效率、民意与车牌分配方式选择

发布时间：2018-03-07 18:06

  本文选题：拥堵定价　切入点：车牌管制　出处：《经济学(季刊)》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文建立了一个包含公交与私车两种交通模式的拥堵定价模型,并分别以一人一票及福利加权两种投票制度讨论民众对车牌拍卖、摇号及混合管制政策的态度。结果表明,若政府从无管制状态引入管制,在一人一票制下,民众将反对任何一种管制政策,但对混合制的反对力度最小,对拍卖反对力度最大;在福利加权制投票下,民众通过拍卖管制,而反对另外两种管制。可见混合制是政府顾虑民众公平意愿的优选政策,而拍卖将是效率优先的最优选择。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a congestion pricing model with two traffic modes, public transport and private traffic, is established, and the public attitudes towards license plate auction, lottery and mixed regulation are discussed with one-person, one-vote and welfare-weighted voting system respectively. If the government introduces regulation from a unregulated state, under the "one person, one vote" system, the public will oppose any kind of regulatory policy, but the opposition to the mixed system will be the least, and the opposition to auctions will be the strongest; under the welfare weighted voting system, Through auction regulation, people oppose the other two kinds of regulation. It can be seen that the mixed system is the preferential choice policy of the government concerned about the people's fair will, and the auction will be the best choice of efficiency priority.
【作者单位】： 西南财经大学经济与管理研究院;成都大学政治学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71101117) 中央高校基本业务专项费(JBK130502)的资助
【分类号】：D631.5
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本文编号：1580369