基于博弈论视角下的企业违法排放行为研究

发布时间：2018-03-07 14:52

本文选题：博弈论　切入点：违法排放　出处：《理论月刊》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：企业在生产经营活动中产生的废弃物是造成我国环境污染的重要因素之一,企业违法排放行为更是加剧了环境的恶化。政府作为社会公众利益的代表,其工作目标之一就是保护环境,维护公众利益。针对政府和企业在环境保护中追求目标不一致,导致二者所采取的不同行为方式的问题,本文从博弈论角度出发,构造企业和政府的博弈模型,通过对博弈双方的行为分析,指出监管的成本、政府的声誉、罚款金额和企业违法排放时被发现的概率是影响企业违法排放行为的主要因素,并提出了短期通过行政方法,即完善第三方监督机制,合理设置罚款额度等措施,长期通过市场方法,即通过推动环保科技的发展与应用,提升监管的效率,以防止企业违法排放的行为发生。
[Abstract]:The waste produced by enterprises in production and management activities is one of the important factors causing environmental pollution in China, and the illegal discharge behavior of enterprises exacerbates the deterioration of the environment. One of its working objectives is to protect the environment and protect the public interests. In view of the problem that the government and the enterprise pursue different objectives in environmental protection, which leads to the different behavior patterns adopted by the two, this paper sets out from the angle of game theory. By analyzing the behavior of both sides of the game, the paper points out that the cost of supervision, the reputation of the government, the amount of fines and the probability of being found when the enterprise discharges illegally are the main factors that affect the illegal emission behavior of the enterprise. It also puts forward short-term administrative measures, that is, perfecting the third party supervision mechanism, setting up the fine quota reasonably, and promoting the efficiency of supervision by promoting the development and application of environmental protection science and technology in the long run through the market method. In order to prevent illegal emissions of enterprises to occur.
【作者单位】：辽宁大学人口研究所;沈阳城市建设学院;辽宁大学环境学院;中国科学院沈阳生态研究所;
【基金】：国家水体污染控制与治理科技重大专项(2015ZX0702-012)
【分类号】：D922.68

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