制造商与零售商间的纵向约束效应研究及反垄断法适用分析

发布时间：2018-02-21 07:40

本文关键词： 零售商制造商纵向约束效应反垄断法适用　出处：《东北财经大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2007年8月30日,《中华人民共和国反垄断法》在第十届全国人大常委会第二十九次会议审议通过。2013年8月1日,上海市高级人民法院对中国首例纵向约束协议垄断民事诉讼案件——“锐邦诉强生案”作出终审判决：判定锐邦公司“违约不违法”、强生公司“违法不违约”。在此案判决之前,针对制造商和零售商之间契约安排的纵向垄断案件的调查及处罚已有先例,影响较为广泛、处罚力度较大的,莫过于2013年国家发改委价格监督检查与反垄断局对茅台、五粮液的纵向垄断行为所开出的巨额罚单,以及对五家进口奶粉厂商作出的纵向垄断协议处罚决定。本文的研究即是建立在上述现实背景下,不论是对“锐邦诉强生案”、“茅台五粮液案”、“进口奶粉案”的判决或处罚,还是2014年7月国家发改委对跨国汽车企业巨头的处罚,在本质上,核心问题都是对制造商与零售商之间纵向约束效应为“良性”还是“恶性”的评定。纵向约束是交易双方签订的长期的、具有约束力的且不同于单位价格固定等简单合同的合同条款。纵向约束往往以某种方式约束了交易的一方(上游制造商或下游零售商)。这种约束没有纵向一体化那么严格,因此,纵向约束的性质介于科层命令制度与市场交易制度二者之间,这种纵向约束可能是制造商主导,也有可能是零售商主导。无论是谁主导,我们希望研究清楚,这些对零售商或者制造商执行的判决和处罚决定在定性上和定量上是否合理的?如果是合理的,其背后所依据的经济学和法学原理又是什么? 为此,本文构建起理论研究、经验研究文献分析、政策和法律实务层面的研究体系：总结纵向约束经济理论的分析框架,分析制造商与零售商之间的纵向约束效应,根据经验研究文献的分析结果结合美国、欧盟及中国在反垄断法的变化、发展及实施过程,分析纵向反垄断法的适用性,为今后的纵向垄断案件执法提供借鉴。首先简要介绍了研究背景、研究意义、研究内容、研究方法与行文结构安排。在文献综述部分,本文根据相关文献整理出纵向约束的定义及主要类型,同时对制造商主导的纵向约束研究和以零售商为主导的纵向约束研究分别做了回顾,并归纳总结了相关文献的经验研究方法。其次在理论分析部分,系统性阐述了纵向约束的“动机——条件——效应”的经济分析框架,即在对纵向约束是否构成反垄断进行评定时,不仅分析协议当事人所处的市场结构,及各自在相关市场上的地位,而且还应当分析约束竞争的动机和效应。在这一部分,着重分析了构成市场结构的主要因素——市场势力对零售商和制造商之间约束效应的影响。接下来汇总了在不同行业及不同前提下,制造商主导的纵向约束对消费者福利、产品价格的影响,零售商主导的纵向约束对产品价格、投资和创新动力的影响。总结了美国、欧盟及中国在纵向反垄断法执法的变化发展历程,比较研究了各国反垄断法的适用性情况。最后归纳了全文结论,初步得出：在制造商主导层面,自发形成的纵向约束有利于消费者、生产者福利的提高,外部力量施加的纵向约束则很难提高社会福利；在零售商主导层面,纵向约束为消费者带来较高的福利和较低的产品价格,并促使制造商增加创新投入。在政策建议方面,对零售商主导的纵向约束行为,采用“合理推定”原则,应该给予较为为宽松的反垄断政策和法律环境；对制造商主导的纵向约束行为,采用“本身违法”和“合理推定”相结合的原则,实行较为严厉的反垄断政策。另外,在纵向反垄断法适用方面,需要明确其他几个纵向垄断协议类型,如纵向地域限制、独家交易等；并明确规定不予豁免的纵向垄断协议的类型。本文还提出了下一步研究的方向,即对纵向约束效应的评估应该细分至具体某个行业,尝试采用经验研究方法去加以分析,以期在实践上为反垄断执法机构和法院提供参考价值较大的借鉴。本文创新主要体现在以下几个方面：一是对理论分析框架的详细阐述,完整清晰地展现了纵向约束的“动机、条件、效应”三阶段分析框架,特别是在条件部分,创新性地将吴绪亮研究和张赞研究相结合,把买方卖方垄断势力和消费者群体纳入到纵向市场结构体系钟来,并对比分析了六种纵向市场结构的福利效应。二是不同于以往的文献只分析零售商主导或者制造商主导的纵向约束效应,本文既分析了零售商主导,又分析了制造商主导的纵向约束效应,期望能够在纵向约束研究范畴内提供一个尽可能完整的研究框架。三是采用了经验研究文献分析的方法,从定量分析的角度估计纵向约束的效应。并初步得出自发形成的纵向约束有利于消费者、生产者福利的提高,而外部力量施加的纵向约束则很难提高社会福利的结论。四是对纵向反垄断法适用对比分析,对比分析了美国、欧盟和中国针对纵向约束行为的反垄断执法的变化发展过程,并尝试找出这种变化发展趋势的依据。
[Abstract]:On August 30 , 2007 , the Anti - monopoly Law of the People ' s Republic of China was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 10th National People ' s Congress . On August 1 , 2013 , the Shanghai Higher People ' s Court made a final judgment on the first case of China ' s longitudinal restraint agreement monopoly civil litigation . The research of this paper is to establish in the above - mentioned realistic background , whether the judgment or punishment of " Sharp State against Johnson & Johnson " , " Mao tai Wuliangye " , " imported milk powder " , or the punishment of the National Development and Reform Commission of the National Development and Reform Commission of July 2014 in the transnational car enterprise giant , in essence , the core issue is the evaluation of the longitudinal restraint effect between the manufacturer and the retailer as " benign " or " malignant " . Longitudinal constraints are the terms of a long - term , binding , and non - fixed - contract terms of contract between the parties . Longitudinal constraints tend to constrain the party ( upstream manufacturer or downstream retailer ) of the transaction in some way . This constraint is not so strict in longitudinal integration , and therefore , the nature of the longitudinal constraint is between the department command system and the market trading system , and therefore , the nature of the longitudinal constraint is between the department command system and the market trading system . Whether or not it is dominant , we want to study whether the decisions and penalties imposed by the retailer or manufacturer are reasonable in nature and quantitative ? If so , what is the economics and jurisprudence behind it ? Therefore , this paper constructs a theoretical research , empirical research literature analysis , policy and legal practice level research system : summarizes the analytical framework of longitudinal restraint economic theory , analyzes the longitudinal restraint effect between the manufacturer and the retailer , and analyzes the applicability of the longitudinal anti - monopoly law in combination with the changes , development and implementation process of the United States , the European Union and China in the anti - monopoly law , and provides reference for the law enforcement of longitudinal monopoly cases . Firstly , the research background , research significance , research content , research methods and structure arrangement of the text are briefly introduced . In the literature review part , the definition and main types of longitudinal constraint are sorted out according to the relevant literatures , meanwhile , the longitudinal restraint research and the longitudinal restraint study dominated by the retailer are reviewed , and the empirical research methods of the relevant literatures are summarized . Secondly , in the theoretical analysis part , the economic analysis framework of the " motivation _ condition _ effect " of the longitudinal constraint is systematically expounded , that is , when the longitudinal constraint is evaluated , it not only analyzes the market structure of the agreement party , but also analyzes the motive and effect of the restriction competition . In this part , the influence of the market forces on the restraint effect between the retailer and the manufacturer is emphatically analyzed . The article summarizes the influence of longitudinal restraint on consumer welfare , product price and the influence of retailer - led longitudinal restraint on product price , investment and innovation power under different industries and different premise . The paper summarizes the development course of the law enforcement of the U.S . , EU and China in the longitudinal anti - monopoly law , and compares the applicability of the anti - monopoly law . Finally , the conclusion of the thesis is concluded . It is concluded that , at the manufacturer ' s dominant level , the longitudinal constraint of spontaneous formation is beneficial to consumers , and the longitudinal constraint imposed by external forces is very difficult to improve social welfare ; at the dominant level of retailers , longitudinal restraint brings higher welfare and lower product prices to consumers , and encourages manufacturers to increase innovation input . In the aspect of policy suggestion , we should give more relaxed anti - monopoly policy and legal environment to retailer - led longitudinal restraint behavior . In addition , in the application of longitudinal anti - monopoly law , it is necessary to clarify some other types of longitudinal monopoly agreement , such as longitudinal geographical limitation , exclusive transaction , etc . It also provides the direction of the next study , namely , it should be divided into specific industry , and the empirical research method is used to analyze it , so as to provide reference value for anti - monopoly law enforcement agencies and courts in practice . The innovation is mainly embodied in the following aspects : One is the detailed exposition of the theoretical analysis framework , which shows the three - stage analytical framework of the " motivation , condition and effect " of the longitudinal restraint , especially in the condition part , creatively combines Wu Xuliang ' s research with Zhang Zan ' s research , integrates the buyer ' s seller ' s monopoly power and consumer group into the vertical market structure system clock , and compares the welfare effect of six longitudinal market structures . Second , unlike previous literatures , only the retailer - dominated or manufacturer - led longitudinal restraint effect is analyzed . This paper analyzes the retailer ' s leading role and analyzes the manufacturer - led longitudinal restraint effect . It is expected that a complete research framework can be provided in the context of longitudinal constraint research . Third , the method of empirical research literature analysis is adopted to estimate the effect of longitudinal constraint from the perspective of quantitative analysis . It is concluded that the longitudinal constraint of spontaneous formation is beneficial to the improvement of consumer and producer ' s well - being , while the longitudinal constraint imposed by external force is difficult to improve the conclusion of social welfare . The fourth is to apply the comparative analysis to the longitudinal anti - monopoly law , and compare the development process of anti - monopoly law enforcement against longitudinal restraint in the United States , the European Union and China , and try to find out the basis for the development trend of this change .

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.294

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