论有限责任公司股东压迫的法定救济规则

发布时间：2018-07-05 15:56

本文选题：有限责任公司 + 股东压迫　；参考：《中国政法大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：有限责任公司的在诸多方面不同于股份公司,有限责任公司的特点造就了股东压迫的土壤,包括:股权退出机制的不便性,两权分离程度低、经营管理欠缺程式化、有效协议安排的缺乏和外部监管的有限性。面对股东压迫问题,我国《公司法》中存在特定情形下的救济规则和一般性救济规则两类法定救济规则。理解股东压迫的概念和特征对于适用中国《公司法》之规则有重要作用:其一可以指导特定情形下救济规则的解释,其二可以把抽象的股东权利滥用的概念具体化。股东压迫现象是资本多数决制度下的产物,通过股东信义义务的理论和股东合理期待的理论可以构建股东压迫救济的理论基础,这些理论也不只是一种摆设,他们应当被实际运用到法律解释之中发挥相应的功能。在特定情形下的救济规则里,基于对有限公司股东压迫的理解,对异议股东回购请求权条款应当做漏洞填补的目的解释;有限公司和股份公司的董事会决议效力判断标准应做区别对待;现行司法解散制度其实难以对股东压迫提供救济,因为公司僵局不同于股东压迫。在一般性救济规则里,基于对有限公司股东压迫的分析,我们对《公司法》第20条禁止股权滥用原则可以建构出一个系统性的评价体系,对主体要件、行为要件、客观结果要件和法律效果做出更周密而妥当的法律解释,让有限责任公司股东压迫问题尽可能的在现行法规则之下得到规制。但是强调股东压迫救济的必要性,不代表我们可以不顾对公司商业判断自由的保护。本文的结论有三点:有限责任公司股东纠纷的审理在合理限度内应当实质重于形式;通过少数股东合理期待理论与多数股东信义义务理论,能够找到平衡多数股东和少数股东利益的平衡点;通过对《公司法》规则的合理解释,我国现有法律资源能够为股东压迫问题提供解决方案。
[Abstract]:The limited liability company is different from the stock company in many aspects. The characteristics of the limited liability company have created the soil of shareholder oppression, including: the inconvenience of the stock right withdrawal mechanism, the low degree of separation of the two rights, the lack of stylized management. Lack of effective arrangements and limited external supervision. Faced with the problem of shareholder oppression, there are two kinds of statutory relief rules in the Company Law of our country, namely, the relief rules under specific circumstances and the general relief rules. Understanding the concept and characteristics of shareholder oppression plays an important role in the application of the rules of Chinese Company Law: first, it can guide the interpretation of relief rules under certain circumstances, and secondly, it can concretize the abstract concept of abuse of shareholders' rights. The phenomenon of shareholder oppression is the product of capital majority decision system. Through the theory of shareholders' fiduciary duty and the theory of shareholders' reasonable expectation, we can construct the theoretical basis of shareholders' oppression and remedy, and these theories are not just a kind of decoration. They should be applied to the interpretation of the law to play a corresponding role. In the relief rules under certain circumstances, based on the understanding of the limited company shareholders' oppression, the purpose of filling the loophole should be given to the dissenting shareholders' repurchase claim. The judgment standard of the validity of the board of directors' resolutions of limited company and stock company should be treated differently; in fact, the current judicial dissolution system is difficult to provide relief to shareholders' oppression, because corporate deadlock is different from shareholder oppression. In the general relief rules, based on the analysis of the oppression of shareholders in limited companies, we can construct a systematic evaluation system for the principle of prohibiting the abuse of equity in Article 20 of the Company Law. Objective result elements and legal effect to make a more thorough and appropriate legal interpretation, so that the limited liability company shareholders oppressive problem as much as possible under the existing rules and regulations to be regulated. But emphasizing the necessity of shareholders'oppressive remedy does not mean that we can disregard the protection of the company's freedom of business judgment. The conclusion of this paper has three points: the trial of shareholder dispute of limited liability company should be substantial and heavier than form within reasonable limits, and through the theory of minority shareholders' reasonable expectation and the theory of majority shareholder's fiduciary duty, It can find the balance point of balancing the interests of majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and through the reasonable interpretation of the rules of Company Law, the existing legal resources of our country can provide solutions to the problem of shareholders' oppression.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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