信贷紧缩对企业和民众的影响是什么
这篇文章的目的是分析最近出现的“信贷紧缩”现象及其对企业和普通民众的影响。不同的理论观点将被吸引到调查目前的金融危机。美国经济将作为一个批判性分析问题的对象,为全球金融危机(GFC)有时也被称为大萧条,从分贷款的美国起源的影响世界上几乎每一个国家。最后,政府采取的各种措施进行评估,以打击相关的经济衰退,推出他们的财政政策和刺激计划。
整个金融危机开始于2007年8月,当美国的房价开始下跌,表现出一定的信用不佳或所谓的“次贷”房主说了很轻松的金融公司和银行抵押贷款。此外,美联储在鼓励这种抵押创新起到了关键作用。这些次级贷款作为担保债务凭证打包在一起。这些CDO是复杂的证券,提供高回报的市场条件下,有效地把下面PAR抵押支持证券,他们甚至被评为“AAA”,最高的信用评级机构,如穆迪。因此,这些金融工具被视为无风险和交易的金融市场的广泛,因为他们回来的一个资产即土地的传统一直上升的价值。贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟,是最积极参与抵押贷款支持证券(MBS),作为投资者提取资金,它们基本上是资不抵债。只是两机构损失不是问题,但这是通用的风险构成;威胁其他公司和信用违约掉期,,保证了破产的后果将影响深远的经济。由于这样美联储和财政部被迫救助公司,以避免系统性的偿付能力状况。
The aim of this essay is to analyse the recent phenomenon of the "credit crunch" and its effects on businesses and ordinary people. Different theoretical perspectives will be drawn upon to investigate the current financial crisis. The American economy will be used as a framework for critically analysing the issue, as The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) sometimes referred to as the Great Depression 2.0, from its origins in the subprime loans of the United States to affecting almost every nation in the world. Finally a variety of measures that governments have taken are evaluated on combating the associated economic downturn by unveiling their fiscal strategies and stimulus packages. The issue seems to be how did we get here?
This whole financial crisis started in August 2007, when property prices in America started to fall, revealing certain uncreditworthy or so called "sub-prime" homeowners that were given mortgages on very relaxed terms by the financial companies and banks. Moreover, The Federal Reserve played a key role in encouraging this mortgage innovation (Gross 2007:139). These subprime loans were packed together as Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). These CDOs were complex securities that provided high returns in the prevailing market conditions, and effectively hid the below par collateral that was backing the security, they were even rated 'AAA', the highest possible by credit rating agencies such as Moody's(Rose and Hudgins 2008:285). Hence, these financial instruments were deemed risk free and traded in financial markets extensively, since they were back by an assest i.e. land which traditional always had a rising value (Gower 2006). Bear Sterns and Leman Brothers, were the most heavily involved in mortgage backed securities (MBS), and as the investors extracted its money, they were essentially insolvent. The loss of just two institutions was not the issue, but the universal risk it posed; threatened to bring other firms down and the widespread use of Credit Default Swaps, ensured the consequences of a bankruptcy would be far reaching in the economy (Rose and Hudgins 2008:299). As such the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were forced to bailout firms, to avoid a systemic solvency situation.
As the financial contamination spread and the apparent counter party default risk amplified, demand for liquidity went up. This led to a situation of credit crunch i.e. reduction on availability of credit or conditions required to obtain a loan. This is evident in the dramatic increase in the corporate bonds spread over government yields, in the United States (Appendix 1.1) and a similar situation occurred in the financial markets around the globe.
The Financial crisis resulted in reduced credit flows to consumers and businesses which when combined with significant declines in major share indexes, house prices and high unemployment rates, this led to resulting net loss of wealth that reduces the appetite of consumers and businesses to consume and invest. This can be seen in drop of in consumer and business confidence in the world's major economies (appendix 1.2).
The Credit Crisis has made the situation difficult for both the lenders and borrowers. Many banks and financial institutions are reluctant to participate in intra-bank loans with each other. This means that lenders are finding it more difficult and more expensive to raise the finance that they need to fund their lending. The rate at which banks lend to each other rose to its highest level since December 1998.The so-called Libor rate is 6.7975%, way above the Bank of England's base rate; banks either worry whether other banks will survive, or urgently need the money themselves(BBC 2009). As the link between the financial crisis and a possible economic downturn became more apparent, central banks around the world slashed interest rates very quickly. The Bank of England cuts interest rates to 0.5%, the lowest level in its 315-year history and in U.S. interest rate fell to 0.25%, the lowest since the records started,as central banks continues efforts to aid an economic recovery in the UK same is followed by different central banks around the world, see graph below.
Since, the credit crunch consumers have found it nearly impossible to get any form of credit from the banks. This is due to the actions taken by the banks to safeguard themselves from a 'run on the bank'. Like in case of Northern rock where depositors withdrew £1bn in what is the biggest run on a British bank for more than a century (BBC 2009). Lenders have also raised interest rates on various financial products, including mortgages, loans, and credit cards, and have also tightened up on their lending criteria, leaving many consumers with no prospect of getting a finance. Even established businesses like British Petroleum; a company with multi billion pound assets, was unable to acquire funds in the money markets for cleaning up the oil spill. Another effect of this credit crunch has shown an unprecedented rise in bankruptcies in U.K. There were 33,935 individual insolvencies across England and Wales just during the third quarter of 2010.(King 2010). Also there was a sharp decline is the house prices since the crisis. The first annual fall in house prices for 12 years is recorded by Nationwide, see figure below.
According to the Global Stability Report by the International Monetary Fund, it blames lax regulations by governments and poor supervision by banks for allowing the current financial crisis to develop. The report also accuses banks and other financial institutions, of "excessive risk-taking" and "weak underwriting". It says they were "too complacent" about liquidity and relied heavily on wholesale money markets and central banks to aid them if they got into trouble (IMF Global Stability Report 2008). There was failure of various international watchdog organisations such as United Nations as stated in Economic survey of Europe report. They said, the United States real GDP is forecasted to increase on average by 3.5%. With the United States acting as "locomotive" for the world economy, the large current account deficit is set to deteriorate further. (Economic Commission For Europe 2005:51)
In a bid to ease the global credit squeeze, central banks unleashed the monetary policy and fiscal policy tools available to them. One of the measure that governments around the world took was to provide loans or make direct purchases to support these very large and extremely complex capital markets (Brighouse and Hontoir 2002:184). In the United States, the government set up a $700bn TRAP which was swiftly passed through the Congress in an attempt to use complex auctions to buy back mortgage securities and provide short term stability. It is generally accepted by mainstream economists, that government intervention in a downturn is essential in shortening the duration of the recession and also to support demand in short term, essentially a Keynesian approach. Since government spending is autonomous, any increase in spending will work its way around the economy, having the multiplier effect, thereby increasing planned aggregate expenditure. Critics of this Keynesian approach, evident in many stimulus packages designed by governments around the world, argue the flaws in the Keynesian theory; that it "implicitly assumes that the government is better than the private market at marshalling idle resources to produce useful stuff." Barro suggests that more focus should present on "incentives for people and businesses to invest, produce and work" (Barro 2009). Essentially, saying stimulus packages should provide tax relief and allow the private sector to be more efficient, instead of throwing money at people.
But according to Bank for international settlements; this is short term solution, preventing the worst but some measures have delayed the needed adjustments, such as reduction of leverage and balance sheet repair (Bank for international settlements 2010). It is also argued that, as a result of these near zero interest rates, there is little or no room for additional cuts to accommodate any future shocks in their respective economies. Also the low interest rates caused the misallocation of resources in the year before the crisis and these current low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies of the central banks may cause distortions in the markets and lead to yet another future economic crisis. Low interest rates in major advanced economies have caused effects beyond their borders. Better growth prospects and higher rates in Emerging Capital Markets (ECM) have increased in capital outflow to these countries and made carry trade more attractive. (Bank for international settlements 2010)
The central banks around the worlds seems to have ignored what a 20th century American economist, Hyman Minsky who theorized that in affluent times, when corporate cash flow increased beyond what is needed to meet their short term debt obligation, a "speculative euphoria" takes over the markets, which leads to total debts increasing what borrower can pay off fuelled by leverage and this leads to a financial crisis. Hence, assets bubble driven by credit cycles are followed by busts. As a result banks tighten credit availability and economy contracts and total debt starts piling up (Minsky 1982:6).Today the private sector debt is far higher than in the 1930s, both in the USA and elsewhere in the OECD. The data shown in Figure below is for the USA and Australia.
The similarities between the 1930 Great depression and 2007 finical crisis is, they both we proceeded by periods of extra ordinary boom i.e., "the roaring twenties" and the "dot com boom". The raise in the national debt is what weakens the financial capacity of a country on international market. The sovereign debt crisis in Greece is clearly jeopardising Europe's nascent recovery brought on by the earlier crisis (Bank for international settlements 2010).The Global Financial Crisis needs discretionary fiscal stimulus to support the economy and maintain liquidity by increasing participation in the market and reducing fees, transaction costs and establishing market prices that truly reflect the value of underlying assets. But it can ill afford it, as national budget deficit balloons, and is completely reliant on foreign savers to finance its debt. Recently the situation in Ireland is a perfect example of this. Beyond just regulating and supervising financial institutions, the central banks need to play an active role in assuring that the business climate is favourable to such things as financial innovation, to ensure that country maintains its position as a major global money centre thus creating liquidity. (Desai 2007:38).
The Global Financial Crisis has tested the very institutions, setup to prevent such crisis. A range of monetary and fiscal policies measures were used to unfreeze the money and capital markets around the world. These measures have helped to sustain short term solution recovery, but to ride out the recession governments not only need to support the financial systems but also empower private sector and increase consumer confidence. There is no right or wrong solution to this problem each country will need to create their own customized solutions depending on their individual limits to ensure maximum recovery; they cannot wait for Adam Smith's invisible hand to fix the problem. Moreover, financial services, firms providing these services, and markets should be regulated stricter world-wide to a greater extent than most other products and services. Why is this? Because the consequences for producers, consumers, taxpayers and the economy in general are enormous, as evidence of this is the current global financial meltdown (Benston 1998:13)
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