发展中国家的贸易偏好与差异化处理

发布时间：2016-04-28 11:00

Summary: 概要：

非互惠的贸易优惠和规定在GATT / WTO是允许发展中国家更大的回旋余地，保留或使用保护主义政策是两个发展中国家在多边贸易体系中所谓的特殊和差别待遇（SDT）的中央木板。本文综述的理由文学，体制特征，和SDT的经济效益。大型文献上已经出现SDT在过去的50年里，双方的支持者和反对者。我们总结了一些关于这个问题的重要贡献，并特别强调对特殊和差别待遇的影响的评价，尤其是优惠的市场准入。 SDT的问题已经成为大家非常关注的一次，下面在此期间，它被看作是多边贸易体制的过时的概念了一段。因此，，我们致力于关注以及对最近的一些贡献该讨论（ⅰ）是否有需要继续SDT，和（ii）如何，这可能来自一个发展（接收方）被设计目标和从交易的透视系统更加普遍。调查的主要议题是，大部分今天所讨论的问题已经在已经在上世纪60年代的讨论。我们的结论是那些谁质疑单方面优惠的价值已被证明是有先见之明。

Non-reciprocal trade preferences and provisions in the GATT/WTO that allow developing countries greater leeway to retain or use protectionist policies are two of the central planks of so-called special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries in the multilateral trading system. This paper surveys the literature on the rationales, institutional features, and economic effectiveness of SDT. A large literature has emerged on SDT in the last 50 years, by both proponents and opponents. We summarize a number of key contributions on the subject, with a special emphasis on the evaluation of the impact of SDT, especially preferential market access. The issue of SDT has become very topical again, following a period during which it was viewed as an outdated concept for the multilateral trading system. We therefore devote attention as well to a number of recent contributions that discuss (i) whether there is a continued need for SDT, and (ii) how this might be designed from both a development (recipient) objective and from the perspective of the trading system more generally. A major theme of the survey is that most of the issues that are debated today were already being discussed in the 1960s. We conclude that those who questioned the value of unilateral preferences have proven to be prescient.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3566, April 2005 Members of the World Trade Organization launched a new “round” of multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference. The round is formally called the Doha Development Agenda, reflecting the desire of many members to address development concerns in the multilateral trading system. Defining the “development dimension” of the WTO is a major challenge. No consensus exists on whether and how to do this. All would agree that development requires sustained economic growth. If greater trade opportunities increase growth—something many (including the present authors) believe is the case—the WTO process of gradual, negotiated liberalization supports development. However, the existence of such a link remains a strongly debated issue, and many also argue that in specific circumstances there is a development rationale for trade interventions.2 Indeed, for many years the GATT took the latter view: many of its provisions allow developing countries wide leeway to retain protectionist policies. This became one of the central elements of socalled special and differential treatment (SDT) policies for developing countries within the GATT regime.
The underlying ideas were elaborated, most notably, by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Their main argument is that developing countries need to foster industrial capacity in non-traditional manufactures both to reduce import dependence and to diversify away from traditional commodities, which were subject to declining terms of trade in the long-term and adversely volatile prices in the short-term. Part of the recommended policy prescription was high trade barriers to protect infant industries—i.e., import-substitution industrialization.

Original Motivation, Early Critiques and Implications for the GATT
Main Features of Unilateral Market Access Programs
Economic Analysis
The utilization of preferences
Development Objectives and Political Economy
From Uruguay to Doha and Beyond
Moving Forward: Key Challenges
Conclusion: Looking Ahead

References文献
Note: references to papers included in the volume of readings are listed in the Annex below.
Adam, Christopher and Steven O’Connell. 2004 “Aid Versus Trade Revisited” The Economic Journal 114: 150-73.
Aitken, N. D., and R. S. Obutelewicz, 1976, “A Cross-Sectional Study of EEC Trade with the Association of African Countries,” The Review of Economics and Statistics (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press).
Alexandraki, Katerina and Hans Peter Lankes (2004) Estimating the Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle-Income Countries, IMF Working Paper, Washington, DC: IMF.
Anderson, K. and B. Hoekman. Eds. Forthcoming. The WTO’s Core Rules and Principles. Elgar.
Anson, J., O. Cadot, A. Estevadeordal, J. de Melo, A. Suwa-Eisenmann and B. Tumurchudur(2003) “Assessing the Costs of Rules of Origin in North-South PTAs with an Application
to NAFTA”, CEPR Discussion Paper 2476.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. Editor. 1977. The New International Economic Order. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Borrell, Brent. 2004. “The EU Banana Drama: Not Over Yet,” Center for International
Economics, Australia.
Bown, Chad. Ed. Forthcoming. The WTO and Temporary Protection for Imports. Elgar.
Brenton, Paul. [2003]. “Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World Trading System: The Current Impact of EU Preferences under Everything But Arms,” Journal of World Trade, June, Vol. 37, no. 3; p. 623-46.
Brenton, Paul and Hiroshi Imagawa (2003) ‘Rules of Origin, Trade, and Customs’ in de Wulf,Luc and Jose Sokol (eds) (2004) Customs Modernization Handbook, Washington, DC:World Bank.
Brenton, P and T. Ikezuki (2004) ‘The Impact of Agricultural Trade Preferences, with Particular Attention to the Least Developed Countries’, in M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghin(eds), Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries Oxford University Press and the World Bank, Washington D.C., (forthcoming),Brown, Drusilla. 1988. “Trade Preferences for Developing Countries: A Survey of Results,”Journal of Development Studies April.
Brown, Drusilla K. [1989a], “Trade and Welfare Effects of the European Schemes of the Generalized System of Preferences,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 37
(July): 757-776.
Brown, Drusilla. 1989b. “A Computational Analysis of Japan’s GSP,” Journal of Development Economics, 30:103-138.
Candau, Fabien Lionel Fontagne and Sébastien Jean (2004) The utilisation rate of preferences in the EU” CEPII, mimeo.
Carrere, C. and J. de Melo (2004) “Are Rules of Origin Equally Costly? Estimates from NAFTA”, paper presented at IDB conference, Washington Feb 2004
Clark, Don. 1998 Are Poorer Developing Countries the Targets of U.S. Protectionist Actions?"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1998, pp. 193-207.
Commonwealth Secretariat (2000) Special and Differential Treatment for the Least Developed
Countries, WTO Policy Brief No.1, September.
Corden, W. Max. 1979. “The NIEO proposals: A Cool Look,” London: Trade Policy Research
Centre. Corrales-Leal, Werner, Mahesh Sugathan and David Primack (2003) “Spaces for Development Policy” Revisiting Special and Differential Treatment, paper prepared for the joint
ICTSD – GP international dialogue: Making Special and Differential treatment more
41
effective and responsive to development needs, 6-7 May 2003, Chavnnes-de-bogis,
Switzerland.
Ethier, W. and A. Hillman (Eds.). Forthcoming. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Elgar.
FAO. 2003. Improving the Value and Effective Utilization of Agricultural Trade Preferences. Rome.
Finger, J. Michael. (1975), ‘Tariff Provisions for Offshore Assembly and the Export Earnings of Developing Countries’, Economic Journal, 85: 365-71 (June).
Finger, J. Michael. 1976. ‘Trade and Domestic effects of the Offshore Assembly Provision in the United States Tariff’, American Economic Review, 66(4): 598-611.
Finger, 2002. “The Doha Agenda and Development: a View from the Uruguay Round” (Manila:Asian Development Bank.Fukasaku, Kiichiro (2000) “Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries: does it help those who help themselves,” Working Paper No 197, WIDER, The United Nations University.
Gibbs, Murray. 1998. “Special and Differential Treatment in the Context of Globalization,” G15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agreements, New Delhi,December 10 .
Grilli, E. 1997. “EU Trade and Aid Policies Towards the LDCs and CEECs'' in Economic
Integration Worldwide, Ali M. El-Agra (ed.), London, MacMillan Press: 135-174.
Grossman, Gene, 1982. “Import Competition from Developed and Developing Countries,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 64: 271-81.
Hart, Michael and Bill Dymond. 2003. “Special and Differential Treatment and the Doha “Development” Round,” Journal of World Trade, 37(2) 395-415.
Hoekman, Be4rnard. 2004a. “Dismantling Discrimination Against Developing Countries:
Access, Rules and Differential Treatment,” CEPR Discussion Paper 4694.
Hoekman, Bernard. 2004b. Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, World Bank, mimeo.
Hoekman, Bernard and Simeon Djankov. 1997. “Determinants of Export Structure of Countries in Central and Eastern Europe,” World Bank Economic Review, 11:471-90.
IMF (2003) “Financing of Losses from Preference Erosion, Note on Issues raised by Developing Countries in the Doha Round,” Communication to the WTO from the International Monetary Fund, No WT/TF/COH/14, 14 February.
IMF. 2004. “Fund Support for Trade-Related Balance of Payments Adjustments,”
Karsenty, Guy and Sam Laird. 1986. The generalized system of preferences : a quantitative assessment of the direct trade effects and of policy options, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ; no. 18
Karsenty, Guy and Sam Laird. 1987. The GSP, Policy Options and the New Round",
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Band 123(2).
Keck, Alexander and Patrick Low (2004) Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: why,when and how? WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03, Geneva: WTO, May.
Kee, Hiau Looi, Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2004. “Import demand elasticities and trade distortions,” mimeo, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Lederman, D., and Ç. Özden, 2004, “United States Trade Preferences: All Are Not Created Equal,” World Bank Policy Research Paper, (Washington: The World Bank).
Limao, Nuno and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2004. “David vs. Goliath: Can Trade Preferences to Small
Countries Stop Multilateral Liberalization?,” University of Maryland, mimeo.
42
MacPhee, Craig R., and Rosenbaum, David I., 1989, “The Asymmetric Effects of Reversible Tariff Changes under the United States GSP," Southern Economic Journal 56 (July):105-125.
Mattoo, Aaditya, Devesh Roy, Arvind Subramanian. [2003] “The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?,” World Economy, 26(6): 829-52
(June).
McQueen, M (1999) “After Lomé IV: ACP-EU Trade Preferences in the 21st Century,”
Intereconomics, 34, 223-232
McQueen, M and C. Stevens, (1989), “Trade Preferences and Lomé IV: Non-traditional ACP Exports to the EC,” Development Policy Review Vol. 7, pp. 239-260.
Melamed, Claire (2003) Doing ‘Development’ at the World Trade Organization: the Doha Round and special and differential treatment’, IDS Bulletin Vol. 34, No 2.
Michalopoulos, Constantine (2000) ‘Trade and Development in the GATT and WTO: The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries’, World Economy
Marcus and Howard Pack, 2003. Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia (Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics).
McCulloch, Neil, L. Alan Winters and Xavier Cirera. 2001. Trade Liberalization and Poverty: a Handbook (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
OECD. 1997. “Market Access for the Least Developed Countries: Where are the barriers?,” OCDE/GD(97)174.
Onguglo, Bonapas. 1999. “Developing Countries and Unilateral Trade Preferences in the New International Trading System,” in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar (editors), Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and
Multilateral Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution
Press/Organization of American States.
Oyejide, T. Ademola. 2002. “Special and Differential Treatment,” in B. Hoekman et al. (eds.),
Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook Washington DC: World Bank.
Ozden, C. and E. Reinhart. 2003. “First Do No Harm: GSP and The Effect of Trade Preferences on Developing Country Exports,” World Bank, mimeo.
Özden, C. and Gunjan Sharma (2004) Price Effects of Preferential Market Access: the Caribbean Basin initiative and the apparel sector. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
3244.
Page, Sheila and Michael Davenport. 1994. “Effects of the GATT Uruguay Round on Developing Countries,” Overseas Development Institute, Mimeo
Page, Sheila and Peter Kleen. 2004. “Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization,” report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden.
Panagariya, Arvind. 2003a. “Miracles and Debacles: Do Free Trade Skeptics Have a Case?,” mimeo.
Panagariya, Arvind. 2003b. “Aid Through Trade: An Effective Option?,” mimeo.
Pangestu, Mari. 2000. ‘Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different?’ The World Economy 23(9), 1285-1302.
Pelzman, J., and G. Schoepfle. 1988. “The Impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act on Caribbean Nations’ Exports and Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 38: 753-96 (July).
Romalis, J., 2003, “Would Rich Country Trade Preferences Help Poor Countries Grow?”
Rousslang, Donald and John Lindsay. 1984., “The Benefits to Caribbean Basin Countries from the US CBI Tariff Elimination,” Journal of Policy Modeling 6(4): 513-30. 
Srinivasan, T. N. and Jagdish Bhagwati. 2001. “Outward-Orientation and Development: Are Revisionists Right?” in Trade, Development and Political Economy: Essays in Honour of Anne O. Krueger. Deepak Lal and R. H. Snape, eds. London: Palgrave, pp. 3-26.
43 Stevens, Christopher. 2002. “The Future of SDT for Developing Countries in the WTO,” Institute for Development Studies, Sussex, Working Paper 163 (May).
Tangermann, S., 2002 The Future of Preferential Trade Arrangements for Developing Countries and the Current Round of WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, Rome: FAO.
UNCTAD (1999), “Quantifying the Benefits Obtained by Developing Countries from the
Generalized System of Preferences”, mimeo.
UNCTAD (2003) Trade Preferences for LDCs: an early assessment of benefits and possible improvements, New York and Geneva: United Nations.
Wang, Zhen Kun and Winters, 2000. Putting “Humpty” Together Again: Including Developing Countries in a Consensus for the WTO, CEPR Policy Paper No. 4 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research).
Weston, A. (1995), “The Uruguay Round - Costs and Compensation for Developing Countries,” Geneva: UNCTAD.
Winters, L. A. 2004. “Adjustment Assistance for Trade Liberalization,” mimeo.
Yeats, A., 1995, “What are OECD Trade preferences Worth to Sub-Saharan Africa?,” African Studies Review, Vol. 38, April, pp. 81-101.

本文编号：37754