碳税规制下零售商减排成本分担对企业减排决策的影响

发布时间：2018-02-21 21:57

本文关键词： 碳税碳排放敏感度零售商成本分担斯坦伯格博弈　出处：《商业研究》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于制造商与零售商行为的斯坦伯格博弈,本文分析在碳税规制下零售商减排成本分担如何影响制造商与零售商减排的最优决策。研究结果表明:在零售商不承担减排成本时,零售商的最优订货批量与制造商的减排量正相关,零售商的最优订货量与产品的批发价格负相关;在零售商承担减排成本时,零售商的订购批量与制造商产品的减排量之间的关系主要取决于消费者对碳排放敏感度与零售商成本分担率之差,当消费者对碳排放的敏感度大于零售商成本分担率,零售商的最优订购量与制造商的减排量之间正相关,反之则负相关。零售商的订购批量与制造商确定的半成品价格负相关;实施成本分担契约后,如果制造商的减排量满足一定约束条件,制造商的利润和零售商的利润会同时增加,实现帕累托最优。
[Abstract]:Steinberg game manufacturer and retailer behavior based on the analysis of the carbon tax under the regulation of emission reduction cost sharing retailers how to influence the optimal decision of manufacturer and retailer reduction. The results show that the retailer does not undertake emission reduction in emission reduction cost, optimal order quantity and the manufacturer retailer is related to the optimal order quantity and product wholesale retailers the price is negatively related; incur abatement costs in retailers, the relationship between emission reductions of order quantities of retailers and manufacturers of products mainly depends on consumers of carbon emissions and the sensitivity of retailer cost sharing rate difference, when consumers share of carbon emissions is more sensitive than the retailer cost reductions, a positive correlation between the retailer's optimal ordering with the manufacturer, and vice versa. The negative correlation between retailers and manufacturers to determine the quantity of semi-finished price negative After implementation of cost sharing contract, if the manufacturer's emission reduction meets certain constraints, the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of the retailer will increase simultaneously, so as to achieve Pareto optimality.

【作者单位】：福建工程学院管理学院;厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目,项目编号:71671152 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目,项目编号:NCET-12-0321 福建工程学院引进人才科研启动基金项目,项目编号:GY-S17001
【分类号】：F715.5;F724.2;X322

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