股权激励与公司业绩关系的实证检验

发布时间：2018-10-21 08:43

【摘要】：作为解决企业委托——代理问题的重要手段,股权激励通过使经营者持有公司的股份,将经营者的个人利益与企业所有者的利益捆绑在一起,促使经营者竭尽全力地为企业利益最大化服务。股权激励诞生于20世纪50年代的美国,之后在西方资本市场相对成熟的国家广泛实施,并且取得了巨大的成功。西方实践经验表明股权激励的确能够推动公司进行价值创造,促进业绩增长。但是,与其在国外的发展历程相比,股权激励真正开始在我国实施的时间不长。从1993年深圳万科最先开始尝试推行股权激励到2005年《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》的颁布,我国上市公司经历了一段时间的摸索期。直到2005年,中国证券市场实施了具有重要意义的股权分置改革,促使了股票市场的结构转型。同年,证监会出台了《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》,新修订的《证券法》与《公司法》颁布实施。2005年之后,《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》、《股权激励有关事项备忘录》等也陆续出台。在一系列政策法规的推动下,阻碍中国上市公司股权激励实施的障碍被逐一清除,上市公司实施股权激励的热情高涨,中国的股权激励迎来了一个蓬勃发展的“春天”。此后,理论界和实务界也对股权激励的相关问题展开了深入的研究。但是到目前为止,对于股权激励在我国市场环境下实施的具体效果如何,股权激励与公司业绩之间是否存在相关关系等问题,还没有形成一个定论。因此,为了推进我们对股权激励的全面认识,完善上市公司的股权激励方案,本文认为非常有必要对我国股权激励的实施效果进行系统、深入地研究。基于以上目的,本文吸收了前人的研究成果,采用实证研究的方法,以国内实施股权激励计划的62家公司为研究对象,对股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系进行实证分析。全文共分为五部分：一、引言,简要介绍选题的理论背景、研究目的、研究意义,并且通过对国内外股权激励的文献进行总结、归纳、评述,提炼出本文的研究方向和研究重点；二、股权激励概述,主要阐述了股权激励的概念、意义、基本模式以及股权激励在我国实施的基本概况,为后文的理论分析做铺垫；三、股权激励与公司业绩关系的理论分析,首先引入委托——代理理论及人力资本理论,对股权激励制度的运行机制进行了深入地分析,然后对利益汇聚假说和掘壕自守假说进行函数分析,探析股权激励比例与公司业绩之间的相关性,最后对股票期权和限制性股票进行全方面地比较,分析二者激励效果的差异；四、实证分析,在理论分析的基础上,提出了三个具体假设并建立了回归模型,然后选取股权激励上市公司2009年的截面数据,运用SPSS统计软件,采用独立样本T检验以及配对样本T检验的方法,验证股权激励实施的整体效果,采用线性回归的方法,分别验证了股权激励比例与公司业绩的关系、股权激励模式与公司业绩的关系,最后得到实证结果；五、研究结论及建议,对实证结果进行解释和分析,针对股权激励实施过程中存在的问题,提出几条可行性的建议。通过上述理论研究和实证研究,得出了以下结论：(1)股权激励的实施虽然在一定程度上促进了上市公司业绩的提升,但是业绩提升的幅度较小,提升效果并不显著。这主要是由于我国资本市场有效性不足,上市公司内部人控制的情况比较严重,股权激励的考核指标不够科学,竞争性的职业经理人市场尚未建立起来,现行法律法规比较滞后等原因造成的。(2)股权激励比例与公司业绩呈正相关关系,股权激励比例越大,公司业绩表现越好；(3)采用限制性股票激励的公司其业绩好于采用股票期权的公司,限制性股票的激励效果略好于股票期权。本文的主要创新点在于实证部分。以往关于股权激励的实证论文大多选取高管层持股的上市公司作为样本,但本文认为,由于中国的特殊国情,实行股权激励的公司不能用高管层持股的公司来替代。因为高管层持有本公司股票的来源非常广泛,并不一定是实施股权激励的结果。因此,利用高管层持股的公司来分析股权激励的实施效果,得到的结论可能有失偏颇。本文选取了推出股权激励计划的上市公司为研究样本,利用股权激励方案中高管激励股权的比例作为自变量进行实证分析,使实证结果更加准确,更具有说服力。作者希望本文的分析及建议能够有助于推进我们对股权激励的全面认识,有助于完善上市公司的股权激励方案,有助于提高公司的经营效率,推动企业的持续、健康、稳定发展。
[Abstract]:As an important means to solve the entrustment _ agency problem of enterprises, the incentive of equity grants the business operators to hold the shares of the company, bundle the personal interests of the operators with the interests of the owners of the enterprises, and impel the operators to make every effort to maximize the interests of the enterprises. Equity incentives were born in the 1950s in the United States, followed by the widespread implementation of Western capital markets in relatively mature countries, and great success has been achieved. Western practice shows that equity incentives can indeed drive companies to value creation and promote performance growth. However, compared with the development of foreign countries, equity incentives really start to be implemented in our country not long. China's listed companies have experienced a period of groping period since the first attempt was made in 1993 to promote the promulgation of the Stock Option Incentive Management Method (Trial)> of the Listed Company in 2005. Up to 2005, China's securities market implemented an important stock-equity reform and promoted the structural transformation of the stock market. In the same year, the CSRC promulgated the Measures for the Management of Stock Right of Listed Companies (Trial)>, the New Revision of the Securities Law and the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China. and so on. Under the promotion of a series of policies and regulations, the obstacles to the implementation of the equity incentive of listed companies in China are cleared one by one, and the enthusiasm of the listed companies to implement the equity incentive is high, and China's equity incentive has ushered in a vigorous development "Spring". After that, theoretical and practical circles have also carried out an in-depth study on the related issues of equity incentive. However, so far, it has not reached a conclusion about the specific effect of equity incentive in China's market environment, whether there is related relationship between equity incentive and equity. Therefore, in order to promote our comprehensive understanding of equity incentive and perfect the equity incentive scheme of listed companies, this paper holds that it is necessary to systematically and deeply study the effect of equity incentive in our country. Based on the above objective, this paper absorbs the previous research results, adopts the method of empirical research, takes 62 companies in domestic implementation of equity incentive plan as the research object, and carries out the real research on the relationship between the equity incentive and the stock market. The thesis is divided into five parts: one, introduction, brief introduction to the theoretical background, research purpose and research significance of the subject, and summarize, summarize and comment on the literature of the domestic and foreign equity incentive, and summarize the research direction and research focus of this paper. In this paper, the concept, significance, basic model of equity incentive and the basic general situation of equity incentive in our country are mainly discussed, and the theoretical analysis of the post-text is laid down. The theoretical analysis of the relationship between equity and incentive is first introduced into the theory of delegation _ agent and human resources. In this paper, the operating mechanism of the equity incentive system is analyzed in depth, then the function analysis is carried out on the benefit convergence hypothesis and the trench self-defense hypothesis, and the correlation between the equity incentive ratio and the stock price is analyzed, and finally the stock option and the restricted stock are all aspects. On the basis of theoretical analysis, three specific assumptions are put forward and the regression model is set up, then the cross-section data of the listed company in 2009 is selected, and the SPSS system is used to analyze the cross-section data of the listed company in 2009. By using the method of independent sample T-test and paired sample T-test, the whole effect of equity incentive implementation is verified, and the relationship between equity incentive ratio and stock price is verified by means of linear regression, and the relationship between equity incentive model and equity is finally obtained. The paper explains and analyzes the empirical results, and puts forward several feasibility in view of the problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive. Through the above theoretical research and empirical research, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Although the implementation of the equity incentive has promoted the promotion of the listed stock market to a certain extent, the amplitude of the performance promotion is small, The promotion effect is not significant. This is mainly due to the shortage of the capital market of our country, the situation of the internal control of the listed company is serious, the appraisal index of the equity incentive is not scientific, the competitive professional manager market has not been established, the current laws and regulations are relatively stagnant (2) The proportion of equity incentive is positively related to the stock price, the larger the proportion of equity incentive is, the better the performance is, and (3) the company with restricted stock incentive is better than the company with stock option and the incentive effect of restricted stock. slightly better than stock options. The main innovation point lies in the empirical part. In the past, most of the empirical papers on equity incentive choose the listed companies with high-level holdings as samples, but this paper thinks that because of the special conditions of China, companies that carry out the equity incentive are not able to use them A company with a high-level stake is replaced. Because the high-pipe layer holds a very broad source of shares in the company's shares, it does not It is the result of carrying out the equity incentive. Therefore, using the company holding the high-pipe layer to analyze the effect of equity incentive, The conclusion may be biased. This paper has chosen the listed company which launched the equity incentive plan as the research sample, using the proportion of the high-level incentive equity in the equity incentive scheme as the independent variable, so as to make the empirical results. It is more accurate and convincing. The author hopes that the analysis and suggestion of this paper can help to promote the comprehensive understanding of the equity incentive, help perfect the equity incentive scheme of the listed company, help to improve the company's operating efficiency and promote the enterprise.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F272;F832.51;F224

【引证文献】