论我国地方政府履行环保职能的激励机制

发布时间：2018-07-10 13:38

本文选题：地方政府 + 环保职能　；参考：《上海交通大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：“经济人”假设是近代西方经济学研究中常用的一块重要理论基石。二十世纪五、六十年代，美国经济学家詹姆斯.M.布坎南等人将“经济人”假设引入到政治领域，来分析政治活动中人的行为选择，提出了政治的经济理论，即公共选择理论。该理论认为政治活动中的参与人，即政治家、政府官员和选民类似于市场中参与主体，都有着“经济人”的行为动机。从“经济人”的视觉考察地方政府，地方政府是这样一类组织，即由一类理性自利的、把经济利益放在首位、追求自身利益最大化、具有机会主义倾向的个人组成的集合。地方政府是环保法律关系中的一个重要主体，地方政府环保履职的好坏直接关系着国家环保法律、政策目的的实现情况。然而，在我国实践中，一些地方政府为了地方利益和官员个人利益，长期只顾“政绩工程”、追求地方经济粗放式增长，而环保执法不到位、监管不得力的现象比较普遍。近年来我国发生的多起重大环境污染案件都与地方政府在履行环保职责方面的失职直接相关，这种做法已经成为影响国家环保法律、政策目标实现的最大困境。制度经济学的理论告诉我们，制度作为规范人们行为动机的社会规范框架，对人们的行为直接起着激励导向作用。仔细分析地方政府行为背后的原因，会发现这与我国现行法律框架下，地方政府面临的激励机机制有关。首先，从正激励机制上来说，针对多任务目标的地方政府，财政分权、行政分权、以GDP为核心的干部晋升考核制度起到的是激励地方政府追求经济利益最大化的导向作用。行政分权、财政分权创造出了这样一个激励格局：辖区经济越发展，财政收入越高，地方政府所能分享的财力就越多。同时，财政分权和行政分权，赋予了地方政府很大的经济管理权。地方政府在发展本地经济过程中，有相当大的决策自由裁量权。这些权力与GDP政绩考核制度结合，使地方政府对于发展地方经济、做大GDP有着强烈的冲动。也正是这种制度安排促进了我国经济的快速发展。然而，这三方面的制度都存在着不利于地方政府履行环保职能的因素：财权、事权不对等的矛盾给地方政府履职造成相当大的财政压力。在多种任务的委托下，地方政府作为理性经济人，往往会把精力放到那些容易被上级观察到的任务上，从而减少或完全放弃在其他任务上的努力。而长期以来，在地方政府政绩考核中，环保指标是软指标，这就造成地方政府不重视环保职能。同时，在地方政府的税源结构、转移支付制度、土地财政等方面的法律制度缺陷使地方政府可以根据自己的利益偏好不重视环保职能。在负激励机制上，监督问责立法滞后；现行法律缺乏对地方政府的环保责任、问责标准、问责程序等内容的明确规定；内部监督软约束；人大、公众、司法等外部监督乏力；缺乏事前监督机制。这为一些地方政府只顾“政绩工程”、滥用自由裁量权追求自身利益最大化而环保履职不力提供了空间。针对这种情形，我们需要完善法律政策、加强地方政府环保履职的正负激励。首先，在行政分权上，从行政性分权走向法治分权、让地方政府对自己的权益有稳定的预期。合理界定政府的权力边界，进一步完善环保管理体制，提升环保部门在地方政府中的地位、加强县、乡（镇）级地方环保部门的履职能力。其次，在财政分权上，通过合理划分各级政府间的事权与财权，减轻地方政府的负担；完善环境保护转移支付制度、加大对地方政府环保履职的财政支持；完善资源税制、环境税制，发挥其经济调节和增加收入功能；规范土地财政，建立合理的土地收入制度，约束地方政府滥用土地管理权力破坏环境的行为。再次，要在干部晋升考核制度中增加环保指标权重，让地方官员通过积极保护环境来获得自己的收益。最后，完善监督问责制度来约束地方政府的“经济人”动机，，促使其积极履行环保职责。通过环保立法明确、细化地方政府的环保责任。加强事前监督、外部监督、对抽象行政行为的监督。立法建立如重大决策失误的问责制度、地方政府环保工作人大监督制度、对地方政府行为的环境影响评价制度、环境公民诉讼制度等一批具体制度，来约束地方政府不顾环境公共利益、而只顾追求经济利益最大化的行为动机。地方政府环保履职的动力来源于有效的激励机制，这种激励机制一方面尊重地方政府的自利动机，尊重其自由选择的自由权利，同时，通过制度的激励约束功能的发挥，使地方政府的自主选择基础上的自主行动，能够在实现自我利益最大化的同时，实现环境公共利益的最大化，实现环境公共利益和私人利益的完美和谐。
[Abstract]:The hypothesis of "economic man" is an important theoretical cornerstone commonly used in modern western economics. In twentieth Century, five and 60s, American economist James.M. Buchanan introduced the hypothesis of "economic man" into the political field to analyze the choice of human behavior in political activities, and put forward the political economic theory, that is, public choice. The theory holds that the participants in the political activities, namely the politicians, the government officials and the voters, are similar to the participants in the market. They all have the behavior motivation of the "economic man". From the visual inspection of the "economic man", the local government is such a kind of organization, that is, a kind of rational self-interest, putting the economic interests in the first place, and pursuing the pursuit of the economic interests. Self interest maximization and opportunistic tendencies of individuals.
The local government is an important subject in the legal relationship of environmental protection. The quality of the local government's environmental protection is directly related to the national environmental protection law and the realization of the policy purpose. However, in the practice of China, some local governments, for the local interests and the personal interests of the officials, have long been looking at the "achievements project" for a long time to pursue the extensive increase of the local economy. In recent years, many major environmental pollution cases in China have been directly related to the failure of local governments to fulfill their duties in environmental protection. This practice has become the greatest predicament that affects the national environmental protection law and the policy objectives.
The theory of institutional economics tells us that as a social norm framework that regulates the behavior motivation of people, it plays an incentive and guiding role to people's behavior. The reasons behind the careful analysis of the behavior behind the local government will be related to the incentive mechanism facing the local government under the current legal framework of our country. On the basis of the system, the local government, fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and the GDP as the core of the cadre promotion and assessment system, is the guiding role of encouraging local governments to pursue the maximization of economic benefits. The more financial resources the government can share. At the same time, the financial decentralization and administrative decentralization give the local government a great economic management power. The local government has a considerable discretion in decision-making in the process of developing the local economy. These powers are combined with the performance appraisal system of GDP to make the local government to develop the local economy and make a big GDP. It is a strong impulse. It is also the institutional arrangement that promotes the rapid development of our economy. However, the three aspects of the system are not conducive to the local government to perform environmental protection functions: financial power, the unequal conflict of power has caused considerable financial pressure to the local government to perform its duties. Under the Commission of a variety of tasks, the local government works For the rational economic people, they tend to put their efforts on tasks that are easily observed by their superiors, thereby reducing or completely abandoning their efforts on other tasks. For a long time, environmental indicators are soft indicators in the performance assessment of local governments, which causes local governments to ignore environmental protection functions. At the same time, the tax source structure of local governments, The legal system of transfer payment system, land finance and other aspects makes the local government not pay attention to the environmental protection function according to its own interest preference. In the negative incentive mechanism, the supervision of accountability legislation is lagging behind; the current law lacks the clear provisions on the environmental responsibility of the local government, the standards of accountability, the procedure of accountability and so on; the internal supervision is soft. The external supervision of the people's congresses, the public and the judiciary is weak and lack of the pre supervision mechanism. This provides some local governments with the "achievement project", and the abuse of discretion to pursue the maximization of its own interests and the inadequate environmental protection.
In this case, we need to improve the legal policy and strengthen the positive and negative incentives for the local government to perform their duties. First, in administrative decentralization, from administrative decentralization to the rule of law decentralization, the local government has a stable expectation of its own rights and interests. It defines the power boundary of the government reasonably, further perfected the environmental management system, and promoted the environmental protection department. In the local government, we should strengthen the ability of the local environmental protection departments of the county and township level. Secondly, on the fiscal decentralization, the burden of local governments can be reduced by reasonable division of the powers and financial rights between governments at all levels, the transfer payment system of environmental protection, the financial support for local government environmental protection and the improvement of the resource tax system are improved. Environmental tax system, play its economic adjustment and increase income function, standardize land finance, establish a reasonable land income system, restrain local government abuse of land management power to destroy the environment. Thirdly, we should increase the weight of environmental indicators in the cadre promotion assessment system, so that local officials can obtain their own environment through the active protection of the environment. In the end, the system of supervision and accountability should be perfected to restrict the motive of the local government's "economic man" and promote its environmental responsibility actively. Through the legislation of environmental protection, the environmental responsibility of local governments should be clarifies. The supervision of pre supervision, external supervision and the supervision of the abstract administrative act should be strengthened. The supervision system of the government's environmental protection working people's Congress, the environmental impact assessment system of local government behavior, the environmental citizen litigation system and so on, restrict the local government to ignore the environmental public interests, but only pursue the motive of maximizing the economic interests. The power of the local government's environmental protection comes from the effective incentive mechanism. On the one hand, the incentive mechanism respects the self-interest motive of the local government and respects the free right of the free choice. At the same time, through the exertion of the incentive and constraint function of the system, the autonomous action on the basis of the autonomous choice of the local government can maximize the public interest and realize the environmental public at the same time of realizing the maximization of the self interest. The perfect harmony between the interests and the private interests.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D625;D922.68

【引证文献】