基于收益共享契约与Nash讨价还价公平的供应链碳减排决策

发布时间：2018-07-07 08:17

  本文选题：收益共享契约 + 公平偏好　； 参考：《生态经济》2017年05期

【摘要】：针对现有低碳供应链决策相关研究中忽略了公平偏好的问题,以Nash讨价还价解作为判断收益分配是否公平的参考标准,基于收益共享契约建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到碳减排量和批发价格等供应链决策,并分析公平偏好的影响。研究发现,收益共享契约有利于供应链的碳减排;零售商和供应商的公平偏好都会促进碳减排;而且,公平偏好会影响收益共享契约的批发价格和收益共享比例两个参数的取值。因此,选择公平偏好较强的企业构建供应链,并根据自身和供应链伙伴公平偏好强度确定恰当的收益共享契约参数值,对促进供应链碳减排都具有重要意义。
[Abstract]:In view of the neglect of fairness preference in the existing research on low carbon supply chain decision making, a Stackelberg game model based on the income sharing contract is established by using Nash bargaining solution as the reference standard to judge whether the income distribution is fair or not. The supply chain decisions such as carbon abatement and wholesale price are obtained and the influence of fairness preference is analyzed. The study found that revenue-sharing contracts are conducive to carbon emissions reduction in supply chains; that both retailers and suppliers' fair preferences contribute to carbon emissions reduction; and, Fair preference will affect the wholesale price and income sharing ratio of the revenue sharing contract. Therefore, it is of great significance to select enterprises with strong equity preference to construct supply chain, and to determine appropriate benefit sharing contract parameters according to their fair preference intensity and supply chain partners' fair preference, which is of great significance to promote carbon emission reduction in supply chain.
【作者单位】： 重庆交通大学经济与管理学院;重庆理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“基于社会偏好及其认知动态演进的供应链契约优化与协调研究”(16CGL017)
【分类号】：F274;X32
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本文编号：2104355