欧洲共同体 - 条件的关税优惠向发展中国家发放
发布时间：2016-03-18 12:20
I. Introduction介绍
2.条例规定五个优惠关税“安排”，即：
（一）在条例第七条所述的一般安排（“常规安排”）;
（二）劳动者权益保护专项激励安排;
（三）对环境的保护专项激励安排;
（四）对最不发达国家的特殊安排;和
（五）特别安排，以打击毒品生产和贩运（“药品的安排”）。
3.所有附件一所列法规的国家有资格获得常规安排，提供，大致在关税优惠，对列为“非敏感”的产品，并减少俗的共同关税关税停牌关税
对列为“敏感”产品的从价税。一般安排在更详细的段落2.4和专家组报告的2.5描述。在条例的其他四个安排提供关税优惠，除了那些常规的安排下授予的。但是，只有一些常规的安排的国家受益者也的其他安排受益者。具体地讲，对于劳动权利的保护和对环境的保护的特别奖励安排专项激励安排的喜好只限于那些国家的“由欧洲共同体决心要遵守一定的劳动[或]环境政策标准” ，， 分别。下的特殊安排喜好最不发达国家仅限于某些特定国家。最后，在药品的安排喜好只提供12个预定的国家，即玻利维亚，哥伦比亚，哥斯达黎加，厄瓜多尔，萨尔瓦多，危地马拉，洪都拉斯，尼加拉瓜，巴基斯坦，巴拿马，秘鲁和委内瑞拉。
1. The European Communities appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (the "Panel Report"). The Panel was established to consider a complaint by India against the European Communities regarding the conditions under which the European Communities accords tariff preferences to developing countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 "applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004" (the "Regulation").
2. The Regulation provides for five preferential tariff "arrangements" , namely:
(a) general arrangements described in Article 7 of the Regulation (the "General Arrangements");
(b) special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights;
(c) special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment;
(d) special arrangements for least-developed countries; and
(e) special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking (the "Drug Arrangements").
3. All the countries listed in Annex I to the Regulation are eligible to receive tariff preferences under the General Arrangements , which provide, broadly, for suspension of Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed as "non-sensitive" and for reduction of Common Customs Tariff
ad valorem duties on products listed as "sensitive". The General Arrangements are described in further detail in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of the Panel Report. The four other arrangements in the Regulation provide tariff preferences in addition to those granted under the General Arrangements. However, only some of the country beneficiaries of the General Arrangements are also beneficiaries of the other arrangements. Specifically, preferences under the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights and the special incentive arrangements for the protection of the environment are restricted to thosecountries that "are determined by the European Communities to comply with certain labour [or] environmental policy standards" , respectively. Preferences under the special arrangements for least-developed countries are restricted to certain specified countries. Finally, preferences under the Drug Arrangements are provided only to 12 predetermined countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
VI. Findings and Conclusions
190. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(c) modifies the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "bears the burden of invoking the Enabling Clause and justifying its Drug Arrangements" under that Clause, by finding that it was incumbent upon India to raise the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, but that the European Communities bore the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions of the Enabling Clause, in order to justify those Arrangements under that Clause; and finds, further, that India sufficiently raised paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 before the Panel;
(d) need not rule on the Panel's conclusion, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of the
Panel Report, that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(e) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.161 and 7.176 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations";
(f) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.174 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) [of the Enabling Clause] should be interpreted to mean all developing countries, with the exception that where developed countries are implementing a priori limitations, 'developing countries' may mean less than all developing countries"; and
(g) upholds, for different reasons, the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 8.1(d) of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".
191. The Appellate Body therefore recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and not justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
目录
I. Introduction 1
II. Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants 5
A. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant 5
1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause 5
2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause 9
B. Arguments of India – Appellee 15
1. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause 15
2. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause 18
C. Arguments of the Third Participants 22
1. Andean Community 22
2. Costa Rica 24
3. Panama 24
4. Paraguay 26
5. United States 27
III. Issues Raised in This Appeal 29
IV. The Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause 30
A. The Panel's Analysis and the Arguments on Appeal 30
B. Relevance of the Relationship Between Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause for the Allocation of the Burden of Proof 33
C. Characterization of the Enabling Clause 34
1. Text of Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause 34
2. Object and Purpose of the WTO Agreement and the Enabling Clause 36
D. Burden of Proof 41
1. Responsibility for Raising the Enabling Clause 42
2. Whether India Raised the Enabling Clause Before the Panel 49
V. Whether the Drug Arrangements are Justified Under the Enabling Clause 52
A. Panel Findings 54
B. Interpretation of the Term "Non-Discriminatory" in Footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause 58
C. The Words "Developing Countries" in Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause 70
D. Consistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling Clause 71
VI. Findings and Conclusions 76
Annex 1 Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under paragraph 4
of Article 16 of the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS246/7 79
Annex 2 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Document L/4903 81
VI. Findings and Conclusions
190. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause is an "exception" to Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the Enabling Clause"does not exclude the applicability" of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(c) modifies the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "bears the burden of invoking the Enabling Clause and justifying its Drug Arrangements" under that Clause, by finding that it was incumbent upon India to raise the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, but that the European Communities bore the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions of the Enabling Clause, in order to justify those Arrangements under that Clause; and finds, further, that India sufficiently raised paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 before the Panel;
(d) need not rule on the Panel's conclusion, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of the
Panel Report, that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
(e) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.161 and 7.176 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations";
(f) reverses the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.174 of the Panel Report, that "the term 'developing countries' in paragraph 2(a) [of the Enabling Clause] should be interpreted to mean all developing countries, with the exception that where developed countries are implementing a priori limitations, 'developing countries' may mean less than all developing countries"; and
(g) upholds, for different reasons, the Panel's conclusion, in paragraph 8.1(d) of the Panel Report, that the European Communities "failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".
191. The Appellate Body therefore recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and not justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
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