税收竞争对环境污染的影响及传导机制分析

发布时间：2018-07-21 18:47

【摘要】：在中国经济高增长的背后,环境污染问题愈发凸显,不利于经济的可持续增长。税收竞争是影响环境污染的主要因素之一,但是学术界研究税收竞争对环境污染的影响及其作用机制的较少。本文按照污染物属性将其划分为外溢性污染物和非外溢性污染物,通过构建一个包含生产者、消费者、地方政府及中央政府的一般均衡模型,刻画了在税收竞争的背景下,地方政府的税收征管效率对不同属性污染物的影响及其传导机制。结果发现当污染物具有外溢性属性时,税收征管效率对该地环境污染的影响通过改变本地及周边地区资本存量渠道实现;当污染物具有非外溢性属性时,降低税收征管效率通过增加该地区资本存量而提高了环境污染。文章首先使用随机前沿模型测算了2007—2014年中国28个省份企业所得税的税收征管效率,并将其作为税收竞争的衡量指标,然后运用系统GMM法证实了所提的假说。研究显示:地方政府的税收竞争增加了本地区的资本存量;税收竞争是将本地资本存量作为其推高外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)及非外溢性污染物(固体废弃物)排放量的一个主要渠道,邻近地区资本存量则是推高外溢性污染物(二氧化硫)的次要渠道。这意味着,要想改善环境质量,中央政府应规范地方政府的税收竞争行为,尽快建立一套科学、有效的绿色GDP评价体系;完善地方转移支付制度;应针对各个地区的污染及经济发展情况利用财政激励手段引入环保、绿色的资本项目;地方政府应减少不利于环境改善的地方财政支出,增加环保投入比重。
[Abstract]:Behind the high economic growth in China, environmental pollution has become increasingly prominent, which is not conducive to sustainable economic growth. Tax competition is one of the main factors that affect environmental pollution, but the academic research on the impact of tax competition on environmental pollution and its mechanism is less. This paper divides the pollutants into spillover pollutants and non-spillover pollutants by constructing a general equilibrium model which includes producers, consumers, local governments and central governments, and depicts the background of tax competition. The effect of local government's tax collection and management efficiency on different attribute pollutants and its transmission mechanism. The results show that when pollutants have spillover properties, the effect of tax collection and management efficiency on local environmental pollution is realized by changing local and surrounding capital stock channels, and when pollutants have non-spillover properties, Reducing the efficiency of tax collection and administration increases environmental pollution by increasing the region's capital stock. This paper first uses the stochastic frontier model to measure the efficiency of enterprise income tax collection and management in 28 provinces of China from 2007 to 2014, and regards it as a measure of tax competition, and then verifies the hypothesis by using the systematic GMM method. The research shows that the tax competition of local governments increases the capital stock in the region; Tax competition is a major channel through which local capital stocks are used to boost emissions of spillover pollutants (sulphur dioxide) and non-spillover pollutants (solid waste), Nearby capital stocks are secondary to pushing up spillover pollutants (sulphur dioxide). This means that in order to improve the environmental quality, the central government should standardize the tax competition behavior of local governments, establish a set of scientific and effective green GDP evaluation system as soon as possible, and improve the local transfer payment system. In view of the pollution and economic development in various regions, fiscal incentives should be used to introduce environmental protection and green capital items, and local governments should reduce the local fiscal expenditure which is not conducive to environmental improvement and increase the proportion of environmental protection investment.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学经济与金融学院;
【分类号】：F812.42;X196

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