论国有独资公司监事会对董事的审计监督
发布时间：2018-10-26 10:02
【摘要】：国有独资公司在我国经济生活中扮演着非常重要的角色,但同时也因为其特殊的股权结构,通常被认为公司治理机制失效而备受质疑。对国有独资公司而言,无论从法律规定还是实际情况看,其董事会的权力都大于一般公司的董事会。在“强董事会”的公司内部权力配置模式下,国有独资公司董事会所享有的公司经营管理决策权大于一般公司,加强对董事会监督成为国有独资公司的重大课题。审计以其独立性和权威性,成为一种重要的经济监督方式,在公司内部监督中具有重要地位。国有独资公司的股权结构和股东特殊性,决定了在股东对董事的监督过程中,审计监督毫无疑问具有非常重要的地位。但实践中,国家审计、社会审计和公司内部审计等都对董事约束不足。鉴于国有独资公司内部监督非比寻常的重要性、以及中国公司机构的特性,从公司机构之间权力制衡角度考虑,按照公司法原理,这个任务当然应当由国有独资公司监事会来承担,但同时应当加强监事会的各项权力。 本文分为引言、正文和结论三部分。 引言部分主要阐述了文献综述、选题意义、文章主要观点、研究方法和创新之处。文献综述表明现有研究对“对董事审计监督机制”的研究缺失,而本文意在阐述国有独资公司特殊治理结构和现有监督力量不足的基础上,论证国有独资公司中应当由监事会承担对董事的审计监督任务,具有理论和现实意义。 正文部分分为六部分进行论述。 第一部分主要论证内部审计监督在国有独资公司董事监督中的重要地位。一方面从公司法理论分析国有独资公司治理结构的缺陷,说明内部监督在国有独资公司中的重要性;另一方面国家审计、出资人审计、社会审计都缺乏对董事审计约束,而内部审计由于具有信息优势、机构优势以及较高的独立性和权威性,在董事审计监督中具有重要地位。 第二部分论述了国有独资公司现行内部审计制度存在的问题。在现行审计制度中,单一的审计机构不能适应国有独资公司多层次代理关系的监督需求,出资人与董事之间的代理关系没有受到审计约束。相关的法律法规在董事约束方面则存在空白,未能有效弥补现行审计制度的缺陷。而实践中虽然在董事会试点企业中,内部审计职权实际上已经开始在现行内部审计机构、监事会、董事会审计委员会之间进行划分,但仍未明确监事会是否有权对董事进行审计监督。 第三部分探析了国有独资公司监事会对董事审计监督的合理性:由公司内部专门履行监督职责的监事会代为履行对董事的审计监督职责符合公司法理;同时,立法例和司法实践也表明监事会享有审计职权是监事会制度的发展趋势;并且监事会可以实现独立董事对董事进行监督的功能;此外,建议制度和报告制度等也成为监事会行使审计监督职能的有利条件。 第四部分具体阐述国有独资公司监事会对董事审计监督的制度设计,具体包括审计主体、审计对象、审计职责、审计内容、实施审计的时间、审计结果的应用、审计责任等内容。 第五部分阐述了监事会有效行使审计监督权的配套措施。首先,由于审计职权一旦怠于行使或者滥用,都会给公司造成损失,所以应当予以适当监督和限制,主要监督主体为出资人和被审计人。其次,监事会审计监督功能的有效发挥有赖于监事会其他制度的加强和改进,主要包括对监事的激励与约束机制、完善监事会会议制度、完善监事任职制度、完善监事会的监督手段等。 结论部分重申本文的基本论证思路和观点。
[Abstract]:The state-owned company plays a very important role in our country's economic life, but also because of its special equity structure, it is often regarded as the failure of corporate governance mechanism. For wholly state-owned companies, the powers of the board of directors are more than the board of directors of the general company, whether from the legal provisions or in the practical situation. At "Strong Board of Directors" Under the internal power configuration mode of the company, the decision-making power of the company's management and management enjoyed by the board of directors of the wholly state-owned company is larger than that of the general company, and the supervision of the board of directors becomes a major task of the wholly state-owned company. Audit, in its independence and authority, becomes an important way of economic supervision and plays an important role in internal oversight of the company. The ownership structure and shareholder particularity of the wholly state-owned company determines that the audit supervision has a very important position in the supervision of the directors. But in practice, the state audit, social auditing and internal audit of the company are insufficient for directors. Given the importance of internal oversight of wholly state-owned companies and the characteristics of China's corporate institutions, this task should, of course, be borne by the board of supervisors of wholly state-owned companies in accordance with the principles of the Company Law, in accordance with the principles of the Company Law. At the same time, the powers of the board of supervisors should be strengthened. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction part mainly expounds the literature review, the significance of the topic selection, the main point of the article, and the research method. Office of Innovation. Literature Review Form A Review of the Existing Study on the Audit of Directors On the basis of analyzing the special governance structure of the wholly state-owned company and the deficiency of the existing supervision power, the author proves that the state-owned wholly-owned company should bear the audit supervision task of the director by the board of supervisors, and it has the theory. and practical significance. The body part is divided into two parts: The first part mainly proves that the internal audit supervision is in the state-owned enterprise. On the one hand, it analyzes the defect of state-owned company's governance structure from the theory of corporation law, illustrates the importance of internal oversight in wholly state-owned company, and on the other hand, the state audit, investor audit and social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director, and the internal audit, the investor's audit and the social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director. The Department of Audit has the advantages of information, institutional advantages and higher independence and authority. The second part discusses the state-owned enterprise. In the current audit system, a single audit institution can not adapt to the supervision requirement, investor and director of the multi-level agency relationship of the state-owned company. The inter-agency relationship is not subject to audit constraints. The relevant laws and regulations are blank in terms of directors' constraints, not In practice, the internal audit authority has actually started to be divided among the current internal audit institutions, the board of supervisors and the board of directors' audit committees. The third part discusses the rationality of the board of supervisors of the state-owned wholly state-owned company to supervise the audit supervision of the directors: the board of supervisors who is dedicated to the supervision and duties within the company performs the audit supervision on behalf of the board of supervisors. In the meantime, the legislative example and the judicial practice also show that the board of supervisors has the audit function as the development trend of the board of supervisors; and the board of supervisors can realize the functions of independent directors to supervise the directors; besides, the proposed system and reporting system are also The fourth part describes the system design of the board of supervisors of the wholly state-owned company on the audit supervision of the directors, including the audit main body, the audit object, the audit responsibility, the audit content and the implementation audit. The time of the count, the application of the audit results, the audit responsibility, etc. The fifth part expounds the supporting measures of the board of supervisors to exercise the right to supervise the audit effectively. First, as the audit authority is idle in the exercise or abuse, it will cause loss to the company, so it should be given. Secondly, the effective exertion of the audit supervision function of the board of supervisors depends on the strengthening and improvement of the other system of the board of supervisors, mainly including the incentive and restraint mechanism of supervisors, and perfecting the meeting of the board of supervisors. System, Perfect Supervisor's Appointment System, Perfect Supervision of Board of Supervisors
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91
[Abstract]:The state-owned company plays a very important role in our country's economic life, but also because of its special equity structure, it is often regarded as the failure of corporate governance mechanism. For wholly state-owned companies, the powers of the board of directors are more than the board of directors of the general company, whether from the legal provisions or in the practical situation. At "Strong Board of Directors" Under the internal power configuration mode of the company, the decision-making power of the company's management and management enjoyed by the board of directors of the wholly state-owned company is larger than that of the general company, and the supervision of the board of directors becomes a major task of the wholly state-owned company. Audit, in its independence and authority, becomes an important way of economic supervision and plays an important role in internal oversight of the company. The ownership structure and shareholder particularity of the wholly state-owned company determines that the audit supervision has a very important position in the supervision of the directors. But in practice, the state audit, social auditing and internal audit of the company are insufficient for directors. Given the importance of internal oversight of wholly state-owned companies and the characteristics of China's corporate institutions, this task should, of course, be borne by the board of supervisors of wholly state-owned companies in accordance with the principles of the Company Law, in accordance with the principles of the Company Law. At the same time, the powers of the board of supervisors should be strengthened. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction part mainly expounds the literature review, the significance of the topic selection, the main point of the article, and the research method. Office of Innovation. Literature Review Form A Review of the Existing Study on the Audit of Directors On the basis of analyzing the special governance structure of the wholly state-owned company and the deficiency of the existing supervision power, the author proves that the state-owned wholly-owned company should bear the audit supervision task of the director by the board of supervisors, and it has the theory. and practical significance. The body part is divided into two parts: The first part mainly proves that the internal audit supervision is in the state-owned enterprise. On the one hand, it analyzes the defect of state-owned company's governance structure from the theory of corporation law, illustrates the importance of internal oversight in wholly state-owned company, and on the other hand, the state audit, investor audit and social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director, and the internal audit, the investor's audit and the social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director. The Department of Audit has the advantages of information, institutional advantages and higher independence and authority. The second part discusses the state-owned enterprise. In the current audit system, a single audit institution can not adapt to the supervision requirement, investor and director of the multi-level agency relationship of the state-owned company. The inter-agency relationship is not subject to audit constraints. The relevant laws and regulations are blank in terms of directors' constraints, not In practice, the internal audit authority has actually started to be divided among the current internal audit institutions, the board of supervisors and the board of directors' audit committees. The third part discusses the rationality of the board of supervisors of the state-owned wholly state-owned company to supervise the audit supervision of the directors: the board of supervisors who is dedicated to the supervision and duties within the company performs the audit supervision on behalf of the board of supervisors. In the meantime, the legislative example and the judicial practice also show that the board of supervisors has the audit function as the development trend of the board of supervisors; and the board of supervisors can realize the functions of independent directors to supervise the directors; besides, the proposed system and reporting system are also The fourth part describes the system design of the board of supervisors of the wholly state-owned company on the audit supervision of the directors, including the audit main body, the audit object, the audit responsibility, the audit content and the implementation audit. The time of the count, the application of the audit results, the audit responsibility, etc. The fifth part expounds the supporting measures of the board of supervisors to exercise the right to supervise the audit effectively. First, as the audit authority is idle in the exercise or abuse, it will cause loss to the company, so it should be given. Secondly, the effective exertion of the audit supervision function of the board of supervisors depends on the strengthening and improvement of the other system of the board of supervisors, mainly including the incentive and restraint mechanism of supervisors, and perfecting the meeting of the board of supervisors. System, Perfect Supervisor's Appointment System, Perfect Supervision of Board of Supervisors
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91
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