CEO薪酬与公司业绩

发布时间：2016-03-25 10:21

论文题目：CEO compensation and firm performance
论文语言：英语论文 English
论文专业：金融
字数：11000
学校国家：英国
是否有数据处理要求：是
您的学校：英国名校 全英前十 金融学全英第二
论文用于：Master Dissertation 硕士毕业论文
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因为上次论文没过，只有一次重交机会，请务必保证质量。
需要建模和进行实证研究，用stata进行分析
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论文可用Harvard style
文献大概30-40个


Abstract摘要


CEO的薪酬是为大量学术研究的热点之一。因此，本文的主要目的是通过检查的总体非金融业CEO薪酬与公司业绩之间的联系。在美国公司的公司治理结构与CEO薪酬之间的关系已经成为越来越多的问题为企业，以便确定CEO的薪酬与企业的战略是否包括考虑。更重要的是，CEO的薪酬，公司业绩和股东财富应该保持组成为好。有许多研究都集中在现代商业世界（AGGARWAL和Samwick，1999年，，考夫兰和施密特，1985年，兰伯特和拉克尔，1987）高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系。薪酬与公司绩效指标的信息可以从2007年至2011年期间在这篇文章中Execucomp和数据库Compustat的OLS回归测试将实施证明补偿等因素之间的薪酬与公司业绩之间以及链接。CEO compensation is one of the hot topics for a large number of academic researchers. Therefore, the paper mainly aims to examine the links between CEO compensation and firm performance through the overall non-financial industry. The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in US firms has become a increasing issue for corporations to consider in order to determine whether CEO compensation and corporation strategy are consist. More importantly, CEO compensation, firm performance and shareholders' wealth should keep consist as well. There are many studies have focused on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the modern business world (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The information of compensation and firm performance indicator is available on Execucomp and Compustat database from the period 2007 to 2011. In this essay, an OLS regression test will be implemented to prove the links between compensation and firm performance and that between compensation and other determinants. 

Content 

Chapter 1 Introduction 4
Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation 6
2.2 The relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 9
2.2.1 Jensen and Murphy’s work on executive compensation 9
3.1 The factors influencing CEO compensation 11
3.1.1 The data source 11
3.1.2 Variables 12
3.1.3 Relations hypothesis 12
3.1.4 Descriptive Statistics 13
3.1.5 Correlation analysis on CEOs compensation, firm size and firm performance 16
3.2 Regression analysis 17
3.2.1 The factor analysis on CEO compensation 17
3.2.2 The robustness test 19
3.3 Principal component analysis 19
Chapter 4 Small sample analysis 20
4.1 Sample 20
4.2 Methodology 20
4.3 Empirical results and discussion 21
4.3.1 Differences in corporate governance practices between US and German firms 21
4.3.2 Differences of compensation structure between US and German firms 24
Chapter 5 Results and Conclusion 26
5.1 Empirical Results 26
5.2 Reasonable corporate governance system 27
5.3 Improving the performance appraisal system of executive team 29
5.4 Deficiencies and Prospects 30
5.5 Limitations 31
5.6 Conclusion 31


1.1 Research background and Purpose研究背景和目的


The American subprime crisis has lead to financial crisis in the global financial market as well as the real economy. The economic confidence of the global economy has been hit greatly. Therefore, corporations in different countries have decided to decrease compensation of CEOs in order to reduce the burden of corporations(你这句开头我以为你准备写2008年以后的，并且是写financial industry). The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in US firms has become a increasing issue for corporations to consider in order to determine whether CEO compensation and corporation strategy are consist. More importantly, CEO compensation, firm performance and shareholders' wealth should keep consist as well. There are many studies have focused on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the modern business world (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The compensation packages for chief executive officers (CEOs) have drawn lots of attention from scholars all over the world. Added to this, many researchers have argued that corporate governance mechanism also plays an important role in determining the level of CEO compensation. It has been indicated that the level of CEO compensation in the US has increased from year to year, but the correlation relationship between the increase rate of CEO compensation and increase rate of firm performance is not always positive (Kaplan, 2008). It has been shown that since 2001, a series of corporate failures and scandals occur in the US such as Enron and WorldCom which has lead to the issue of Sarbances - Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. As a result, it is very essential for firms in the US to establish sound corporate governance mechanisms in order to avoid corporate failures and scandals.

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