基于不对称Nash谈判模型的吉林省水污染物初始排污权分配方法研究

发布时间：2018-04-04 01:24

本文选题：初始排污权　切入点：区域　出处：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：排污权分配实际上包含着两个层面:首先是区域间的一级分配,即省域根据总量控制要求,进行区域间的逐级分配,二是地区再分配给各排污单位。但从目前我国的研究和实践上来看,由于国家和地区的经济发展政策、各地区的资源禀赋也存在着差异,因此对于排污权的一级分配方法应充分考虑各地区的差异性。因此本文的研究目的在于建立差异性公平的排污权分配机制,从而在初始排污权的一级分配上体现各地区的差异性和分配的公平性。意义在于为决策者提供区域间的污染物初始排污权分配的方法,使得在总量控制目标下的各排污主体通过污染减排合作,能够实现较低成本的区域污染总量减排目标,调动参与分配的各地区实施污染物减排的积极性,促进排污权交易制度顺利实施。本文通过以下方法对如何在区域间公平分配排污权进行研究:(1)首先,结合区域自身的特点,从经济社会与环境的角度进行分析,构建了区域间初始排污权分配的“差异性公平”分配模式。通过构建区域污染物减排评价体系,将区域污染物减排作为目标层,以社会经济、环境质量、处理能力为准则层。运用层次分析法对省域内参与分配的区域的经济社会、环境质量以及污染物处理能力进行综合分析,计算各区域水污染物减排评价因子,获得区域污染物减排量分配系数,来充分体现地区的差异性。(2)其次,本文打破原有的初始排污权区域间分配单纯依赖政府从上到下的行政手段的分配机制,引入博弈论中的不对称Nash谈判机制。各地区进行协商谈判,给予各地区在省域内,水污染物的减排量占全省水污染物减排总量的分配比例。结合体现区域差异性的分配系数,通过模型计算确定最终的省域内各地区的水污染物减排量占全省水污染物减排量的分配比例。(3)最后,通过全省水污染物减排量和通过不对称Nash谈判模型确定的最终各地区水污染物减排量所占比例,再结合基准年的水污染物实际排放量确定目标年份的水污染物初始排污权量的分配。以吉林省为例,对吉林省2016年—2020年的COD的初始排污权量进行分配。研究结果显示:不对称Nash谈判模型由于建立了区域污染物减排量评价指标体系,能够体现了各地区的差异性。同时打破了原有的单纯依赖上级政府决策进行分配的模式,各地区相互给予的分配量比例,一定程度上满足了各地区的预期,能够有效化解对抗,体现分配的公平性。因此该方法下的分配量可以满足吉林省的污染物总量控制目标,同时符合各地区实际污染物排放情况,适应当地的经济发展水平与污染物治理能力,可以提高初始排污权分配的公平性,以及各地区开展污染物减排的积极性,有助于各地区污染控制目标的实现。
[Abstract]:The allocation of emission rights actually includes two levels: first, the distribution between regions, that is, according to the requirements of total quantity control, the province carries out the gradual distribution among regions, and the second is the regional redistribution to the pollutant emission units.However, from the current research and practice in our country, due to the national and regional economic development policies, there are differences in resource endowments of different regions, so the primary allocation method of emission rights should fully consider the differences of different regions.Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to establish a differential and fair mechanism for the allocation of emission rights, so as to reflect the regional differences and the fairness of distribution in the primary allocation of the initial emission rights.The significance lies in providing a method for the decision makers to allocate the initial pollutant emission rights among different regions, so that the polluters under the total emission control target can achieve the lower cost regional emission reduction target through the emission reduction cooperation.We will mobilize the enthusiasm of all regions involved in the distribution of pollutant emission reduction and promote the smooth implementation of the emission trading system.In this paper, the following methods are used to study how to distribute the emission rights fairly among different regions. First of all, considering the characteristics of the region itself, from the angle of economy, society and environment,The "differential fair" distribution mode of initial emission right allocation between regions is constructed.By constructing the regional pollutant emission reduction evaluation system, the emission reduction of regional pollutants is regarded as the target layer, and the social economy, environmental quality and treatment ability are taken as the criterion layer.The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is used to analyze the economic and social, environmental quality and pollutant treatment ability of the regions involved in the distribution of water pollutants in the province, and to calculate the evaluation factors of the emission reduction of water pollutants in each region, and to obtain the distribution coefficient of the emission reduction of the regional pollutants.Secondly, this paper breaks the original allocation mechanism of initial emission rights between regions that rely solely on the government administrative means from top to bottom, and introduces the asymmetric Nash negotiation mechanism in game theory.Each region carries on the negotiation, gives each region in the province domain, the water pollutant abatement quantity accounts for the province water pollutant emission reduction total quantity distributes the proportion.Combined with the distribution coefficient reflecting the regional differences, the final distribution ratio of water pollutant emission reduction in each region of the province to the whole province is determined by the model calculation.The proportion of water pollutant emission reduction in various regions determined by the provincial water pollutant emission reduction amount and the final water pollutant emission reduction volume determined by asymmetric Nash negotiation model,Combined with the actual discharge of water pollutants in the base year, the distribution of the initial discharge weight of water pollutants in the target year is determined.Taking Jilin Province as an example, the initial emission weight of COD in Jilin Province from 2016 to 2020 is allocated.The results show that the asymmetric Nash negotiation model can reflect the regional differences because of the establishment of regional pollutant emission reduction evaluation index system.At the same time, it breaks the original pattern of distribution based on the decision of higher government, and the distribution ratio of each region can meet the expectations of each region to a certain extent, which can effectively resolve the confrontation and reflect the fairness of the distribution.Therefore, the assigned amount under this method can meet the goal of total pollutant control in Jilin Province, and at the same time accord with the actual pollutant discharge situation in various regions, and adapt to the level of local economic development and the ability of pollutant treatment.It can improve the fairness of the distribution of initial emission rights and the enthusiasm of each region to carry out pollutant emission reduction, which is helpful to the realization of the pollution control goal in each region.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X52

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