制约性和偏好的萎缩幅度研究

发布时间：2016-04-12 07:47

INTRODUCTION介绍

多边贸易体制的基石知识产权是经济发展的最佳途径是非歧视性的贸易模式，逐步降低关税，以及阻碍贸易流动的非关税贸易壁垒，消除实现。尽管如此，在世界贸易组织（WTO）的非歧视原则是远离教条。到非歧视原则的两个最显著例外荣誉，在违反最惠国（MFN）义务是：（1）已经激增，在过去的二十年，而且几百区域贸易安排不断增加， （2）关税与贸易（GATT）总协定和世贸组织的多边贸易协定（MTA的）延伸优惠待遇的发展中国家（在WTO的说法“特殊和差别待遇”）中发现的许多规定。
特殊和差别待遇的有利于发展中国家的法律基础是普遍优惠制度。自1971年以来，在中，普遍优惠制（GSP）首次关贸总协定授权下主持今年，GSP已经成为发达国家的贸易政策夹具。普惠制标志着其在2011年的适当时机成立40周年问GSP与否仍然是相关的。在2008年的报告，，美国国会研究服务给了以下几部件不到乐观的评价：在2006年的报告美国国会研究服务注意到20世纪70年代和80年代，其结论是GSP已经有同样的报告指出对发展中国家exports.6一个促进作用研究然而，GSP福利由美国方案的几个特点的限制。 2005年，例如，从普惠制受惠国进口美国的不到10％了普惠制免税待遇的优势。大多数的，共有GSP合格的产品被排除在外，最常见的，因为它们要么超出了特定产品的竞争需要限制或者因为他们不符合普惠制原产地规则。加剧的情况是，任何给定的给予优惠国家的GSP资格的产品清单可以随时间变化而不是所有捐助国作出同样的产品普惠制资格。换句话说，捐助国不配合他们与其他捐助国各自的普惠制方案。

The intellectual keystone of the multilateral trade system is that economic development is best achieved through non-discriminatory trade patterns, the progressive reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of nontariff barriers that impede trade flows.1 Still, the principle of non-discrimination at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is far from dogma. The two most significant exceptions to the non-discrimination principle that honor the most-favored- nation (MFN) obligation in the breach are (1) the hundreds of regional trade arrangements that have proliferated over the past two decades and that continue to increase,2 and (2) the numerous provisions found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the WTO multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) that extend preferential treatment to developing countries (“special and differential treatment” in WTO parlance).
The legal cornerstone of special and differential treatment in favor of developing countries is the Generalized System of Preferences. Since 1971—the year in which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was first authorized under GATT auspices—GSP has become a fixture in the trade policies of developed countries.4 The GSP marked its 40th anniversary in 2011, an appropriate occasion to ask whether or not GSP remains relevant. In a 2008 report the Congressional Research Service gave thefollowing less than sanguine appraisal:In a 2006 report the Congressional Research Service noted studies from the 1970s and 1980s which concluded that GSP has had a stimulative effect on developing countries’ exports.6 That same report observed, however, that GSP benefits are limited by several features of the U.S. program. In 2005, for example, less than 10 percent of U.S. imports from GSP beneficiary countries took advantage of GSP duty-free treatment. The majority of products that were GSP eligible were excluded, most often because they either exceeded the competitive need limit for a specific product or because they did not satisfy the GSP rule of origin.7 Exacerbating the situation is that any given preference-granting countries’ list of GSP-eligible products can change over time and not all donor countries make the same products GSP eligible. In other words, donor countries do not coordinate their respective GSP programs with other donor countries.


I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF S&D TREATMENT AT GATT AND THE WTO
II. MAKING THE 1971 GSP WAIVER PERMANENT: THE ENABLING CLAUSE
III. GSP CONDITIONALITY PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, INTEGRATING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTO THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM


To quote an African proverb, “The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The next best time is now.” It is time to move beyond conditionality in GSP programs and to come to terms with the looming shrinking margin of preference. At UNCTAD’s inaugural conference in 1964, developing countries asserted that one of the major impediments to= their accelerated economic growth and development was their inability to compete with developed countries in the international trading system; the developing countries argued that preferential tariffs would allow them to increase exports and foreign exchange earnings necessary to diversify their economies and reduce dependence on foreign aid. The rationale for trade preferences was that poorer countries need to develop industrial capacity for manufacturing in order to move away from dependence on imports and production of traditional commodities that could be subject to declining prices in the long term. It was argued that poorer countries also needed time to retain some protection to develop their “infant industries,” but that increases in exports would be necessary to help countries develop economies of scale in production and earn foreign exchange. In addition, it was evident that some provision for the elimination of preferences once the industries were firmly established was necessary. The argument was that trade preferences should be temporary, introduced for a period of no less than 10 years with respect to any given industry in any developing country. At the end of the 10-year period, preferences would be withdrawn unless it could be shown that special circumstances warranted their continuation. At the second UNCTAD conference in 1968, the United States joined other participants in supporting a resolution to establish a mutually acceptable system of preferences. In order to permit the implementation of a generalized system of preferences, in June 1971 developed countries were granted a 10-year waiver from their international legal obligations under GATT. Following the grant of this waiver, developed countries created their national GSP programs, and Congress enacted the U.S. GSP program in January 1975. The United States maintained that GSP was a temporary program to advance trade liberalization in the developing world, but it recognized the need to address the legal basis for granting these preferences in anticipation of the expiration of the waiver in 1981. An agreement was reached at the 1979 conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, known as the “Enabling Clause,” which has no expiration date and replaced the waiver.

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