基于部门利益博弈的产业低碳转型机制设计

发布时间：2018-01-18 08:40

本文关键词：基于部门利益博弈的产业低碳转型机制设计　出处：《生态经济》2017年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：产业的低碳转型涉及企业、政府,其中政府部门包括环保部门和财政、税收、金融等经济部门。在分析环保部门、经济部门及企业的行为动机和利益取向的基础上,运用完全信息静态博弈方法推导各主体行为决策的影响因素。研究结果表明:在不考虑部门利益时,环境政策及财政、税收、金融等经济政策能很好地促进企业的低碳转型;考虑部门利益时,企业的低碳转型会对环保部门、经济部门的监管成本及部门利益产生影响,从而对产业低碳转型政策的设计和实施提出了新的要求。因此,在部门利益博弈的基础上,运用机制设计理论,从公共选择角度分析了部门利益与公共利益的良性互动,从信息共享角度探讨部门间的协调,对产业低碳转型机制的设计进行深入的探讨。
[Abstract]:The low-carbon transformation of the industry involves businesses, governments, which include environmental protection departments and economic sectors such as finance, taxation and finance. On the basis of the behavior motivation and benefit orientation of economic departments and enterprises, this paper deduces the influencing factors of each subject's behavior decision by using the method of complete information static game. The research results show that when the sector interests are not considered. Environmental policies, fiscal, tax, financial and other economic policies can well promote the low-carbon transformation of enterprises; When considering the sectoral interests, the low-carbon transformation of enterprises will have an impact on the environmental protection sector, economic sector regulatory costs and sectoral interests, thus putting forward new requirements for the design and implementation of industrial low-carbon transformation policy. On the basis of the game of departmental interests, this paper analyzes the benign interaction between departmental interests and public interests from the perspective of public choice by using the theory of mechanism design, and probes into the coordination between departments from the angle of information sharing. The design of industry low-carbon transition mechanism is discussed in depth.
【作者单位】：广西财经学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“西部低碳城市新兴产业培育的制度联动机制研究”(16BJL118)
【分类号】：F124.5;F224.32;X32
【正文快照】： 1问题的提出从20世纪70年代起,政府通过命令-控制型的环境规制干预产业结构调整,以减少产业发展带来的环境问题。但是政府干预加强的同时,规制成本也在提高。到了20世纪80年代,以环境税、排污权交易为代表的基于市场的环境规制因较低的规制成本和较强的灵活性被广泛应用[1]。

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