试论SCM协定下事实上的出口补贴——以美国诉欧盟及其成员国影响民用大型飞机贸易措施案为例
发布时间:2018-04-18 17:57
本文选题:补贴与反补贴措施协定 + 出口补贴 ; 参考:《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2010年06期
【摘要】:WTO《补贴与反补贴措施协定》第3.1(a)条规定,"事实上以预期的出口实绩为条件"的出口补贴被列为禁止性补贴。它应满足两个要件,即政府补贴的授予"预期"了出口实绩并且与出口实绩"相挂钩"。"预期"意味着将来可能有出口实绩,但并不一定会发生。"相挂钩"意味着如果没有出口实绩,政府就不授予补贴。美国诉欧盟及其成员国影响民用大型飞机贸易措施案中,专家组对此规则进行了非常宽泛的解释。此解释显然不利于后起的WTO成员方促进民用飞机产业的发展。为此,中国应谨慎实施事实上刺激和鼓励民用飞机的出口补贴,积极推动与完善民用飞机产业补贴的国际和国内立法。
[Abstract]:Under Article 3.1 ( a ) of the WTO Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures , " in fact , export subsidies that are conditional on the expected export performance " are classified as prohibitive subsidies . It should satisfy the two elements that the grant of government subsidies is " expected " and is linked to the performance of exports . " This means that if there is no export performance , the Group does not grant subsidies . " This interpretation is clearly not conducive to the development of civil aircraft industry by the following WTO Members . In this regard , China should carefully implement international and domestic legislation in effect to stimulate and encourage the export subsidies of civil aircraft , actively promote and improve industrial subsidies for civil aircraft .
【作者单位】: 北京理工大学法学院;
【分类号】:D996.1;D971.2
【共引文献】
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