论投资者—国家间争端解决机制在实践中产生的主要问题及完善建议

发布时间：2018-03-21 12:12

本文选题：投资者-国家间争端解决机制　切入点：国际投资争端解决中心　出处：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：国际上已经缔结的多边或双边投资协定以及自贸协定的投资章节中大多数均规定,投资者与东道国之间的争端应提交仲裁解决。但是,由于投资仲裁存在着仲裁裁决不一致、缺乏透明度和当事方利益失衡等缺陷,使其裁决无法实现实体性公正,导致投资者-国家间争端解决机制(Investor-State Dispute Settlement,简称ISDS机制)在实践中产生了很多问题。目前国际上出现的对ISDS机制进行改革甚至废除这一机制的声音也可以从侧面印证这一点。目前,中国在对外签订投资协定时,在争端解决方面基本上全盘纳入了国际投资争端解决国际中心“国际投资争端解决国际中心”(the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes,以下简称ICSID)的所有条款。但是,在这些双边投资协定中,有许多因经验不足以及其他客观原因所导致的条文内容的缺陷,不利于我国利益的维护。本文以ICSID仲裁机制为例,分四章对目前ISDS机制在实践中产生的主要问题及问题产生的原因、完善ISDS机制的措施和中国缔结投资条约时的相关考量等方面进行深入分析。第一章是阐述ISDS机制的基本概念,与传统的国际商事仲裁的异同点进行比较。并在对《北美自由贸易协定》投资章节等国际上具有代表性的投资协定的文本进行分析的基础上,阐明典型国际投资协议中确立的ISDS机制。第二章是以ICSID为例,通过对有关案例的探析,指出目前ISDS机制在实践中产生的主要问题,仲裁裁决不一致、仲裁程序透明度的缺乏及投资者与东道国之间的权益失衡。第三章包括两部分,一是通过分析构建投资仲裁上诉机制的必要性和可行性,就上诉机制构建的具体内容提出合理化建议;二是通过分析提高投资仲裁的透明度的必要性,结合国际社会的实践就提高透明度提出具体建议。第四章是中国缔结投资条约的相关考量,包括中国对ICSID管辖权的态度演变、投资者-国家间争端解决机制的现状的分析、中国参与投资者-国家间争端解决机制的实践以及中国在以后缔结投资条约时的相关考量。
[Abstract]:Most of the investment chapters of multilateral or bilateral investment agreements and free trade agreements that have been concluded provide that disputes between investors and host countries should be submitted to arbitration... however, because of the inconsistency of arbitral awards in investment arbitration, Deficiencies such as lack of transparency and imbalance in the interests of the parties make it impossible for their decisions to achieve substantive justice, The investor-state Dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS mechanism for short) has caused many problems in practice. At present, the voice of ISDS mechanism reform and even abolition can be printed from the side. Prove this. At present, In signing investment agreements with foreign countries, China has basically incorporated all the provisions of the International Centre for the settlement of International Investment disputes (ICSID) of the International Centre for the settlement of International Investment disputes (ICSID), the International Centre for the settlement of International Investment disputes (ICSID). In these bits, there are many defects in the content of the articles caused by inexperience and other objective reasons, which are not conducive to the protection of China's interests. This paper takes the ICSID arbitration mechanism as an example. This paper is divided into four chapters to analyze the main problems and the causes of the current ISDS mechanism in practice, the measures to perfect the ISDS mechanism and the relevant considerations when China concludes the investment treaty. The first chapter is to elaborate the basic concepts of the ISDS mechanism. On the basis of an analysis of the texts of internationally representative investment agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chapter two, taking ICSID as an example, points out the main problems in the practice of ISDS mechanism and the inconsistency of arbitration awards, through the analysis of relevant cases. The third chapter consists of two parts, one is the necessity and feasibility of constructing the appeal mechanism of investment arbitration, the other is the lack of transparency of arbitration procedure and the imbalance of interests between investors and host countries. The second is the necessity of improving the transparency of investment arbitration by analyzing the specific content of the appeal mechanism. Based on the practice of the international community, this paper puts forward specific suggestions for enhancing transparency. Chapter 4th deals with the relevant considerations of China's conclusion of investment treaties, including the evolution of China's attitude towards ICSID jurisdiction, and an analysis of the current situation of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. China's participation in investor-state dispute settlement mechanism and its consideration in future investment treaties.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D996.4

【相似文献】