终极控制股东，投资者法律保护与会计稳健性

发布时间：2018-02-25 03:22

本文关键词： 会计稳健性投资者法律保护终极控制股东两权分离度　出处：《西南交通大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：会计稳健性一直被认为是编制财务报表的重要特性之一(Sterling,1967),对公司治理和债务契约等方面的代理问题以及信息不对称问题都有一定的影响(Ball和Shivakumar,2005)。由于缺乏相对科学的计量模型和度量方法会计稳健性的研究要远远滞后于其出现时间,当代会计稳健性的研究真正丰富得益于Basu在1997年提出的计量模型,这一创举让有关的研究有了较为经典的参考模型。但从目前的研究来看学者们多是从直接所有权结构入手,实际上,许多股东往往选择更复杂的间接持股方式来控制公司,成为公司的终极控制股东(La Porta等,1999)。研究终极控制股东对会计稳健性的影响有利于揭示终极控制股东的掠夺行为和掩盖掠夺行为的信息操纵手段。目前,我国的法律制度还不够完善,对投资者的法律保护也还不够充分,以致许多本土的优秀企业选择在国外上市(如淘宝、京东等),造成大量的资本流出。我国立法虽然在股东权益保护方面一直努力地完善着,但始终存在着许多的不足之处,本文有关投资者法律保护的研究为我国法律制度的完善提供了良好的改革方向与政策建议,对未来资本市场的健康发展有一定的促进作用。本文比较分析了各种会计稳健性计量模型后,采用了Khan和Watts (2009)提出的C-score指标来作为代理变量。经过一定的剔除规则选取了2010～2013四年间1223家上市公司的平衡面板数据作为研究样本(共有观察值4892个),利用计量经济学的相关知识与软件进行了实证性的研究。最终得出研究结论：(1)终极控制股东为国有的公司的会计信息更为稳健；(2)会计稳健性随着现金流权的加大而增强；(3)会计稳健性随着两权分离度的加大而减弱；(4)会计稳健性随着投资者法律保护力度的加大而越弱；(5)投资者法律保护力度的加大能够有效地抑制终极控制股东的侵害意向降低其损害会计稳健性的可能；(6)证明了Khan和Watts (2009)提出的C-score指标在中国的适用性及其与Basu (1997)模型结论的一致性。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism has always been regarded as one of the important characteristics of preparing financial statements. Sterling has a certain influence on agency problems in corporate governance and debt contracts, as well as information asymmetry problems. Due to the lack of relative science, accounting conservatism has been regarded as one of the important characteristics of financial statements. The research on accounting conservatism of the measurement model and measurement method is lagging far behind the time of its appearance, The study of accounting conservatism in the contemporary era is really enriched by the metrological model put forward by Basu in 1997, which makes the relevant research have a more classical reference model. However, from the current research, most scholars begin with the structure of direct ownership. In fact, many shareholders tend to opt for more complex indirect shareholdings to control the company. To become the ultimate controlling shareholder of the company, La Porta et al. 1999.To study the influence of the ultimate controlling shareholder on accounting conservatism is helpful to reveal the plundering behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder and the information manipulation means to conceal the plundering behavior. Our country's legal system is not perfect, and the legal protection to investors is not enough, so many local excellent enterprises choose to list abroad (such as Taobao, JingDong and others have caused a large amount of capital outflow. Although China's legislation has been improving in terms of the protection of shareholders' rights and interests, there are still many deficiencies. The research on the legal protection of investors in this paper provides a good reform direction and policy advice for the perfection of our legal system. It will promote the healthy development of the future capital market. The C-score index proposed by Khan and Watts 2009 is used as proxy variable. The equilibrium panel data of 1223 listed companies during the four years from 2010 to 2013 are selected as the study sample (the total observed value is 4892), and the econometric analysis is used. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the accounting information of the company whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the state-owned company is more prudent. 2) the accounting conservatism increases with the increase of cash flow right. Accounting conservatism is weakened with the increase of the separation between the two rights. Accounting conservatism becomes weaker and weaker with the increase of investor legal protection. 5) the strengthening of investor legal protection can effectively restrain the infringement of ultimate controlling shareholders. This paper proves the applicability of the C-score index proposed by Khan and Watts 2009 in China and its consistency with the conclusion of Basu 1997).
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91;F275

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