基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-05-15 15:08

本文选题：集体行动 + 演化博弈　；参考：《中国人口·资源与环境》2017年09期

【摘要】：当前京津冀地区在雾霾问题上面临环境外部性困扰和集体行动困境,其根源在于地方政府作为雾霾合作治理集体成员的收益是不对称的,而割裂集体行动中收益与损失之间的联系是一种纠正环境外部性市场失灵的政府失灵。奥尔森集体行动的逻辑在京津冀三地政府执行雾霾合作治理规制行为上表现为私人理性与集体理性的动态重复博弈。针对京津冀地区大气污染联防联控执行状况,基于集体行动的逻辑视角,借助演化经济学研究工具,构建京津冀三地政府在雾霾合作治理执行策略的猎鹿模型、拓展模型的演化、随机和动态的博弈过程,探究地方政府执行雾霾合作治理集体行动的行为特征及其影响因素。根据复制动态方程探讨博弈主体行为演化特征和演化稳定策略,采用数值仿真方法分析不同情形下系统演化轨迹及演化均衡状态,考察随机因素对系统演化均衡状态的影响以及实现区域环境合作联盟的动态演化均衡机制。研究发现,京津冀三地政府在雾霾合作治理执行过程中的动态演化,很大程度上取决于本地区在区域整体中的环境偏好系数和搭便车收益与集体行动收益的比值。因此,中央政府要健全跨区域环境治理的制度建设,为京津冀地区建立一致的区域环境质量标准,有效降低地方政府在合作治理雾霾集体行动中的搭便车收益,以立法的形式对约束地方政府承担环境治理责任的强制和选择性激励措施加以确定。此外,将雾霾造成的经济损失作为重要指标纳入地方官员政绩考核体系,加强对地方政府雾霾治理执行情况的监管力度,实现合作治理雾霾集体行动责任落实的帕累托改进。
[Abstract]:At present, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is confronted with environmental externalities and collective action dilemma on the issue of haze, the root of which lies in the asymmetric benefits of local governments as collective members of haze cooperative governance. Separating the relationship between profit and loss in collective action is a kind of government failure which corrects environmental externality market failure. The logic of Olson's collective action is a dynamic repeated game between private rationality and collective rationality in the implementation of haze cooperative governance regulation by Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei governments. Based on the logic perspective of collective action and evolutionary economics research tools, the paper constructs a deer hunting model of the implementation strategy of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei governments in the haze management cooperation, aiming at the implementation of joint air pollution control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, based on the logic perspective of collective action. Expanding the evolution of the model and the stochastic and dynamic game process, this paper explores the behavior characteristics and influencing factors of the collective action of local government implementing haze cooperative governance. Based on the replicative dynamic equation, the evolution characteristics and evolutionary stability strategies of game players are discussed, and the evolution trajectory and equilibrium state of the system under different conditions are analyzed by numerical simulation method. The influence of random factors on the evolution equilibrium state of the system and the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium mechanism of regional environmental cooperation alliance are investigated. It is found that the dynamic evolution of the three governments in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in the process of implementing cooperative governance of haze depends to a great extent on the regional environmental preference coefficient and the ratio of hitchhiker benefit to collective action income in the region as a whole. Therefore, the central government should improve the system of trans-regional environmental governance, establish a consistent regional environmental quality standard for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, and effectively reduce the hitchhiker benefits of local governments in the cooperative haze collective action. In the form of legislation, the compulsory and selective incentive measures to restrain local governments from assuming responsibility for environmental governance are determined. In addition, taking the economic loss caused by haze as an important index, we should bring it into the performance assessment system of local officials, strengthen the supervision and control of the implementation of local government haze governance, and realize the Pareto improvement of cooperative governance of haze collective action responsibility.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学秦皇岛分校经济学院;中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“空间正义视阈下京津冀协同发展的城市群治理研究”(批准号:17BJY054) 河北省自然科学基金项目“基于情景分析的河北省碳减排环境效应与碳市场路径研究”(批准号:D2016501095)
【分类号】：X513

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