大气污染区域联控机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 04:39

本文选题：大气污染 + 区域联控　；参考：《北方工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：污染排放具有公共物品属性,而污染治理则具有正外部性,单靠一省一市无法解决根本问题,所以,污染联控问题的解决是区域间环境保护、经济发展的关键。本文首先从中央政府的角度出发,分析了污染治理的外部性会带来市场的非效率,研究了地方政府污染联控机制在占优均衡与子博弈精炼纳什均衡下的执行问题。研究发现:市场效率损失来源于私有信息与机制设计者的监管力度不够,得到了纳什均衡下机制执行的充分必要条件,并构建了一个动态机制来实现污染联控问题,同时通过非对称信息的引入,给出了占优均衡下机制实现目标的方式。其次,考察了地方政府的异质性特征,构造了非独裁和独裁的社会福利函数,给出了独裁地方政府存在的必要条件,设计了不完全信息下独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制,通过该机制尝试比较实践中的污染政策和实证结果。研究结果表明:若中央政府不监管,地方政府不能实现污染联控;独裁地方政府存在的必要条件是,他对社会福利的贡献程度大于其他地方政府对社会福利贡献程度的总和;非独裁和独裁地方政府污染联控机制都是占优策略可执行的,且独裁时的社会福利大于非独裁时的社会福利。最后,研究了不同参与者私有信息相关时的污染联控机制设计问题,讨论了非合谋机制在完全信息和不完全信息下的执行结果,并设计了防合谋机制,给出了不完全信息下机制执行的条件。研究结果表明:完全信息下,企业购买污染排放权的边际收益与中央政府污染治理的边际成本相等;不完全信息下,中央政府在调控污染排放权资源配置上失灵,使得高污染类型企业获得正的信息租金,为此达到减小该类型企业给政府带来的信息成本的目的;防合谋机制下,高污染类型企业合谋时,中央政府提供的社会污染治理总量与最优情形保持一致,低污染类型企业合谋时,中央政府污染治理的边际成本与该合谋企业私有信息的相关性有关,相关性越高,边际成本越小,防合谋难度越低。
[Abstract]:The pollution discharge has the attribute of public goods, but the pollution control has the positive externality, which can not solve the fundamental problem only by one province and one city. Therefore, the solution of the pollution joint control problem is the key to the interregional environmental protection and economic development. From the view of the central government, this paper analyzes the non-efficiency of the market caused by the externality of pollution control, and studies the implementation of the local government pollution control mechanism under the dominant equilibrium and the subgame refined Nash equilibrium. It is found that the loss of market efficiency comes from the insufficient supervision of private information and mechanism designers, and obtains the necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of the mechanism under Nash equilibrium, and constructs a dynamic mechanism to realize the problem of joint pollution control. At the same time, through the introduction of asymmetric information, the mechanism to achieve the goal under dominant equilibrium is given. Secondly, the heterogeneity of local government is investigated, the social welfare function of non-autocracy and dictatorship is constructed, the necessary conditions for the existence of autocratic local government are given, and the joint control mechanism of pollution between dictatorial and non-dictatorial local government is designed under incomplete information. Through this mechanism, we try to compare the pollution policy and empirical results in practice. The results show that if the central government does not regulate, the local government can not realize the pollution control, the necessary condition for the existence of authoritarian local government is that its contribution to social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of other local governments to social welfare. Non-autocratic and dictatorial local government pollution control mechanism is the dominant strategy can be carried out, and the social welfare of dictatorship is greater than that of non-dictatorship. Finally, this paper studies the design of the pollution control mechanism when the private information is related to different participants, discusses the implementation results of the non-collusion mechanism under the complete and incomplete information, and designs a mechanism to prevent collusion. The conditions of mechanism execution under incomplete information are given. The results show that under complete information, the marginal income of enterprises purchasing pollution emission rights is equal to the marginal cost of central government pollution control, and the central government fails to regulate and control the allocation of pollution emission rights resources under incomplete information. In order to reduce the cost of information brought to the government by the enterprises of high pollution type, the enterprises of high pollution type can obtain positive information rent. Under the mechanism of preventing collusion, when the enterprises of high pollution type collude with each other, The total amount of social pollution treatment provided by the central government is consistent with the optimal situation. When the enterprises of low pollution type collude, the marginal cost of the central government pollution treatment is related to the correlation of the private information of the collusion enterprise, and the higher the correlation is, The smaller the marginal cost, the lower the difficulty of preventing collusion.
【学位授予单位】：北方工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X51

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