商事仲裁程序问题的经济分析
发布时间：2018-08-16 16:18
【摘要】：商事仲裁是国际通行的一种争议解决方式。随着经济的快速发展和争议当事人权利意识的不断增强,现有的商事仲裁机制在多个方面已经无法满足争议当事人的需求。争议当事人在追求己方利益最大化的驱动下,通过各种方式寻求对商事仲裁的改变。目前,国内仲裁机构还未对仲裁实践中的问题给予足够重视,还未对争议当事人与仲裁庭的实际需求做出回应。本文结合仲裁实践中已经出现的各种问题,运用经济分析的方法分析这些问题出现的成因以及发展情况,并对现有仲裁机制的调整及应对提出了意见和建议。本文除了导论和结语之外,正文分为六章,主要内容如下：第一章,仲裁协议的经济分析。本章回避了传统研究内容,首先运用博弈论的方法分析了实践中出现的仲裁地之争的问题,然后根据当事人的实际需求,分析了选择性仲裁协议以及概括性仲裁协议的效力。第二章,仲裁规则的经济分析。本章以实践中出现的规则完整化倾向为研究对象,通过实证分析和制度分析方法分析了这种倾向的成因。然后通过成本收益理论分别从静态和动态两方面对完整化倾向进行分析,最后通过对比分析国内与国外仲裁发展的不同道路,说明国内仲裁不具备国外仲裁自我调整的可能,国内仲裁机构要避免出现规则过度完整所引起的制度性阻碍。第三章,仲裁请求提出的经济分析。本章首先分析仲裁请求提起程序中的“权利不均衡状态”,以仲裁机构受理申请人仲裁请求为分界点,在前一阶段,申请人权利的行使明显受到限制,仲裁请求“明确而唯一”的要求、“一事不再理”规则的设置使申请人提起仲裁的行为难以自如实现。相反,在受理后的阶段,申请人权利得到扩充,仲裁请求的变更和撤回规则使申请人掌握着仲裁程序的主动。本章对申请人行使权利与当前的仲裁环境之间的关系进行分析,运用“蛛网模型”分析申请人变更或者撤回仲裁请求对仲裁环境的影响,说明仲裁机构应当适当限制当事人意思自治。然后对预备性仲裁请求、重复性仲裁请求进行研究,通过当事人双方收益对比说明预备性仲裁请求存在的意义,并运用成本收益分析方法说明仲裁中一事不再理规则的不适应性。第四章,仲裁庭组成程序的经济分析。本章分为两个部分,一是仲裁员的选定,二是仲裁庭的组成规则。首先分析当事人和仲裁员的实际需求,以促进两者之间的信息平衡,实现两者需求的有效衔接。然后分析现有仲裁规则下仲裁庭组成程序的“异化”趋势,运用博弈论的方法分析各类组庭方式和实际效果,并提出修正后的仲裁组庭规则。第五章,仲裁调解的经济分析。本章分析实践中存在的两种冲突：一种是仲裁庭与当事人之间的调解意愿冲突。另一种是当事人调解意愿与调解技巧之间的冲突。文章通过分析影响仲裁庭与当事人调解意愿的因素以及之间的关系,说明相互配合是解决第一种冲突的手段；通过尝试使用经济学中的双边垄断理论和博弈论的方法分析第二种冲突产生的原因,说明当事人自发调解并无深层次动力,只有通过外部引导的方式才能促进当事人积极调解。第六章,仲裁裁决的经济分析。本章首先分析仲裁裁决的可接受性问题,分析仲裁庭与争议当事人之间的信息不平衡引起的冲突,然后对仲裁庭分阶段披露裁决信息的可行性进行了论证。最后分析“一裁终局”规则的经济价值,提出一裁终局与裁决救济之间的冲突与协调。
[Abstract]:Commercial arbitration is an international popular way of dispute settlement. With the rapid economic development and the increasing awareness of the rights of the parties to the dispute, the existing commercial arbitration mechanism has been unable to meet the needs of the parties to the dispute in many ways. At present, the domestic arbitration institutions have not paid enough attention to the problems in the practice of arbitration and have not responded to the actual needs of the disputed parties and the arbitration tribunal. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into six chapters. The main contents are as follows: Chapter 1, Economic Analysis of Arbitration Agreement. This chapter avoids the traditional research content. Firstly, it uses game theory to analyze the disputes over the place of arbitration in practice. Then, according to the actual needs of the parties, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of selective arbitration agreements and general arbitration agreements. Chapter two is the economic analysis of arbitration rules. The theory analyzes the tendency of completeness from static and dynamic aspects respectively. Finally, by comparing and analyzing the different development paths of domestic and foreign arbitration, it shows that domestic arbitration does not have the possibility of self-adjustment of foreign arbitration, and domestic arbitration institutions should avoid the institutional obstacles caused by the excessive integrity of the rules. Chapter three, arbitration claims. This chapter first analyzes the "imbalance of rights" in the procedure of filing an arbitration claim. Taking the arbitration institution's acceptance of the applicant's arbitration claim as the demarcation point, in the previous stage, the exercise of the applicant's rights was obviously restricted, and the arbitration request was "clear and unique" and the "no longer reason for one thing" rule enabled the application. On the contrary, in the later stage of acceptance, the rights of the applicant are expanded, and the rules of alteration and withdrawal of the arbitration request enable the applicant to grasp the initiative of the arbitration procedure. The influence of the requestor's alteration or withdrawal of the arbitration request on the arbitration environment indicates that the arbitration institution should appropriately restrict the party's autonomy of will. Then it studies the preparatory arbitration request and the repetitive arbitration request, and explains the significance of the preparatory arbitration request by comparing the two parties'income, and uses the cost-benefit analysis method to explain the existence of the preparatory arbitration request. Chapter IV, Economic Analysis of the Procedure for the Formation of the Arbitration Tribunal. This chapter is divided into two parts: the selection of arbitrators and the rules for the formation of the arbitration tribunal. Then it analyzes the "alienation" trend of the composition procedure of arbitral tribunals under the existing arbitration rules, analyzes the various forms and actual effects of arbitral tribunal formation by means of game theory, and puts forward the revised rules of arbitral tribunal formation. The other is the conflict between the parties'willingness to mediate and the mediation skills. By analyzing the factors influencing the arbitral tribunal and the parties' willingness to mediate and the relationship between them, this paper shows that mutual cooperation is the means to solve the first conflict, and tries to use the bilateral monopoly theory and the game theory in economics. Chapter 6: Economic analysis of arbitral award. This chapter first analyzes the acceptability of arbitral award and the information inequality between arbitral tribunal and disputed parties. Finally, the economic value of the rule of "final adjudication" is analyzed, and the conflict and coordination between the final adjudication and the remedy of adjudication are proposed.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D997.4
，
本文编号：2186512
[Abstract]:Commercial arbitration is an international popular way of dispute settlement. With the rapid economic development and the increasing awareness of the rights of the parties to the dispute, the existing commercial arbitration mechanism has been unable to meet the needs of the parties to the dispute in many ways. At present, the domestic arbitration institutions have not paid enough attention to the problems in the practice of arbitration and have not responded to the actual needs of the disputed parties and the arbitration tribunal. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into six chapters. The main contents are as follows: Chapter 1, Economic Analysis of Arbitration Agreement. This chapter avoids the traditional research content. Firstly, it uses game theory to analyze the disputes over the place of arbitration in practice. Then, according to the actual needs of the parties, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of selective arbitration agreements and general arbitration agreements. Chapter two is the economic analysis of arbitration rules. The theory analyzes the tendency of completeness from static and dynamic aspects respectively. Finally, by comparing and analyzing the different development paths of domestic and foreign arbitration, it shows that domestic arbitration does not have the possibility of self-adjustment of foreign arbitration, and domestic arbitration institutions should avoid the institutional obstacles caused by the excessive integrity of the rules. Chapter three, arbitration claims. This chapter first analyzes the "imbalance of rights" in the procedure of filing an arbitration claim. Taking the arbitration institution's acceptance of the applicant's arbitration claim as the demarcation point, in the previous stage, the exercise of the applicant's rights was obviously restricted, and the arbitration request was "clear and unique" and the "no longer reason for one thing" rule enabled the application. On the contrary, in the later stage of acceptance, the rights of the applicant are expanded, and the rules of alteration and withdrawal of the arbitration request enable the applicant to grasp the initiative of the arbitration procedure. The influence of the requestor's alteration or withdrawal of the arbitration request on the arbitration environment indicates that the arbitration institution should appropriately restrict the party's autonomy of will. Then it studies the preparatory arbitration request and the repetitive arbitration request, and explains the significance of the preparatory arbitration request by comparing the two parties'income, and uses the cost-benefit analysis method to explain the existence of the preparatory arbitration request. Chapter IV, Economic Analysis of the Procedure for the Formation of the Arbitration Tribunal. This chapter is divided into two parts: the selection of arbitrators and the rules for the formation of the arbitration tribunal. Then it analyzes the "alienation" trend of the composition procedure of arbitral tribunals under the existing arbitration rules, analyzes the various forms and actual effects of arbitral tribunal formation by means of game theory, and puts forward the revised rules of arbitral tribunal formation. The other is the conflict between the parties'willingness to mediate and the mediation skills. By analyzing the factors influencing the arbitral tribunal and the parties' willingness to mediate and the relationship between them, this paper shows that mutual cooperation is the means to solve the first conflict, and tries to use the bilateral monopoly theory and the game theory in economics. Chapter 6: Economic analysis of arbitral award. This chapter first analyzes the acceptability of arbitral award and the information inequality between arbitral tribunal and disputed parties. Finally, the economic value of the rule of "final adjudication" is analyzed, and the conflict and coordination between the final adjudication and the remedy of adjudication are proposed.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D997.4
，
本文编号：2186512
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