环境治理中的政府监查与企业治污行为研究

发布时间：2018-04-26 14:33

  本文选题：政府监查 + 进化稳定策略　； 参考：《运筹与管理》2017年02期

【摘要】：通过建立环境治理中地方政府与排污企业的进化博弈模型,考察了参与者的决策演化过程,分析了参与者的进化稳定策略及其影响因素。研究表明,地方政府政绩考核体系中环境指标的权重系数、企业的排污量并不会影响博弈双方的策略选择。地方政府监查行为和企业治污行为会受到包括系统初始状态在内的7种因素的影响。加大对企业不完全治污的处罚,降低企业的治污成本,尽管可以促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化,但却会不利于地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化;而中央政府提高对地方政府严格监查的奖励,加大对地方政府监查不力的处罚,降低地方政府的监查成本,以及降低企业利润对地方政府支付水平的影响系数,既可以促使地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化,又能够促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化。
[Abstract]:By establishing an evolutionary game model between local government and sewage enterprises in environmental governance, the decision evolution process of participants was investigated, and the evolutionary stability strategy of participants and its influencing factors were analyzed. The study shows that the weight coefficient of environmental indicators and the amount of enterprise sewage in the performance assessment system of local government will not affect the strategic choice of both sides of the game. The behavior of local government supervision and enterprise pollution control is affected by seven factors, including the initial state of the system. Increasing the punishment of incomplete pollution control and reducing the cost of pollution control of enterprises can promote the strategy choice of enterprises to the direction of complete pollution control, but it will not benefit the local government in the direction of strict supervision and inspection. And the central government will increase incentives for strict supervision of local governments, increase penalties for inadequate supervision by local governments, reduce local government supervision costs, and reduce the coefficient of influence of enterprise profits on the level of payment by local governments. It can not only promote the local government's strategy choice to the direction of strict supervision, but also promote the enterprise's strategy choice to the direction of complete pollution control.
【作者单位】： 大连海事大学公共管理与人文学院;大连大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AGL010) 国家自然科学基金(61074133)
【分类号】：F273;X322
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本文编号：1806443