,让原本就艰难前行的宪政改革一下子找不到前进的方向,蛰伏已久的派系矛盾再次不可抑制地爆发了,只不过依然打的是“立宪”的旗号,由此拉开了以载沣为首的晚清少壮派和以袁世凯为首的袁氏集团对晚清权力的最后博弈。文章第三部分侧重于这两派对权力争夺的描写,此时的立宪意味已经不像开始时那样浓重,立宪真正开始沦为一种工具,晚清少壮派正是因为无法应对立宪这一局面而最终受到致命一击,把自己到手的权力拱手相让。这一部分以博弈论中的“智猪博弈”为例,从这一案例中来进一步分析刻画袁世凯是如何由小变大,由弱变强,并最终将权力收入囊中。文章通过将博弈论融入到“预备立宪”这一过程中来展示这一改革的产牛,发展和天亡。
[Abstract]:The "preparation for constitutionalism" occupies an important seat in the history of constitutional reform in China. It can be said that it is closely related to the fate of the Qing government, and it is its importance that also determines the bumpy and uncertain nature of this reform.From early preparation to implementation in the medium to the end of the period, this process is full of factional struggles, either out of public opinion or for private gain, for politicians with ulterior motives,The preparation for constitutionalism is the best cover for his ambition.The reform itself is full of complexity, die-hards and constitutionalists on whether to establish the constitution under the historical conditions of China, there is a situation of life and death, from a certain aspect, is responding to the game theory in the zero-sum game.The first part of this paper is to analyze the basis of the choice of die-hards and constitutionalists based on the four distributions of zero-sum game, thus providing a theoretical basis for the preference of dynasty orientation.In the second part, starting from the strict and superior strategy in game theory, through the analysis of Cixi's choice, the author points out that "preparing for constitutionalism" is the best policy, which can satisfy the demands of constitutionalism and domestic demands for reform.Without leaving the die-hards too isolated, constitutionalism, though difficult, ended up stumbling.However, the death of Empress Dowager Cixi, who is known as "nature" in game theory, made the constitutional reform, which was already struggling ahead, suddenly unable to find the way forward, and the long-dormant factional contradictions broke out irreversibly again.However, it is still playing the banner of "constitutionalism", thus opening the final game of the late Qing Dynasty, led by Zaifeng and Yuan's Group, headed by Yuan Shikai, on the power of the late Qing Dynasty.The third part of the article focuses on the description of the power struggle between the two parties. At this time, the constitutional meaning is not as strong as it was at the beginning, and the constitution really began to become a tool.Because of their inability to cope with the constitutionalism in the late Qing Dynasty, the Shaozang school was finally hit with a fatal blow and ceded its power.This part takes the game theory as an example to further analyze and depict how Yuan Shikai changed from small to large, from weak to strong, and finally took power into the bag.By integrating game theory into the process of "preparing constitution", this paper demonstrates the cattle production, development and death of the reform.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：K257

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