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碳泄漏:发达国家与发展中国家的规则博弈与战略思考

发布时间:2019-02-13 12:58
【摘要】:《巴黎协定》既不能消除碳泄漏,也不能解决碳泄漏问题。发达国家与发展中国家在碳泄漏问题上的博弈将长期存在。博弈表现为双方观点的对立。发达国家博弈的目的是阳谋与阴谋并举,名利双收;发展中国家则是为了实现气候正义,维护自由贸易。发达国家博弈的基础相对雄厚,既有道德基础,也有理论支撑,还有实践保证。发展中国家博弈的基础相对薄弱,有法伦理学基础、国际法支持和理论支撑。共同责任将是解决碳泄漏作为环境问题的路径,威胁实施碳关税仍可能是解决碳泄漏作为国际政治和经济问题的路径。以中国为首的发展中国家应当采取措施积极应对碳泄漏问题。
[Abstract]:The Paris Agreement can neither eliminate carbon leaks nor solve carbon leaks. There will be a long-term game between developed and developing countries on carbon leakage. The game is expressed as the opposition between the two sides. The purpose of the game in the developed countries is to achieve both conspiracy and conspiracy, while the developing countries are to achieve climate justice and safeguard free trade. The foundation of game in developed countries is relatively strong, both moral basis, theoretical support, and practical guarantee. The foundation of developing country game is relatively weak, with legal ethics foundation, international law support and theoretical support. The common responsibility will be to solve the problem of carbon leakage as an environmental problem, and the threat to implement carbon tariff may still be the way to solve the problem of carbon leakage as an international political and economic problem. Developing countries, led by China, should take steps to deal with carbon spills.
【作者单位】: 广东财经大学法学院;
【基金】:教育部人文社科规划项目“碳泄漏问题及其法律规制研究”(13YJA820036)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】:D996.9


本文编号:2421568

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