上市公司收购中目标公司董事信赖义务研究
发布时间：2018-09-09 16:13
【摘要】：收购已经成为上市公司发展和壮大的外部成长方式,通过公开要约收购方式以取得目标公司的经营控制权,已逐渐成为各国企业并购中的主要手段。而在收购的过程中,目标公司董事由于与公司利益各方都休戚相关,故其对于收购的态度或行为都将对目标公司及其股东利益产生实质性影响,并容易陷入一种严重的利益冲突鉴于目标公司董事在收购中的特殊地位,为有效规制其从事严重的利益冲突行为,维护目标公司及其股东的利益,英美国家率先将传统公司法的董事义务理论引入证券活动的理论和实践中,并逐渐发展成为当今世界最具代表性的两种目标公司董事信赖义务模式,形成了今天针对目标公司董事行为的相对完备的法律规制。 本文立足我国现实,拟通过研究国外规制目标公司董事行为的相关立法和司法实践,在借鉴其有关立法的基础上提出构建我国上市公司收购中目标董事义务模式及完善的建议。全文分为引言、正文和结束语。 正文部分分为三章:第一章为上市公司收购中的目标公司董事信赖义务。本章进行了收购和反收购的一般理论介绍,结合董事信赖义务的根源和发展,指出强化董事信赖义务已成为反收购立法中一个重要的命题。第二章为上市公司董事信赖义务规制的不同模式比较。本章介绍了国外对目标公司董事信赖义务不同的法律规制,即美国的董事中立模式和英国的股东大会决定模式。通过两种模式的比较,评析了美国和英国在各自立法背景下对反收购中董事信赖义务的规范。第三章为我国目标公司董事信赖义务立法及实施机制之检视。本章的将讨论的重点放在我国的现状上,通过我国董事职能的转变和相关立法的分析,探究我国现行法律体系中的不足,并对我国反收购中董事信赖义务得以合理履行的前提做出分析,提出我国反收购中强化董事信赖义务的若干具体制度。建议在完善相关立法的同时,以激励和约束并行的理念为指导,通过公司内控和外控双重机制的共同作用,保障董事信赖义务的最大化履行。 结语部分对本文进行了总结,提出要使我国有关公司董事信赖义务的立法约束发挥出应有的效力,一方面要不断完善我国的法律体系,另一方面就是要培育法律制度赖以有效实施的文化基础,力图早日在我国建立起完善的信托文化。
[Abstract]:Acquisition has become the external growth mode for the development and growth of listed companies. To obtain the management control rights of the target companies through public offer acquisition has gradually become the main means of mergers and acquisitions of enterprises in various countries. In the process of acquisition, the directors of the target company have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders because they are closely related to the interests of the company, so their attitude or behavior towards the acquisition will have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders. And it is easy to fall into a serious conflict of interest, in view of the special position of the director of the target company in the acquisition, in order to effectively regulate its serious conflict of interest behavior, protect the interests of the target company and its shareholders. Anglo-American countries take the lead in introducing the theory of directors' obligations of traditional company law into the theory and practice of securities activities, and gradually develop into the two most representative models of directors' trust obligations of target companies in the world. It forms a relatively complete legal regulation on the director behavior of the target company today. Based on the reality of our country, this paper, by studying the relevant legislation and judicial practice of regulating the directors' behavior of target companies in foreign countries, puts forward some suggestions on how to construct the target directors' obligation mode in the acquisition of listed companies in our country on the basis of the relevant legislation. The full text is divided into preface, text and conclusion. The main body is divided into three chapters: the first chapter is the trust obligation of the target company. This chapter introduces the general theory of takeover and anti-takeover and points out that strengthening the trust duty of directors has become an important proposition in the legislation of anti-takeover combined with the origin and development of directors' fiduciary duty. The second chapter is the comparison of different models of directors' trust obligation regulation in listed companies. This chapter introduces the different legal regulations on the directors' trust obligation in foreign countries, that is, the neutral mode of directors in the United States and the decision mode of the shareholders' general meeting in the United Kingdom. Through the comparison of the two models, this paper analyzes the norms of the trust obligations of the directors in the anti-takeover in the background of the respective legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom. The third chapter examines the legislation and implementation mechanism of the directors' trust obligation in China's target companies. This chapter will focus on the current situation of our country, through the transformation of the functions of our directors and the analysis of relevant legislation, to explore the shortcomings of our current legal system, This paper also analyzes the premise that the director's trust duty can be reasonably fulfilled in China's anti-takeover, and puts forward some concrete systems to strengthen the director's trust obligation in the anti-takeover. It is suggested that, while perfecting the relevant legislation, under the guidance of the idea of encouragement and restraint, and through the joint action of internal control and external control, the maximization of directors' trust obligations can be guaranteed. The conclusion part summarizes this article, and puts forward that we should make the legislative restraint of the trust duty of directors in our country play its due effect, on the one hand, we should constantly perfect our legal system. On the other hand, it is necessary to cultivate the cultural foundation on which the legal system is effectively implemented and try to establish a perfect trust culture in our country as soon as possible.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91
本文编号：2232895
[Abstract]:Acquisition has become the external growth mode for the development and growth of listed companies. To obtain the management control rights of the target companies through public offer acquisition has gradually become the main means of mergers and acquisitions of enterprises in various countries. In the process of acquisition, the directors of the target company have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders because they are closely related to the interests of the company, so their attitude or behavior towards the acquisition will have a substantial impact on the interests of the target company and its shareholders. And it is easy to fall into a serious conflict of interest, in view of the special position of the director of the target company in the acquisition, in order to effectively regulate its serious conflict of interest behavior, protect the interests of the target company and its shareholders. Anglo-American countries take the lead in introducing the theory of directors' obligations of traditional company law into the theory and practice of securities activities, and gradually develop into the two most representative models of directors' trust obligations of target companies in the world. It forms a relatively complete legal regulation on the director behavior of the target company today. Based on the reality of our country, this paper, by studying the relevant legislation and judicial practice of regulating the directors' behavior of target companies in foreign countries, puts forward some suggestions on how to construct the target directors' obligation mode in the acquisition of listed companies in our country on the basis of the relevant legislation. The full text is divided into preface, text and conclusion. The main body is divided into three chapters: the first chapter is the trust obligation of the target company. This chapter introduces the general theory of takeover and anti-takeover and points out that strengthening the trust duty of directors has become an important proposition in the legislation of anti-takeover combined with the origin and development of directors' fiduciary duty. The second chapter is the comparison of different models of directors' trust obligation regulation in listed companies. This chapter introduces the different legal regulations on the directors' trust obligation in foreign countries, that is, the neutral mode of directors in the United States and the decision mode of the shareholders' general meeting in the United Kingdom. Through the comparison of the two models, this paper analyzes the norms of the trust obligations of the directors in the anti-takeover in the background of the respective legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom. The third chapter examines the legislation and implementation mechanism of the directors' trust obligation in China's target companies. This chapter will focus on the current situation of our country, through the transformation of the functions of our directors and the analysis of relevant legislation, to explore the shortcomings of our current legal system, This paper also analyzes the premise that the director's trust duty can be reasonably fulfilled in China's anti-takeover, and puts forward some concrete systems to strengthen the director's trust obligation in the anti-takeover. It is suggested that, while perfecting the relevant legislation, under the guidance of the idea of encouragement and restraint, and through the joint action of internal control and external control, the maximization of directors' trust obligations can be guaranteed. The conclusion part summarizes this article, and puts forward that we should make the legislative restraint of the trust duty of directors in our country play its due effect, on the one hand, we should constantly perfect our legal system. On the other hand, it is necessary to cultivate the cultural foundation on which the legal system is effectively implemented and try to establish a perfect trust culture in our country as soon as possible.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91
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