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双渠道低碳供应链合作减排与促销决策模型

发布时间:2018-05-22 08:41

  本文选题:低碳供应链 + 合作促销 ; 参考:《科技管理研究》2017年17期


【摘要】:研究由一个努力减排的制造商和一个努力促销的零售商组成的双渠道供应链的减排与促销决策问题。首先建立分散决策和集中决策下供应链成员的Stackelberg博弈模型,表明集中决策会激励制造商努力减排、零售商努力促销及提高供应链整体利润,为此提出合作减排、合作促销和成本互担3种合作模式,分别构建博弈模型来分析均衡解。研究表明:3种合作方式分别在不同的条件下能提高供应链及各成员的利润,但是合作减排方式不能激励零售商努力促销、合作促销方式不能激励制造商努力减排,而成本互担方式能同时激励制造商努力减排水平和零售商努力促销。最后通过数值仿真验证模型的有效性,并对比分析3种合作方式下消费者对直销渠道的偏好对供应链成员利润的影响。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the problem of emission reduction and promotion decision in a two-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer who is trying to reduce emissions and a retailer who is trying to promote sales. Firstly, the Stackelberg game model of supply chain members under decentralized and centralized decision is established, which shows that centralized decision will encourage manufacturers to reduce emissions, retailers will strive to promote and increase the overall profit of supply chain, so the cooperative emission reduction is proposed. Three cooperative modes of cooperative promotion and cost sharing are constructed to analyze the equilibrium solution. The research shows that the three ways of cooperation can increase the profit of the supply chain and members under different conditions, but cooperative emission reduction can not motivate retailers to promote sales, and cooperative promotion can not encourage manufacturers to make efforts to reduce emissions. The cost-sharing approach can encourage both manufacturers and retailers to work hard to cut emissions and promote sales. Finally, the effectiveness of the model is verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of consumers' preference for direct selling channels on the profit of supply chain members is compared and analyzed under the three modes of cooperation.
【作者单位】: 上海理工大学管理学院;上海理工大学超网络研究中心(中国);
【基金】:国家自然科学基金项目“基于供需网(SDN)基本特征理念的企业合作优化模型方法研究(71171135) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题“基于供需网合作度的街区开放判定要素与策略研究”(2016EGL007) 上海高校青年教师培养资助计划项目“基于自旋玻璃的社会供需网的演化机制研究”(slg14020) 上海市高原学科建设项目“管理科学与工程”
【分类号】:F274;F724;X322


本文编号:1921375

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