论责任承担方式的效率——侵权损害赔偿责任与行政罚款的效率探讨

发布时间：2019-08-12 15:33

【摘要】：本文通过将科斯定理中权利有效率地移转有利于整个社会福利的增进这一理论应用于合同法、侵权法以及行政处罚法,以求从法律与经济学的角度分析,侵权责任与行政罚款在何种领域内运行更有效率。侵权责任以自由交易为前置途径,因此它赋予理性的施害人以选择权:首先寻求自由交易;交易成本很高而诉讼成本很低时就选择侵权行为实现权利有效率的再配置,同时承担损害成本。其中的效率问题集中体现于在互施成本的双方之间如何分配责任更有利于社会福利的增进。在论述行政罚款时,分析了两个问题:一是将行政罚款与侵权损害赔偿进行比较,得出行政罚款应该针对施害人与受害人绝无可能(是指效率上的不可能)自愿达成合意转移权利的情况;二是政府在选择以造成的损害(或可能造成的损害)为确定罚款数额的标准,还是以预防损害的成本为标准时,似乎前者更有效率。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the theory of efficient transfer of rights in Coase Theorem is applied to contract law, tort law and administrative punishment law, in order to analyze the fields in which tort liability and administrative fine operate more efficiently from the point of view of law and economics. Tort liability takes free transaction as the leading way, so it gives rational perpetrators the right to choose: first of all, seek free transaction; when the transaction cost is very high and the litigation cost is very low, it chooses tort to realize the efficient redistribution of rights, and bears the cost of damage at the same time. The efficiency problem is mainly reflected in how to distribute responsibility between the two sides of mutual cost is more conducive to the improvement of social welfare. When discussing the administrative fine, this paper analyzes two problems: first, it compares the administrative fine with the compensation for tort damage, and concludes that the administrative fine should be aimed at the situation that it is impossible for the perpetrator and the victim (that is, the impossibility of efficiency) to voluntarily reach the desired transfer of rights; Second, when the government chooses the damage caused (or the damage that may be caused) as the criterion for determining the amount of the fine, or the cost of preventing the damage, the former seems to be more efficient.
【作者单位】：山西省高级人民法院;
【分类号】：D913

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